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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 The aim of this dissertation is to assess the usefulness of using non-financial 
performance measures in the performance measurement and evaluation system of 
middle managers. It reports two empirical studies in a large Dutch logistics 
organization that had a substantial change in its performance measurement system 
(PMS). More specific, a change in the PMS took place, where before the change 
managers were evaluated mainly on financial measures, whereas after the change 
additional non-financial measures were included in the performance evaluation 
system. In the first study, non-financial and financial performance measures are 
compared to assess their ability to predict future financial performance. The second 
study assesses the impact of the change in the PMS on managerial performance 
through a quasi-experiment.  
 Since the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard concept (Kaplan and Norton, 
1992), the subject of non-financial performance measurement has received a lot of 
attention from both practitioners and academics. The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) and 
other comparable performance measurement systems were developed as a reaction to 
the general dissatisfaction of using only financial measures for performance 
measurement and evaluation purposes. Financial measures were argued, among 
others, to be too aggregated, to be too focussed on the short-term, and to reflect only 
effects of actions and not about causes. All advantages given of non-financial 
performance measures can be summarized as follows. Managerial efforts lead to 
future outcomes, but these outcomes are not all reflected in current financial 
measures. Therefore, the non-financial measures should help managers to refocus 
their attention on tasks that drive these future outcomes (Hemmer, 1996). 
 Banker et al. (2001) show from a sample of 165 financial executives from the US, 
that 35% used the BSC. In Europe, a survey of 236 Scandinavian business unit 
managers indicated that 27% used a BSC (Kald and Nilsson, 2000). In contrast, 
several sources show that managers have many problems implementing Balanced 
Scorecard systems (for example, Ittner and Larcker, 1998b). This shows the 
importance of the topic among practitioners.   
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 Ittner and Larcker (1998b) derive a number of researchable issues with respect to 
non-financial performance measurement. First, whether the use of non-financial 
performance measures, or concepts such as the BSC that incorporate non-financial 
measures, has positive benefits for organizations. Second, when this is not the case for 
all organizations, identify variables that moderate the relationship between using more 
non-financial performance measures and increased performance is an important issue. 
Finally, other addressable issues are what does the concept of balance mean in the 
BSC, how a number of different performance measures should be used in the 
evaluation of managers, and whether the same measures can be used for both 
improved decision making and control. 
 In this dissertation two general research questions are addressed.  First,   
 
“Do non-financial performance measures have relative or incremental information 
content, or both, beyond financial performance measures in predicting future 
financial performance?”   
 
And second,  
 
“Do managers perform better when non-financial measures are added to their 
performance evaluation system?” 
 
 The first research question examines a claim in the popular management 
accounting literature. Kaplan and Norton (1992) argue that current non-financial 
measures are better indicators for future financial performance than current financial 
measures. In addition, Banker et al. (2000b, p. 65) argue that:  
 
“current non-financial measures are better predictors of long-term financial 
performance than current financial measures” (italics added).   
 
Finally, Nagar and Rajan (2001, p. 496) state in the context of quality cost systems, 
that:  
 
“critics of traditional quality cost systems propose supplementing financial measures 
with non-financial quality measures, arguing that non-financial measures provide a 
better indication of quality related customer goodwill losses” (italics added).  
 
These claims are based on the conjectures that non-financial measures, compared to 
financial measures, for example, pay more attention to causes rather than effects 
(Singleton-Green, 1993), and induce a long-term orientation in managers (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1992). These claims suggest that non-financial measures have a higher 
relative information content than financial measures for predicting future financial 
performance, i.e., that non-financial measures contain more information than financial 
measures (Biddle et al., 1995). 
 However, empirical accounting research assesses the usefulness of non-financial 
measures through the incremental information content of non-financial measures 
beyond financial measures for predicting future financial performance. For example, 
Ittner and Larcker (1998b, p. 226) argue that1:  
                                                          
1
 However, Ittner and Larcker (1998b) also state that predictive ability of non-financial measures does 
not necessarily mean usefulness for contracting, since the weight of a measure is also influenced by the 
noise of the measure.   
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“from an accounting standpoint, a crucial test is whether a broad set of non-financial 
measures […] possess incremental ability to predict future financial performance, after 
controlling for the predictability of past financial performance”  (italics added). 
 
This remark hints that non-financial performance measures should have “incremental 
information content”, that is they provide information beyond the lagged financial 
measures (Biddle et al., 1995). In addition, Ittner and Larcker (1998a), Banker et al., 
(2000b), and Nagar and Rajan (2001) test the incremental information content of non-
financial measures beyond financial measures for future financial performance. The 
accounting literature therefore is ambiguous whether non-financial measures have 
relative or incremental information content, or both, to predict future financial 
performance beyond lagged financial measures. Therefore, in this dissertation I test 
both the relative and incremental information content of non-financial measures to 
explore this contention.  
 In addition, a critical assumption in the BSC concept is that non-financial measures 
are indicators for financial performance. The first research question also addresses 
this assumption. Non-financial measures do not need to be an indicator for current 
financial performance, but only for future financial performance. Prior studies that 
addressed this question used either an arbitrary lag (Anderson et al., 1994; Ittner and 
Larcker, 1998a; Nagar and Rajan, 2001) or had the same lag for all non-financial 
measures and all financial measures (Banker et al., 2000b).2 Therefore, in this study a 
lag search is executed to explore the lag length between non-financial measures and 
future financial measures, in which different non-financial measures can have 
different lags for different financial measures.  
 Three years of monthly performance data on two non-financial and two financial 
measures is available for 27 areas of one company to examine the first research 
question. These measures are the measures from the contracts of middle managers. 
The non-financial measures are on-time delivery and worker satisfaction, and the 
financial measures are costs and revenues. 
 The second research question is an evaluation of the change in the PMS. Foster and 
Young (1997) argue that much of the management accounting literature is larded with 
proposals of new accounting systems, but that any systematic evaluation of such new 
systems is scarce.3 This is in sharp contrast with evaluations of new products or 
programs in other disciplines, such as medicine, and education, in which each new 
initiative is tested before use. The second study in this dissertation is an empirical 
account of such an evaluation in one organization. Although the new PMS was not a 
BSC, the goals of the change were similar. 
 Available empirical research for the second research question provides mixed 
evidence for a number of reasons. First, the outcome measures used to indicate the 
success of emphasizing non-financial measures relatively more are short-term 
outcome measures that do not incorporate the full performance effects (Perera et al., 
1997).  Second, most studies use a cross-sectional methodology and therefore do not 
capture long-term performance effects of emphasizing non-financial performance 
measures relatively more (Perera et al., 1997). Therefore, the second research question 
in this study is explored through a quasi-experiment in a large Dutch service 
                                                          
2
 It is not clear from Banker et al. (2000b) whether this same lag between the two non-financial 
measures and three financial measures was a restriction in the analysis or a coincidence. Personal 
communication with the first author learned that it was a coincidence. 
3
 Notable exceptions are Banker et al. (1996a, 1996b, 2000b) and Emsley (2000). 
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organization where a change in the performance measurement system (PMS) has 
taken place. Before the change in the PMS managers were mainly evaluated on 
financial measures, whereas after the change additional non-financial measures were 
emphasized relatively more.  
 To answer the second research question I use the same data as for the first research 
question. Of these three years, one year is from before, and two years are from after 
the change in the PMS. 
 Both research questions are not independent of each other. The first question might 
be considered a validity check whether the added non-financial measure were value 
drivers in the context of the organization. For example, the informativeness 
hypothesis implies that all indicators that have incremental information content about 
the effort of a manager should have a non-zero weight in the contract of managers 
(Ittner and Larcker, 1997). When this is not the case no performance effects can be 
expected of the change in the PMS.  
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follow. First, the subject of non-
financial performance measurement is outlined and defined. Second, the subject of 
non-financial performance measurement is situated in the management control 
literature. Third, the evaluation question uses managerial performance as outcome 
measure. This is defined in section 1.4. Fourth, the contributions of the study to the 
literature are enumerated. Finally, an overview of the dissertation is given. 
 
1.2 Non-financial performance measures 
 
 Labels for performance measures that are alternatives to financial or accounting 
measures abound. In this section I discuss a number of alternative labels used in the 
literature that are partly overlapping with the financial and non-financial dimension. 
In addition, I give advantages and disadvantages of non-financial performance 
measures. 
 The American Accounting Association defines financial information as:  
 
“a quantitative measure, expressed in the monetary metric, resulting from the 
measurement of past, present and future economic events, or that has a financial 
character (American Accounting Association, 1975)”.  
 
Morisette (1998, p. 4) derives from this definition a definition for non-financial 
measures4: 
 
“any quantitative measure, 1) expressed in a metric other than a monetary unit, or 2) 
that results from mathematical manipulations or ratios of pieces of information 
expressed in metrics other  than monetary units”. 
 
These definitions suggest that the basic content of the difference between financial 
and non-financial measures is the unit of the measure, i.e., financial versus other units. 
However, the accounting literature encloses numerous other labels that are partly 
overlapping with the financial versus non-financial distinction. First, the distinction 
between accounting and non-accounting information is central in the “reliance on 
accounting performance measure” construct. However, it is not clear what the exact 
contents of the accounting and non-accounting categories are (Hartmann, 2000). In 
                                                          
4
 Horngren et al. (1994) make a further distinction between internal and external financial and non-
financial measures.   
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addition, Abernethy and Lillis (1995, p. 242) refer to “accounting and other efficiency 
based measures”, but the items that measure this construct are a number of both 
financial and non-financial measures. Further, in the Balanced Scorecard the notion of 
leading versus lagging measures is central, in which the lagging measures are most 
often considered to be the financial measures and the leading measures are considered 
to be the non-financial measures.5 Finally, Govindarajan and Gupta (1985) use the 
construct long-run versus short-run criteria in the bonus system, but again the items in 
the construct used are financial measures for the short-run criteria and non-financial 
measures for the long-run criteria. The existence of these different labels raises the 
question whether the distinction between giving measures in financial or non-financial 
units is substantial, and what the basic argument is for this difference.6,7   
 To make the issue even more complex, some empirical evidence suggests that 
financial and non-financial measures are not substitutes, but that non-financial 
measures are used additive to financial measures (Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985). 
This implies that financial and non-financial measures are not the endpoints of a 
continuum, and therefore a scale that uses these endpoints cannot measure the 
dimension properly.  
 Given the diverse labels that exist in the literature it is difficult to give a clear-cut 
definition of financial and non-financial performance measure that captures the real 
difference. Therefore, acknowledging the problematic nature of the definitions, I use 
the definitions of financial and non-financial measures given by the American 
Accounting Association  (1975) and Morisette (1998) given above. This implies that I 
only consider quantitative measures, and therefore qualitative non-financial measures 
are not part of the definition.  
 The literature provides several claims in front of emphasizing non-financial 
performance measures relatively more. A non exclusive enumeration is that non-
financial performance measures are argued to be more actionable, be more directly 
traceable to the strategies of the firm, work well with high-technology manufacturing 
systems like Automatic Manufacturing Technologies and JIT, facilitate continuous 
improvements (Fisher, 1992), focus attention on causes rather than effects (Singleton-
Green 1993)8, focus attention on the long-run perspective (Kaplan and Norton, 1992), 
and give less room for dysfunctional behavior (Fisher, 1992). Empirical evidence for 
these advantages is scant. Van der Stede et al. (2001) find that non-financial measures 
encourage risk taking and innovation, have less noise, and are less susceptible to 
short-termism and gamesmanship. Disadvantages of non-financial performance 
measures are stated less often. This list might include that they are not always directly 
                                                          
5
 However, in Nagar and Rajan (2001) financial quality costs, i.e., internal failure costs and external 
failure costs, are also indicators for future revenues.  This example shows that the distinction between 
leading and lagging is not the same as the distinction between financial and non-financial measures.  
6
 Although deriving proper labels for a construct is a theoretical question, empirically the difference 
between the different labels and the discriminant validity of the constructs could be assessed through 
use of factor analysis (Hair et al., 1998).   
7
 The coexistence of all these different labels illustrates the risks of using “practice defined variables” 
(Luft and Shields, forthcoming).  For example, although accounting and non-accounting measures are 
labels that are used for many years, its underlying theoretical properties are still not well understood.   
8
 For example, Singleton-Green (1993, p. 52) argued that “profit measures show the effects of non-
financial activities and achievements; they do not pin down precisely what it is in your business that 
you are getting right or wrong”. In addition, from an experiment Luft and Shields (2000) find that 
managers are better able to identify the impact of quality problems on future profits when the quality 
problems are reported in non-financial terms than in financial terms.  
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linked with financial measures9, are considered to be 'softer' measures, have more 
measurement error10, and because different non-financial performance measures are 
stated in different units, there is not one integrative denominator (Singleton-Green, 
1993). Further limitations are that they are not audited, and easier to manipulate 
(Ittner et al., 1997).  
 Ittner and Larcker (1998b) give a classification of three reasons why non-financial 
performance measures are used more often. First, non-financial performance measures 
try to mitigate limitations in traditional accounting based measures. Traditional 
accounting measures are, for example, backward looking, emphasize effects instead of 
causes of problems, are too aggregated, neglect soft or difficult to measure assets, lead 
to short-termism. Second, due to increased competitive pressure companies need to 
have more information about the relevant drivers of their performance. Third, 
operational strategies such as TQM, JIT and flexible production automation lead to a 
demand for non-financial measures to implement, and trace the effects of these 
strategies.  
 The discussion above lists advantages and disadvantages of using non-financial 
measures. However integrating financial and non-financial measures, for example in a 
BSC, is argued to give additional advantages.  Such integrated systems are assumed to 
improve the communication of the strategic plan11, help implement the strategic plan, 
and facilitate strategic learning (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Van der Stede (2001) 
gives some empirical evidence for these claims. He finds that integrating financial and 
non-financial measures adequately captures lead-lag relationships, and reinforces the 
strategic plan.    
 
1.3 Management control  
 
 This section embeds the use of non-financial performance measures in the 
management control literature. I discuss the concept of (management) control, and the 
role of non-financial performance measures within management control. 
 The concept of control is defined in an infinite number of ways in the literature. 
This study follows Merchant’s (1998, p. 2) perspective of control. Therefore, the 
definition of control used is:  
 
“controls [….] are devices managers use to ensure that the behaviors and decisions of 
people in the organization are consistent with the organization’s objectives and 
strategies”. 
 
To be able to discuss some critical elements in this definition, I first describe the 
cybernetic control concept.  
 Cybernetic control consists of the elements 1) set goals, 2) measure performance, 
3) compare performance with the goals, and 4) provide feedback to correct a variance 
between the performance and the goal. This model assumes that goals are clear, 
performance can be measured, a predictive model is available, and a set of corrective 
                                                          
9
 For example, Brancato (1995) reports from a case study that none of the interviewees could quantify 
the link between non-financial and financial measures.  
10
 For example, Strivers et al. (1998) find from a sample of 253 CEO’s that 75.9% think employee 
involvement is very important but only 35.9% measure this dimension because they find it is difficult 
to measure. 
11
 Malina and Selto (2002) find that this is the case when the BSC measures and its implementation are 
credible, the BSC fits in the culture of the company, and BSC leads to increasing and sharing 
knowledge. 
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actions is available when goals and actual performance deviate (Otley and Berry, 
1980). Although a helpful metaphor for understanding the concept of control, the 
concept lacks at least three important aspects of controls in organizations.12 First, 
organizations act in their environment, and this leads to uncontrollable elements in the 
goals set. This implies that the predictive model is incomplete and therefore feedback 
actions do not necessarily lead to a system that is in control. Second, cybernetic 
controls lack the impact of human behavior, that is individuals have their own goals 
that may conflict with organizational goals, and individuals have limitations that may 
inhibit them to execute their tasks perfectly. Again this leads to the result that 
corrective actions taken do not necessarily lead to a system that will be in control 
again. Finally, unlike the cybernetic control concept organizations have a number of 
conflicting, or even vague, goals that are not always compatible with each other. 
Thus, not only the set of corrective actions available to keep the organization in 
control is incomplete, but also the goals themselves may be unclear or incorrect.  
 Merchant's definition also assumes that organizations have objectives and 
strategies for themselves. The most likely operationalization is that these 
organizational objectives and strategies are the objectives and strategies of the 
dominant coalition of the organization (see also section 1.4). In addition, to be able to 
influence the “behavior and decisions of people” it should be recognized that these 
people have goals for themselves that may conflict with the organizational goals or 
that the goals are not clear for them. Finally, Merchant defines the efficacy of controls 
as the increased probability that the organizational goals are achieved or exceeded 
(Merchant, 1998). Again this assumes that a clear picture of organizational goals 
exists.  
 The performance measurement system from the company under study (see chapter 
3) has the same flaws as the cybernetic control concept. First, it provides measures 
derived from the goals of the company that are partly influenced by the environment 
of the organization. Second, the managers in the organization might have goals that 
differ from the organizational goals. Finally, the different performance measures 
derived from the organizational goals might be conflicting with each other.     
 Generally, control systems can have two functions, i.e., strategic control and 
management control (Merchant, 1998). Strategic control questions the validity of the 
strategies of the organization in a changing environment. In contrast, management 
control deals with the issue “are the employees behaving appropriately”. In this study 
the focus is mainly on management control, although the change in the PMS of the 
organization (see chapter 3) might be a consequence of the strategic control process. 
 The need for management controls stems from control problems. Merchant (1998) 
classifies these control problems in 1) lack of direction, 2) personal limitations, and 3) 
motivational problems. Lack of direction means that individuals do not know what the 
organization expects from them, for example, because the organizational goals are 
unclear. Personal limitations are the lack of ability of the individual to execute the job 
due to, for example, inappropriate training or unavailability of proper information. 
Motivational problems are the most widely stated control problems and are the result 
of a number of different causes. For example, managers can have different time-
horizons compared with the organization, managers are effort and risk averse, and 
managers spend too much money on, for example, perquisites.13 
                                                          
12
 Hartmann (1997) argued that it is not the model itself that is inappropriate, but that the assumptions 
underlying the model do not hold. 
13Goal incongruence, a central concept in multi-task principal-agent models, refers to both lack of 
direction and motivational problems (Merchant, 1998).   
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 Merchant (1998) classifies control devices in results controls, action controls, and 
personal and cultural controls. Non-financial performance measurement can best be 
described as a control device where the performance of managers is measured, 
evaluated and rewarded on a number of both financial and non-financial measures that 
are important for the organization. This description includes that relevant performance 
dimensions are defined, measured, set targets for, and is input for the rewards of 
managers. Therefore, non-financial performance measurement is a results control 
device. 
 Merchant (1998) argued that results controls are able to directly mitigate the 
control problems lack of direction and motivational problems. However, non-financial 
performance measures can explicitly help managers learn lead-lag relationships 
between different dimensions of performance14 and hence help them to do a better 
job. This indicates that non-financial performance measures might also lessen the 
personal limitation control problem. The role of non-financial performance measures 
in mitigating control problems is summarized in table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1: Control problems and non-financial measures 
Control problems Role of non-financial measures to address control problems 
 
Personal limitations Learning lead-lag relations between financial and non-financial 
measures 
 
Lack of direction Adding non-financial measures to the contract informs managers 
what is expected of them 
 
Motivational 
problems 
The non-financial measures reallocate the focus of managers to the 
non-financial measures by evaluating the managers on these 
measures 
 
 
 Perera et al. (1997, p. 561) make a distinction between the instrumental versus 
motivational premise of efficacy of performance measurement15. The instrumental 
premise is described as:  
 
“for manager actions and decisions to be effective in achieving [performance 
dimensions] such actions and decisions need to be informed by relevant and specific 
feedback on those dimensions”.  
 
The motivational premise is described as:  
 
“managers have an incentive to concentrate on, and will seek to maximize performance 
against, those activities on which performance is  measured”. 
 
These two premises are not only difficult to separate in empirical research but might 
be potentially conflicting. For the instrumental premise managers need to represent 
information in an honest way to their evaluators. However, when the same measures 
                                                          
14
 There is some evidence that, for example, CEO’s have great difficulties to link improvements in non-
financial measures to financial measures. Ittner and Larcker (1998b) surveyed 27 CEO’s from large US 
companies and found that only approximately 25% claimed that they could relate quality and customer 
satisfaction dimensions of performance to accounting returns. 
15
 Other labels in the literature are decision making versus decision control (Zimmerman, 1997), and 
decision making versus stewardship (Gjesdal, 1981). 
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are also used for motivational purposes, individuals have an incentive to misrepresent 
the information.16 The performance measures in the contracts of the managers in the 
company also have this tension. The managers use the measures to make tradeoffs 
between different performance measures but are also evaluated on these same 
measures.    
 The change in the PMS considered in the organization (see chapter 3) is installed to 
align the goals of the managers with the organizational goals, thus mitigating 
motivational problems. Second, it focuses managers on certain performance 
dimensions, thus mitigating the problem of lack of direction. Finally, the PMS gives 
the managers an indication of trade-offs between different performance dimensions. 
 
1.4 Managerial performance  
 
 The second research question evaluates whether managers perform better when 
they are evaluated and rewarded relatively more on non-financial measures. Before 
this question can be answered, better managerial performance has to be defined.  
 Ittner and Larcker (2001) discuss the problem of endogeneity when performance is 
used as a dependent variable. When all organizations optimize their accounting 
systems no performance effect can be expected of a change in the PMS. However, this 
assumes that all organizations act rational, and that the changes take effect 
immediately, which seems highly unlikely. As Milgrom and Roberts (1992) state, it 
seems more likely that people learn how to make good decisions by experimentation 
and imitation. The change in the PMS in the organization under study (see chapter 3), 
was a reaction to the perceived need to react to shocks in the environment. The 
organization can therefore be seen as temporarily out of the equilibrium. The change 
in the PMS is a reaction to this. Throughout the change, the organization and its 
managers tried to adapt the organization to the changing needs of the environment. 
Thus, with the change in the PMS examined the organization strives for optimality. 
Consequently, this is tested in the empirical analysis (Banker et al., 1996a; Banker et 
al., 2000b). 
 A number of different performance models exist. Meyer and Gupta (1994) 
enumerate the maximizing model, the political model, the constituency model, and the 
business model. These models are summarized in table 1.2.  
 
                                                          
16
 For example, in early publications of Kaplan and Norton about the BSC, they argued that the BSC 
should not be used for rewarding purposes, since this would give managers an incentive to misrepresent 
the information that is necessary to construct the BSC (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1993). In later 
publications, they seem to change this opinion since they also discuss the use of personal BSC as an 
input for the annual bonus (Kaplan and Norton, 2000).   
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Table 1.2: Performance models  
Performance models1 Definition of performance 
 
Maximizing model Long-term value of company (stock returns with efficient market) 
 
Political model Dominant coalition defines performance 
 
Constituency model Different coalitions (e.g., workers, shareholders) define 
performance 
 
Business model Overall performance improves when individual measures improve 
 
Notes: 
1
 Source: Meyer and Gupta (1994). 
 
 In the empirical analysis in this dissertation elements of both the political and the 
business model are used.17 The political model assumes that the dominant coalition of 
the organization chooses the performance measures that should be maximized. The 
difference with the maximizing model is that in the political model more than one 
measure is optimized, while in the maximizing model only the long-term value of the 
organization is maximized, operationalized by the current share price in an efficient 
market (Meyer and Gupta, 1994). The business model is a heuristic that helps to 
identify causal links between different dimensions of performance. These different 
dimensions of performance are often expected to be correlated in lagged periods 
rather than in the same period. The business model assumes that an increase in one 
measure leads to an improvement of overall performance (Meyer and Gupta, 1994).     
 In this dissertation the change in the PMS is evaluated through the items of the 
managers' contracts. These contracts are contrived by the dominant coalition of the 
organization, i.e., the top management, and should represent causal links between the 
dominant strategic drivers for the performance of the areas. The second research 
question assesses the change in the PMS. I assume that overall performance increases 
when each individual measure increases, i.e., I use the business model.  
 
1.5 Contributions of the study 
 
 The research stream on which I build my empirical studies in chapter 5 and 6 is 
characterized by a lack of a consistent body of theory. The so-called “practice 
defined” variables financial and non-financial performance measures are attributed a 
number of characteristics without clearly understanding its properties (Luft and 
Shields, 2001). Only a number of ad hoc claims in front of these variables are 
available in the literature. This dissertation therefore mainly contributes to the 
empirical literature that addresses these claims. Although this might be a weakness of 
the motivation of the two empirical studies, it is also the only way forward to be able 
to improve the topic. The directions of further research in section 7.6. give a  number 
of questions that should be answered before it is possible to be able to integrate the 
different findings in the literature. 
 This dissertation makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, it assesses 
the relative information content of non-financial performance measures and financial 
performance measures for future financial performance. This is the first direct test of 
                                                          
17
 In contrast, the principal-agent model used to derive the expectations for the second research 
question uses the maximizing model (see section 6.2).   
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the popular claim that non-financial measures are better indicators for future financial 
performance than lagged financial measures. In addition, it adds to the growing 
literature of incremental information content of non-financial performance measures 
beyond financial performance measures for future financial performance (Ittner and 
Larcker, 1998a, Banker et al., 2000b, Nagar and Rajan, 2001).  
 This study contributes indirectly to the principal-agent literature. The relative 
information analysis addresses the congruence of the different measures with future 
financial performance, in which the congruence of the measure determines partly the 
weight of the measures in the contract (Datar et al., 2001). The incremental 
information analysis assesses the informativeness of each measure, i.e., whether the 
measures should have a non-zero weight in the contract (Ittner et al., 1997).     
 A lag search procedure, which is widely used in economic research, but relatively 
new in management accounting research, is used to explore the incremental 
information content of lagged non-financial measures beyond financial measures. The 
method used in my dissertation extends the method used in Banker et al. (2000b) in 
two ways. First, the various non-financial measures can have different lags for 
different financial measures. In the study of Banker et al. (2000b), the two different 
non-financial measures have the same lag for cost, revenues and profit.   
 Second, in Banker et al. (2000b) the average of the lagged non-financial measures 
from each period t is used to measure the lagged non-financial construct. This 
assumes that the lagged non-financial measure from each period t has the same impact 
on the financial measure. This assumption is unlikely to be met, since non-financial 
measures in period t might not have an immediate impact on the following period 
financial measure. In addition, later periods probably have a decaying effect on the 
financial measures. Therefore, in this study the factor loadings are also used to 
estimate the impact of non-financial measures on financial measures.    
 The evaluation question contributes to the empirical management accounting 
literature by exploring the long-term impact of a change in the PMS in a large Dutch 
service organization.  Before the change managers were evaluated mainly on financial 
performance measures, whereas after the change worker satisfaction and customer 
satisfaction measures were added to these contracts. Exploring the long-term impact 
of such a change in the PMS is mentioned as a fruitful avenue for further research by 
Perera et al. (1997), and is for the first time considered in Banker et al. (2000b). Since 
non-financial measures are argued to have a long-term orientation, a cross-sectional 
study that measures the effect on only a short-term success measure will probably not 
capture the complete effect (Perera et al., 1997).  
 The evaluation question contributes indirectly to the multi-task principal-agent 
model by addressing the value of additional measures in the contracts of the 
managers. 
 The second study extends the study of Banker et al. (2000b) on a number of 
aspects. First, in the study of Banker et al. (2000b) two changes took place 
simultaneously. Next to the added measures in the contract the bonus of the managers 
was raised as well. This makes it hard to isolate the individual effects. In my study 
only one change took place, i.e., the contracts of the managers were added with the 
non-financial measures worker satisfaction and customer satisfaction.    
 A final contribution is that the research setting where the analyses are 
accomplished is different from the setting in Banker et al. (2000b) in a number of 
ways. First, the reward structure of the managers is different, i.e., the bonus is less 
important whereas promotion opportunities are more important. Second, in the 
research setting of Banker et al. (2000b) customer satisfaction is the most important 
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strategic issue, whereas in my research setting a quality orientation is the most 
important issue. Third, as a consequence from the second point the non-financial 
measures considered were different than in other studies.    
 
1.6 Summary and overview of remainder dissertation  
 
 In this chapter the basic research questions and its motivation are outlined. Section 
1.2 discusses the financial and non-financial performance dimension, and enumerates 
claimed advantages of these measures. Afterwards, section 1.3 positions the research 
questions in the management control literature. Next, section 1.4 explains the 
dependent variable in the evaluation question, i.e., managerial performance. Finally, 
Section 1.5 enumerates the contributions of the study.    
 The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. In chapter two the 
literature with respect to the two research questions is reviewed. This chapter 
describes the literature, gives a critical discussion, and provides directions for further 
research. Chapter three gives background information about the company where the 
data-collection took place. I discuss the organization, its PMS and the change and 
goals of the change in the PMS. This background information is given to facilitate the 
interpretation of the empirical results in chapter 5 and 6. In Chapter 4 I define all 
variables used in the two empirical studies and discuss the data collection process. 
Further, the chapter discusses properties of pooled time-series data. For the empirical 
analysis a pooled time-series data set is used. Pooled time-series data have unique 
econometric properties that have both advantages and disadvantages. Finally, I give 
the data description.  
 The empirical part of the dissertation is organized in Chapter 5 and 6. I divide the 
empirical work in two chapters since both analyses used a different framework and 
different research methods. Chapter 5 addresses the first research question, i.e., 
whether non-financial performance measures have relative or incremental information 
content, or both, beyond financial performance measures in predicting future financial 
performance. In this chapter I provide the framework that guides the research 
question, followed by the research methods and specifications used for the analysis. 
Then I give the empirical results. Chapter 5 ends with a discussion and summary. 
Chapter 6 addresses the second research question, i.e., whether managers perform 
better when they are evaluated relatively more on non-financial measures. This 
chapter starts with the framework that guides the research question. Afterwards, I 
discuss the research methods used for the analysis. Then the empirical results are 
given. Chapter 7 summarizes and discusses the findings in the dissertation. 
 Chapter 2 Literature review 
Chapter 2  
Literature review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to review the available empirical studies, that explore 
relationships between financial and non-financial performance measures, that identify 
possible antecedents for non-financial performance measures use, and that consider 
contingencies where this use might be effective. Further, directions for further 
research are given to improve this research.  
 The deficits of using only accounting performance measures for evaluating 
managers and organization (-units) were recognized decades ago. In early research, 
most attention was paid to the consequences of, and identify circumstances in which 
these deficits were the most severe. This literature became known as the ‘Reliance on 
accounting performance measures’-debate. For a recent overview of this literature, see 
Hartmann (2000). After the mid 80’s, specially after the publication of “Relevance 
lost” (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987), more attention was paid to using other performance 
measures in addition to accounting measures. One example of these measures is non-
financial performance measures, the subject of this dissertation.  
 While the advantages of the use of non-financial performance measures are well 
documented (see section 1.2), there are few papers that identify determinants of non-
financial performance measures use. Even fewer studies measure outcome variables, 
either financial, non-financial, or at the individual level, when the appropriate match 
between non-financial performance measurement use and contingency variables 
exists.  
 Next to the question whether using more non-financial measures has positive 
performance effects, another important issue is the relationship between financial and 
non-financial performance measures. These studies consider whether non-financial 
performance measures are indicators for financial measures, what the time lag 
between improvements on non-financial measures and improvements on financial 
measures is, and the linearity of these relationships. The main motivation for this 
stream of research is the notion that non-financial measures are indicators for 
financial performance measures (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). These relationships can 
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be either in the same period or have a time lag before higher non-financial measures 
lead to higher financial performance.  
 Section 1.3 discussed the financial and non-financial performance dimension. The 
papers reviewed, however, use different labels, for example manufacturing 
performance measures, non-traditional information and reward systems, and 
operation-based non-financial measures. Therefore, the predominant reason to 
incorporate a study in this review is the content of the measure.   
 The chapter is structured as follows. The next section gives an introduction to the 
studies that address the subject of non-financial performance measurement. Section 
2.3.1 provides an overview of studies that examine relationships between financial 
and non-financial performance measures. In addition, section 2.3.2 discusses some 
characteristics of these relationships. Studies that consider antecedents for the relative 
use of non-financial versus financial performance measures are reviewed in section 
2.4. The performance effects of non-financial performance measure use are discussed 
in section 2.5. After this overview, section 2.6 discusses the literature. Finally, 
avenues for further research are indicated. 
 
2.2 Overview empirical research  
 
 Papers for the review were selected based on a manual search in major accounting 
journals. A manual search was preferred above an electronic search, for example, on 
the words “non-financial”, because this would not be complete due to the various 
labels in the literature for the financial and non-financial dimension (see section 1.2). 
Further, articles were traced by references. Finally, only studies that analyze non-
financial performance measures for internal reporting purposes are selected.1  
 The first part, section 2.3, reviews studies that examine relationships between 
financial and non-financial measures of performance. One of the assumptions of the 
Balanced Scorecard is that non-financial measures are leading indicators of financial 
performance (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). These studies test this assumption. The 
potential time lag before the “lag” measures influence the “lead” measures is also 
explored.  
 For the non-financial measures there is a bias toward customer satisfaction 
measures. The majority of the studies reviewed are industry or organization specific. 
One motivation for this is that the relevance of specific non-financial performance 
measures, is different across industries (Amir and Lev, 1996). Another more 
pragmatic reason is that archival data, the primary datasource used for these studies, 
for non-financial measures from different organizations with the same variable 
definition is difficult to gather. 
 The second part, section 2.4 and 2.5, reviews studies that examine factors that drive 
the relative use of, or the emphasis placed on, financial versus non-financial 
performance measures. Some of these studies also assess the usefulness of the 
hypothesized match between the contingency variable and non-financial performance 
measure use. Both use and usefulness can be considered as success measures (Foster 
and Swenson, 1997). 
 At least two theoretical streams can give insights in the usefulness of using 
additional non-financial performance measures. First, the multi-task principal-agent 
theory states that additional performance measures can have value in the case where 
the “old” measure is incongruent with the goals of the principal and has noise 
                                                          
1
 For example, other studies analyze non-financial measures for predicting failure of companies 
(Keasey and Watson, 1987) and its value relevance (Lev and Thegaranjan, 1993). 
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(Feltham and Xie, 1994).  This is a universal theory, i.e., more measures can never be 
worse than fewer measures.2 Second, Milgrom and Roberts' (1995) notion of 
complementarity between operational strategy and the design of the management 
accounting system is explored.3 This assumes that a particular strategy, for example a 
quality strategy, can only be successful when other organizational systems, for 
example the performance measurement system and allocation of decision rights, are 
aligned with this strategy (Wruck and Jensen, 1994).  
 
2.3 Relationships between financial and non-financial performance measures 
 
2.3.1 Empirical evidence of relationships between financial and non-financial 
performance measures 
 
 One of the first studies that tested the relationship between a non-financial measure 
and financial performance is Anderson et al. (1994). They find evidence that a higher 
customer satisfaction leads to a higher return-on-investment (ROI) in both level and 
first-difference models.4 Customer satisfaction was measured from a survey of 
customers of 77 companies. Anderson et al. (1994) use the ROI measure because they 
consider this a measure for long-term economic health. 
 Banker et al. (2000b) use a longitudinal research methodology to better understand 
the relationship between non-financial and financial performance measures. This was 
an avenue for further research given by Chenhall (1997) and Perera et al. (1997). As 
non-financial performance measures they use two indicators for customer satisfaction, 
i.e, the likelihood of return of customers, and the number of complaints. The data set 
used is a pooled time-series of six years of monthly data from eighteen hotels from 
one hotel chain. 
 They find that one of the non-financial performance measures is associated with 
future operational profit and revenues. There was no relationship with the current 
period measures. In contrast to their expectations, costs5 did not increase significantly 
when the non-financial measures were higher. Costs were expected to increase 
because making customers happy will cost more, for example, due to hiring extra 
people to improve the service provided to customers. The results were consistent both 
in the level and percentage change specifications. Nagar and Rajan (2001) give as an 
explanation for the weak link between the complain measure in Banker et al (2000b) 
and financial measures that complain measures are not very good indicators of 
customer satisfaction. 
 Behn and Riley (1999) make another important contribution. They explore the 
impact of the non-financial measures customer satisfaction, market share, available 
ton-miles, and load factor on financial performance. They use eight years quarterly 
data of seven U.S airline companies. They find that non-financial performance 
measures are associated with current operating income, revenues and operating 
expenses. In addition, non-financial measures in the first and second month of a 
                                                          
2
 The result that additional measures can never have negative value is driven by the assumption that 
contracts are costless (see section 6.2.5). 
3
 These so-called Edgeworth complements assume that doing more of one increases the returns of the 
others. Interestingly, in this view interactions between contingency variables and non-financial use can 
never be dis-ordinal.  
4
 A complete cause-effect chain is tested from expectations of quality, to perceived quality, to customer 
satisfaction, to ROI. The other relations are not discussed in this chapter. 
5
 In the cost measure extra bonus payments due to increased performance are incorporated, therefore 
making the analysis a cost-benefit analysis. 
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quarter are found to be good predictors for quarterly revenues, expenses and operating 
income. Because the non-financial measures are available earlier than accounting 
data, Behn and Riley (1999) argued that financial analysts can make better predictions 
when this information is disclosed. In this study the non-financial measures are not 
only good signals for future performance, but also for current performance.  
 Ittner and Larcker (1998a) also examine whether customer satisfaction is an 
indicator for financial performance. This relationship is tested at three levels, that is, 
at the individual customer, the business unit, and the organizational level.   
 Although the explanatory power for the models is low, higher customer satisfaction 
led to a higher retention-rate of customers, higher revenues per customer, and higher 
revenue changes per customer. This is tested in a sample of 450.000 customers of a 
large telecommunication company.  
 The analysis at the business unit level, whether higher customer satisfaction leads 
to higher future profit, is a cost benefit analysis. The relationship between customer 
satisfaction and different financial measures of the units gave mixed results, in a 
sample of 73 bank branches from one organization. In the level model, the customer 
satisfaction measure had a positive impact on future revenues, but the impact on 
expenses, margins and return-on-sales (ROS) was not significant. Higher satisfaction 
levels lead to higher future improvements in margins and ROS, but had no impact on 
future revenue increases and future changes in expenses. Finally, changes in customer 
satisfaction had no impact on all four financial measures used.  
 Finally, Ittner and Larcker (1998a) provide an analysis on the firm level. They 
show that releasing customer satisfaction information in the magazine Fortune had a 
positive impact on abnormal stock returns. This implies that disclosing this 
information is of value to the stock market.  
 The third analysis of Ittner and Larcker considers the value relevance of non-
financial measures. One concern of evaluating managers on non-financial measures is 
the persuasiveness of the capital market that inhibits its use.  Amir and Lev's (1996) 
study relaxes this concern for industries that never made any profit.6 They show that 
investors are relying heavily on non-financial information for the valuation of 
securities in their sample of 14 wireless telecommunication companies. The fact that 
wireless telephone companies are in a growth market and need a lot of investments in 
R & D and franchise development explains this result. Further, in the growth stage of 
the product life cycle accounting performance measures are more influenced by 
accounting rules like the treatment of goodwill (getting licenses in Amir and Lev 
(1996) example). Therefore, investors are more concerned about future profit 
potential (more subscribers, a higher penetration rate, etc.), than the negative current 
financial results. The financial measures individually7 did not have any value 
relevance for the securities, they were only relevant in combination with non-financial 
performance measures.  
 Nagar and Rajan (2001) document the link between both financial and non-
financial quality measures and the impact on future sales. They show in a sample of 
11 plants of a Fortune 500 firm, that the changes in defect rate, and on-time delivery 
are related to future revenues. Only the impact on future revenues is estimated, 
                                                          
6
 In this (type of) industry it is possible to evaluate managers for a large part on non-financial 
performance measures. In this way, congruence between the goals of the organization (shareholders) 
and the management is higher. Of the ten cellular companies who disclosed information about 
managers’ compensation, six used exclusively non-financial measures and four used a combination of 
financial and non-financial measures. 
7
 (Change in) quarter earnings per share and book value per share.  
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therefore it is not clear whether improving the non-financial measures is beneficial for 
the companies, i.e., leads to a higher profit.  
 In sum, all studies show that non-financial performance measures can be indicators 
for future or current financial performance.  
 
2.3.2 Characteristics of the relationship between financial and non-financial 
measures 
 
 The former section discussed empirical evidence of the relationship between 
financial and non-financial measures. This section explores characteristics of this 
relationship. It discusses the lag length, linearity of the relationship, and whether the 
lagged financial measure is used in the specification.  
 Although leading and lagging performance measures are important concepts in the 
BSC, there is no formal theory about the length of the time lag before an increase in 
non-financial measures leads to improved financial measures. Therefore, most studies 
use an arbitrary lag in their specification. In Anderson et al. (1994), the customer 
satisfaction measure is gathered in the first half of the year, and the ROI measure is 
from the end of the year. That implies they have a six month time lag in their design. 
Ittner and Larcker (1998a) also use an arbitrary time lag of six months between 
customer satisfaction and future financial performance.8 Finally, the lag in Nagar and 
Rajan (2001) between changes in defect rate, on-time delivery and future revenues is 
only one quarter. Banker et al. (2000b) explore the lag length through a lag search 
procedure from the data. In their case the time lag was 6 months, meaning that non-
financial measures in period 1 have predictive power for the financial measure until 
period 7.  
 Another difference between the studies is the assumed form of the relationship. 
Anderson et al. (1994) use the logarithm of the financial and customer satisfaction 
measure in the specification. This implicitly means that the relationship between the 
two measures is assumed to be non-linear. Ittner and Larcker (1998a) explicitly 
consider the form of the relation. They find that before an increase in customer 
satisfaction is beneficial a threshold value has to be reached. In addition, benefits of 
improved satisfaction vanish when customer satisfaction is already at a high level.  
 A final distinction between the studies is that most studies use the lagged financial 
measure as an independent variable in the specification (Anderson et al., 1994; Ittner 
and Larcker 1998a; Banker et al., 2000b; Nagar and Rajan, 2001), whereas others do 
not (Behn and Riley, 1999). This difference in specification leads to a different 
implication. Using the lagged financial measures as an independent variable in the 
specification assesses whether the non-financial measures have additional value 
beyond the lagged financial measure. Omitting this variable assesses whether the non-
financial measure predicts the financial measure.    
 In sum, all studies use different specifications, which seriously inhibits the 
comparison of the results. Table 2.1 gives an overview of these studies and provides 
information about the authors, variables measured, and the samples used. 
    
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 It remains unclear why Ittner and Larcker (1998a) use the average of the third and fourth quarter, and 
compare this with the average of the first and second quarter, instead of using the individual quarters. 
Further, they use no control for seasonal effects. 
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Table 2.1: Overview of studies that examine relationships between financial and non-financial 
performance measures 
Author(s) 
 
Non-financial measure(s) Financial measure(s) Samplea 
Anderson et al. 
(1994) 
 
Customer satisfaction ROI 77 large companies 
Amir  and Lev 
(1996) 
 
Number of subscribers and 
penetration rate 
 
Return and price of 
securities 
14 cellular telephone 
companies 
Behn and 
Riley (1999) 
Customer satisfaction, market 
share, load factor and, available 
ton-miles 
 
Operational cost, 
revenues, and profit 
7 Airline industry 
Ittner and 
Larcker 
(1998a) 
 
Customer satisfaction Revenue, accounting 
performance, stock 
performance 
 
73 branch banks 
Banker et al.  
(2000b) 
 
Customer satisfaction Operational cost 
revenues, and profit 
18 hotels from a hotel 
chain  
Nagar and 
Rajan (2001) 
 
Quality measures Future revenues 11 manufacturing 
companies  
Notes: 
The table gives the author(s), non-financial and financial measures, and the sample used in the studies.  
aWhere the study of Anderson et al. (1994) is cross-sectional and the other studies use pooled time-
series data. 
 
2.4 Antecedents of non-financial performance measures use 
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 
 Of all variables that are antecedents for the use of non-financial performance 
measures, or moderators for the relationship between use of non-financial measures 
and performance, operational and organizational strategy are explored in more than 
one study. These factors are discussed in section 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. Next, variables that 
are examined in only one study are discussed in section 2.4.4.  
 
2.4.2 Operational strategy  
 
 Most studies use dimensions of operational strategy as a determinant of the use of 
non-financial performance measures. This is not surprising, since the use of more 
non-financial performance measures is given as part of the solution to the ‘irrelevant’ 
state of management accounting practices (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987). One of the 
reasons given for this ‘irrelevance’ are the changes in the internal and external 
environment of organizations. As a reaction to these changes organizations have 
implemented new manufacturing practices such as Just-In-Time (JIT), flexible 
production automatization, Total Quality Management (TQM), continuous 
improvement, and workgroups. Success stories from Japanese companies about new 
manufacturing practices led to a series of studies about these practices and their 
impact on the control system. Operational strategy is in this chapter used as a ‘bucket 
term’ for these practices.  
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 Abernethy and Lillis (1995) were one of the firsts that examined the relationship 
between operational strategy and the use of financial and non-financial performance 
measures. They found support for the hypothesis that organizations that use a 
manufacturing flexibility strategy use less efficiency-based performance measures, in 
which efficiency-based measures are operationalized as cost efficiency.9 They found 
their results through semi-structured interviews with managers from 42 organizations.
 Perera et al. (1997) extend the research of Abernethy and Lillis (1995) in a number 
of ways. First, Perera et al. (1997) use a survey of a randomly chosen sample, instead 
of the semi-structured interviews in pre-selected industries. Second, Abernethy and 
Lillis (1995) tested only one dimension of a customer focused manufacturing strategy, 
i.e., manufacturing flexibility. Perera et al. (1997) identify four dimensions of a 
customer focused manufacturing strategy, that is cost, quality, flexibility and the 
dependability of supply. The dimensions of this customer focused manufacturing 
strategy are proxied by advanced manufacturing technology (AMT) and advanced 
management practices (AMP). Third, Abernethy and Lillis (1995) examined only 
efficiency-based measures. In contrast, Perera et al. (1997) use an instrument with a 
number of financial and non-financial measures. Thus, Perera et al. (1997) study the 
relationship between a customer focused manufacturing strategy and the use of non-
financial performance measures in a survey of 105 companies.  
 They find that organizations that have a customer focused manufacturing strategy, 
that is score high on both AMT and AMP, use relatively more non-financial measures. 
AMP seems to have a stronger impact than AMT.  
 Although Chenhall (1997) is not explicitly considering antecedents of non-financial 
performance measures use, his data indicates a univariate relationship between using 
TQM strategies and emphasizing manufacturing performance measures.  
 Ittner and Larcker (1995) explore the relationship between advanced manufacturing 
practices, and non-traditional information and reward systems.10 As a proxy for 
advanced manufacturing practices they use TQM, because this is argued to be the 
starting point of all operational strategies.11 Traditional managerial accounting 
systems are defined as systems that provide aggregated financial information, 
operational control is based on variances from budgeted standards, and the reward 
system is built upon financial performance measures. In contrast, a non-traditional 
system gives more timely physical measures of operational performance, gives 
information for causes of differences with standards, and the rewards are based upon 
more non-financial performance measures.  
 They find empirical support for the hypothesis that organizations that have a TQM-
strategy use more non-traditional information and reward systems, compared to 
organizations that do not have this strategy. 
 The study of Ittner and Larcker (1997) is similar to their study of 1995, and uses 
the same sample of 249 surveyed companies. They examine the relationships between 
a quality oriented strategy, and the use of strategic control practices. The strategic 
                                                          
9Next to the relationship between performance measures and flexibility they also examine the 
relationship between manufacturing flexibility and integrative liaisons. This factor had a stronger effect 
on the use of non-financial measures than the design of the performance measurement system. 
10
 Results from both studies of Ittner and Larcker (1995, 1997) should be used carefully. Especially the 
financial/non-financial dimension in the second paper is only one aspect of strategic control systems 
considered.  
11
 If this is the case, TQM is an antecedent of other operational strategies. This has an impact on the 
specification for other studies, that is TQM can have either a direct impact on the use of non-financial 
measures or an indirect effect via operational strategies.  For example, in Perera et al. (1997) AMT and 
AMP are both determinants of the use of non-financial performances. 
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control practices have to supplement the financial controls such as budgets, and short-
term profits. The hypothesis that organizations placing a greater emphasis on quality 
in their strategy also use more quality related strategic control practices was 
supported. 
 The results of Ittner and Larcker (1995, 1997) are corroborated in van der Stede et 
al. (2001). In a sample of 128 US and Belgian managers they also find evidence that 
companies with a quality based manufacturing strategy use non-financial measures 
more extensively. Surprisingly, companies also use the financial measures more 
extensively when using a quality oriented manufacturing strategy.    
 Carr et al. (1997) examine differences between 65 ISO accredited and 42 non-ISO 
accredited companies in reporting quality in physical (and financial terms) and 
traditional performance measures.12 Some support was found that ISO-accredited 
organizations use more physical (non-financial) measures. No support was found that 
ISO accredited organizations use more financial quality measures, and use less 
traditional performance measures, where traditional performance measurement is, for 
example, variance analyses, and financial quality measures are, for example, cost of 
quality. Less traditional performance measures were expected because they are less 
useful with strategies that have long-term benefits. The results suggest that traditional 
performance measures and physical (non-financial) measures are used as 
complements instead of supplements.  
 Banker et al. (1993) examine the relationship between reporting manufacturing 
performance measures (MPM) to workers while implementing practices like TQM, 
JIT, and teamwork. The underlying motivation for this hypothesis is that when 
workers are encouraged to find ways of improving processes, productivity and 
products, they need information to do so. 
 In a sample of 362 shopfloor workers, they find empirical support that 
organizations that implement TQM, JIT, and teamwork report more manufacturing 
performance measures, about quality and productivity, to their shopfloor workers. 
More specific, providing workers with charts about defects, schedule compliance, and 
machine breakdowns are fruitful ways of reporting when TQM, JIT and teamwork 
strategies are implemented. Using the shopfloor workers as unit of analysis instead of 
middle managers or CEO's is a distinguishing characteristic of this study.  
 In the study of Ittner et al. (1997) of determinants of the relative weight placed on 
financial and non-financial measures in CEO's bonus contracts, companies that 
emphasize a total quality strategy placed a higher relative weight on non-financial 
measures. These results are from a survey of 317 firms. 
 Summarizing the studies, there is a substantive body of evidence that suggests that 
organizations that have operational strategies such as TQM, JIT or a customer focused 
strategy, use relatively more non-financial performance measures for control or 
reward purposes.  
 
2.4.3 Organizational strategy 
 
 Three studies investigate organizational strategy as an antecedent of non-financial 
measure use. From a sample of 317 organizations, Ittner et al. (1997) consider 
determinants of the relative weight of financial and non-financial measures in the 
                                                          
12
 First, a manipulation check was done that ISO-accredited companies really had a quality focused 
strategy and better developed quality practices. This test was executed because organizations can also 
strive for ISO accreditation only fur the purpose of certification signaling to customers. For 7 of the 8 
aspects ISO accredited companies used these practices more. 
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CEO’s contract. They find that non-financial measures had a higher weight for 
organizations with a prospect strategy compared with a defender strategy. The 
explanation for this is that organizations with a prospect strategy focus on new 
product/service market opportunities, and quickly need to adapt to changes in the 
environment. This strategy may need a considerable time to turn into improved 
financial results. Therefore, short-run financial measures might not capture all these 
effects in this situation. In contrast, a defender strategy focuses on operating 
efficiency and therefore short-run financial measures may be suitable.    
 In contrast, Van der Stede et al. (2001) find hardly any support for a correlation 
between organizational strategy, i.e., on the differentiation versus cost-leadership 
distinction, and increased use of non-financial measures in a survey of 128 Belgian 
and US managers. Only the customer-oriented non-financial measures were used 
more in a differentiation strategy.  
 Morisette (1998) also finds no relationship between the mix of information that 
managers use, that is financial versus non-financial information, and the strategy of 
the organization, in which strategy is measured by the prospect versus defender 
continuum (Miles and Snow, 1978). The data in this study is gathered by way of 
direct observation, archival data, and questionnaires and interviews of 42 managers 
from production, marketing and human resource functions. This data is collected from 
three manufacturing and three service organizations. 
 In sum, one study that uses organizational strategy as an antecedent for non-
financial performance measures use finds a relationship (Ittner et al., 1997). In 
contrast, Morissette (1998) and Van der Stede et al. (2001) find no relationship 
between organizational strategy and the relative use of non-financial performance 
measures.  
 
2.4.4 Other antecedents 
 
 A number of additional variables are investigated that can be determinants of non-
financial performance measures use. Ittner et al. (1997) review determinants that 
drive the relative share of financial and non-financial indicators in the incentive 
scheme of CEO's. This study concentrates specifically on the formal compensation 
scheme. The focus of the study is on annual formula-based bonus plans, because these 
over-emphasize short-term accounting returns and discourage long-term investments 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992).    
 They find that when financial measures have more noise, that is the performance 
measure is not a good indicator for the effort of managers, non-financial measures 
have a relatively higher weight. There are no relationships found with the level of 
financial distress, the value of CEO's equity holdings relative to salary and bonus, and 
the influence of the CEO over the board of directors. This last factor was motivated 
by Eccles and Mavrinac's (1995) study. They found that investors and market analysts 
believe that reported non-financial measures may be biased, and its computation may 
change over time, allowing the measure to be more easily manipulated. So when 
CEO's have more influence over the board they try to be evaluated more on non-
financial measures.  
 Morisette's (1998) explanatory study identifies factors that influence the proportion 
of financial and non-financial information in the managers’ mix of information used 
for performance monitoring. Empirical support is provided for the propositions that 
managers use relatively more non-financial performance measures in their 
information mix when managers perceive their task-technology as routine, perceive 
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they are evaluated by their superior on non-financial measures, and have more 
experience. The assumption that experienced workers have a better understanding of a 
few critical causal relationships between their work and performance explains this last 
relationship. Their focus is therefore on the non-financial measures of these 
relationships.  
 In contrast, relatively more financial information is used when managers perceive 
their task-technology as non-routine13, perceive they are evaluated by their superior 
on financial measures, and have less experience. No relationship was found with the 
perceived level of external environmental uncertainty or the level of managers14, i.e., 
strategic, tactical or operational. The most important factor found by Morissette 
(1998), but not used as a prior proposition in the study, was the difference between a 
throughput function versus an output function. Managers in an output (throughput) 
function all used relatively more financial (non-financial) performance measures.  
This result is also found in Bruns and McKinnon's (1993) field study. They find that 
manufacturing managers, i.e., a throughput function, use more operational non-
financial measures, whereas marketing and sales managers, i.e., an output function, 
use more financial measures. 
 Schiff and Hoffman (1996) examine whether managers use different measures for 
the evaluation of managers or departments. This hypothesis is motivated by the 
controllability principle, that is not all factors which drive divisional performance can 
be controlled by managers. Therefore, the use of different performance measures for 
evaluating managers or departments is expected. 
 They did an experiment with 54 executives from a large retail organization. These 
managers were given 51 cases of 4 financial and 4 non-financial measures. Based on 
these measures they had to assess the overall performance of either managers or 
departments. They find the following results. First, executives used for the evaluation 
of departments and managers both financial and non-financial measures. Second, for 
the evaluation of managers, executives placed a higher weight on non-financial 
measures, while for the evaluation of departments the weight on financial measures 
was higher.  
 Coates et al. (1992) investigate the differences in use of performance measures 
between different countries. The data used are 45 interviews from 5 multinationals 
each in Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Their conclusions are 
somewhat strange. First, companies in the US used more non-financial performance 
measures compared with their German and UK counterparts. Second, German 
multinationals used more market share and return on sales performance measures. 
Third, UK companies’ performance measures were set out in more detail. The results 
are based on a small sample, and therefore, must be interpreted with caution. The 
results are explained by the influence of cultural and structural factors, such as the 
strong influence of the capital market in US and UK compared to Germany. However, 
one would expect that when the capital market has a stronger influence more financial 
performance measures would be used. In addition, differences between industries 
were found.  
 The studies in this section have an exploratory character. The variables are 
examined only once and therefore any conclusions should be derived cautiously. 
However, the studies seem to indicate that non-financial measures are used more often 
when financial measures have more noise (Ittner et al. 1997), managers are evaluated 
                                                          
13
 Which was influenced by experience. Managers who were in their position for a short time saw their 
job as non-routine. 
14
 There was only an indirect relationship via the functional area of the manager.   
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instead of departments (Schiff and Hoffman, 1996), in throughput functions instead of 
output functions, when managers perceive they are evaluated on non-financial 
measures, managers see their task as non-routine, and managers have more experience 
(Morissette, 1998).     
 
2.4.5 Summary 
 
 In sum, there is a considerable body of evidence that gives support for a number of 
antecedents for non-financial performance measures use. Comparing the results for 
the operational strategies (e.g., JIT, TQM) with the organizational strategies (e.g., 
build versus harvest) seems to suggest that the former has more impact on the use of 
non-financial measures. One possible explanation for this result is that the 
organizational strategy variables only have an impact on non-financial measures 
related to customers, whereas the operational strategies have an impact on all kinds of 
aspects of the organization (Van der Stede et al., 2001).  
 The studies are summarized in table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2: Overview of studies that examine antecedents of non-financial performance measures use 
Author(s) Antecedent Financial/non-financial 
dimension 
 
Unit of 
analysis 
Abernethy and  
Lillis (1995) 
 
Manufacturing flexibility strategy  Efficiency/flexibility  
measures 
Middle-
managers 
 
Perera et al. 
(1997) 
Customer focused manufacturing 
strategy  
Financial /non-financial 
performance measures 
 
Middle-
managers 
Chenhall  
(1997) 
Customer focused manufacturing 
strategy 
Manufacturing 
performance measures 
 
Middle-
managers 
Ittner and 
Larcker (1995) 
 
TQM-strategy  Information and reward 
system 
 
Middle-
managers 
Ittner and  
Larcker (1997) 
 
Quality oriented strategy Strategic control systems  
 
Middle-
managers 
Carr et al. 
(1997) 
 
ISO accreditation Quality controls CEO's,  
Middle-
managers 
 
Banker et al. 
(1993) 
 
TQM, JIT, and team work strategies  Reporting manufacturing 
performance measures to 
shopfloor workers 
 
Shopfloor 
workers 
Ittner  et al. 
(1997) 
TQM- strategy, prospect/defender 
strategy, noise in financial indicator, 
CEO's influence over the board, 
financial distress, CEO's value of 
equity  holdings relative to salary and 
bonuses  
 
Weight of financial non-
financial measures in 
CEO's compensation 
scheme  
CEO's 
24 Chapter 2 Literature review  
 
 
Table 2.2: Overview of studies that examine antecedents of non-financial performance measures use 
(continued) 
Morissette 
(1998) 
Prospect/defender strategy, Perceived 
external environmental uncertainty, 
experience, perceived evaluation, task-
technology, level managers, use of 
information, throughput/output 
function  
 
Use of financial and non-
financial performance in 
information mix 
Strategic, 
tactical, and 
operational 
managers 
Schiff and 
Hoffman 
(1996) 
 
 
Department/manager evaluation Financial/non-financial 
measures  
 
Department, 
middle-
managers 
 
Coates et al. 
(1992) 
Countries Financial/non-financial 
performance measures 
 
Multi- 
Nationals 
Van der Stede 
et al. (2001) 
Low cost/differentiating strategy, 
quality based manufacturing strategy 
 
Financial/non-financial 
performance measures 
Middle-
managers 
Notes: 
The table provides information about the author(s), the antecedent variable(s), the financial/non-
financial dimension, and the unit of analysis. 
 
2.5 Performance effects of non-financial performance measure use  
 
  A considerable number of studies explore the performance impact of emphasizing 
non-financial measures relatively more. These studies often use a contingency 
approach, i.e., they test the performance impact of a match between the contingency 
variable and the emphasis on non-financial measures.  
 Abernethy and Lillis (1995) find that organizations that emphasize non-financial 
measures relatively more and have a manufacturing flexibility strategy perform better 
than organizations that do not have this match. From the interviews they held an 
interesting point emerged, that is about the moment you measure performance. Some 
organizations only recently changed their performance measurement system (PMS), 
or were still in the process of doing so. Nevertheless, performance had improved for 
organizations with the appropriate match. This point will be discussed more 
extensively in the discussion section.  
 In contrast, Perera et al.  (1997) do not find support for any performance effect 
when organizations have the appropriate match between a customer focused strategy 
and operation based non-financial performance measures.  
 Ittner and Larcker (1995) find little support for the hypothesis that organizations 
that have a match between a TQM-strategy and non-traditional information and 
reward systems perform better. They used return-on-assets and quality as performance 
measures. This performance hypothesis is also tested with a time lag in performance 
after implementation of TQM and information and reward systems. This is examined 
by using the dependent variable of performance from the current period and TQM and 
information and reward systems practices of three years ago. The highest performers 
in the sample were organizations that used both little traditional information and 
reward systems and little formal TQM-practices. This suggests that formal strategic 
control practices might have a negative impact on performance. 
 Ittner and Larcker's (1997) study gives the same result as their 1995 study with a 
slightly different concept, i.e., quality oriented strategy and strategic control practices.   
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 A third study that finds a similar result is Van der Stede et al. (2001). In their 
sample companies that use a quality based manufacturing strategy, and place much 
emphasis on non-financial measures also perform worse than companies that only use 
a quality oriented strategy without a formal control system.15   
 Chenhall (1997) investigates whether the relationship between TQM and 
performance is influenced by the use of manufacturing performance measures 
(MPM).16 He motivates this hypothesis from the notion that many TQM-initiatives do 
not give the predicted effects for profitability improvements if complementary parts in 
the organization, such as the PMS, are not adapted. In a sample of 39 organizational 
units, supporting evidence is found for this conjecture. 
 Chenhall (1997) controls for implementation effects of the new PMS by selecting 
the sample from organizations that implemented the PMS at least three years ago 
(analogous to Simons (1987)). Further, the sample has no organizations that use 
AMT. Otherwise, the study could measure the effect from the study of Perera et al. 
(1997). Chenhall (1997) gives different directions for further research. First, it would 
be interesting to follow the development of TQM and MPM’s over time. Second, he 
suggests that it will be important to study how non-financial indicators combine with 
traditional financial performance measures. 
 Sim and Killough (1998) assess the impact on different dimensions of performance 
of complementaries between TQM or JIT, and providing specific goals, performance 
measures, and incentives in line with these strategies. The subjects in this sample were 
83 directors of manufacturing. First, they find that the interaction of TQM or JIT, and 
providing specific goals had a positive impact on quality and customer performance. 
Second, they find no support that the interaction between TQM or JIT and providing 
non-financial measures more frequently had a positive impact on quality and customer 
performance. Finally, they find that providing incentives in the case of a TQM or JIT 
strategy has a positive impact on quality and customer performance. In this study, 
performance is measured by less aggregated components of performance. It is unclear, 
however, whether the benefits are worth the additional costs of providing more 
information. 
 Govindarajan and Gupta (1985) examine the relationship between organizational 
strategy and the use of short-run versus long-run criteria in the determination of the 
incentive scheme for SBU managers. Organizational strategy is operationalized with 
the build or harvest continuum. Long-run criteria consist of the items sales growth, 
research and development, market share, new product development, market 
development, personal development, and political and public affairs. Short-run criteria 
consist of the items ROI, cost controls, cash flows, operating profits and profit 
margins. Thus, although they use the labels short-run and long-run criteria, the scales 
used consists out of financial and non-financial performance measures. 
 From a sample of 58 strategic business units they find empirical support that a 
greater reliance on long-run criteria for determination of the SBU general managers’ 
bonuses is more effective (profitable) with a build strategy. Surprisingly, a greater 
reliance on short-run criteria in combination with a harvest strategy is not more 
                                                          
15
 They find that companies that make extensive use of subjective measures and a quality based 
manufacturing strategy are the highest performers. 
16
 Although Chenhall answers the research question whether the relationship between TQM and 
performance is moderated by the reliance on MPM, the statistical method used also answers the 
question whether the relationship between the reliance on MPM and performance is moderated by 
TQM. 
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effective. The interpretation for these results seems to be that short-run measures are 
always important, while long-run criteria are only important in a build strategy.       
 Although being one of the first who examined the use of relatively more non-
financial measures, they already recognized the caveats in this research, that are the 
difficulties of measuring performance (effectiveness) and the cross-sectional 
methodology. 
 In sum, the results for the performance hypothesis, when the appropriate match 
between operational strategies and non-financial performance measure exists are 
unclear. Although Abernethy and Lillis (1995), Chenhall (1997), and Sim and 
Killough (1998) present favorable results, Perera et al. (1997) and Ittner and Larcker 
(1995, 1997) find no effect.  
 The studies discussed above are all cross-sectional studies. Therefore, these studies 
are all subject to the same caveats. First, the outcome measures used to indicate the 
success of emphasizing non-financial measures relatively more are short-term 
outcome measures that do not incorporate the full performance effects (Perera et al., 
1997).  Second, since the studies use a cross-sectional methodology, performance is 
measured at one moment and therefore does not capture long-term performance 
effects of emphasizing non-financial performance measures (Perera et al., 1997).  
 These problems motivated Banker et al. (2000b) to consider performance effects of 
placing more emphasis on non-financial performance measures in the evaluation and 
reward system of managers in a longitudinal study. Pooled time-series of 6 years of 
monthly data from 18 hotels from one hotel chain were available for the analyses.17 
From the quasi-experimental design, the impact of the change in the performance 
measurement system is examined on both financial and non-financial dimensions of 
performance. After including non-financial measures in the compensation contract of 
the managers, the customer satisfaction measures increased. Furthermore, the revenue 
and profit measures rose, when relatively more emphasis was placed on non-financial 
performance measures in the compensation contract. In contrast to their expectation, 
the cost measure was not rising. This was expected because the emphasis on the cost 
measures is decreasing after including the customer satisfaction measures in the 
contract, and in addition, increasing customer satisfaction may cost money. 
 The results for the performance hypothesis are summarized in table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3: Overview of studies that examine performance effects of non-financial performance 
measures use 
 Author(s) 
 
 
Fit between contingency variable and non-financial performance 
measure use1 
Performance 
hypothesis 
Confirmed? 
 
Abernethy and 
Lillis (1995) 
 
Manufacturing flexibility and manufacturing performance 
measures 
 
Yes 
Perera et al. (1997) Customer focused strategy and operation based non-financial 
measures 
 
No 
Chenhall (1997)  TQM and manufacturing performance measures 
 
Yes 
Ittner and Larcker 
(1995) 
 
TQM and non-traditional performance and reward systems 
 
No 
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 Limited control data was available from hotels of the same hotel chain that were franchised. 
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Table 2.3: Overview of studies that examine performance effects of non-financial performance 
measures use (continued) 
Ittner and Larcker 
(1997) 
 
Quality oriented strategies and strategic controls 
 
No 
Van der Stede et 
al. (2001) 
 
Quality based manufacturing strategy and non-financial 
performance measure use 
Low cost/differentiation and non-financial performance measures 
use 
  
No 
 
No 
Govindarjan  and 
Gupta (1985) 
 
Build/harvest and providing long-run/short-run in the bonus 
system 
 
Yes 
Sim and Killough 
(1998) 
TQM/JIT and providing specific goals 
TQM/JIT and providing performance measures 
TQM/JIT and providing incentives  
 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Banker et al 
(2000b) 
 
2
 Yes 
Notes: 
The table provides information about the author(s), the financial/non-financial dimension, the 
antecedent variable(s), and whether there is support for the performance hypothesis. 
1 I do not distinguish between different types of “fit” (see Venkatraman, 1989).  
2
 Banker et al. (2000b) do not consider moderators in the relationship. 
 
2.6 Discussion and future research 
  
2.6.1 Relationships between financial and non-financial performance measures 
 
 Anderson et al. (1994), Amir and Lev (1996), Behn and Riley (1997), Ittner and 
Larcker (1998a), Banker et al. (2000b) and Nagar and Rajan (2001) give support for 
the argument that non-financial performance measures can be leading indicators for 
dimension of financial performance. Table 2.1 summarizes these studies. The methods 
used in the studies differ, and the samples are from different industries. This raises a 
number of issues.  
 First, to explore relationships between financial and non-financial performance 
measures, and specially to find a time lag, time-series data are needed. Chances to 
find comparable time-series about performance measures for a large sample of 
companies are almost zero. However, an obvious disadvantage of the industry or 
organization specific samples used in the studies is the generalizability of the results 
to other samples. Another disadvantage of industry or organization specific studies is 
the ability to test contingency variables in the relationships. Industry or organization 
specific studies will probably show less variation in contingency variables, because 
organizations from one industry are on average more homogeneous. Therefore, the 
only solution seems to be to examine the relationships between financial and non-
financial measures, and the time lag, with time-series data of one or a small set of 
organizations, and contingencies that influence these relationships or the time lag, in 
large sample (cross-sectional) studies. 
 Second, for the time lag between improved non-financial measures and improved 
financial measures little research is done. In a few studies an arbitrary time lag is used 
(Anderson et al., 1994; Ittner and Larcker, 1998a; Behn and Riley, 1999; Nagar and 
Rajan, 2001). The method used in Banker et al. (2000b) to explore the time lag from 
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the data is the first try to specify the lag from the data.18 The specification used to 
explore this time lag is (given without control variables): 
 
.** 1211 tttt NFFF εββα +++= −−  (2.1) 
 
In which Ft is a financial measure and NFt-1 is the lagged non-financial measure. In 
this specification β2 gives the impact of the lagged non-financial performance 
measure on future financial performance. The motivation to incorporate Ft-1 in the 
specification is that if non-financial measures have no additional value over financial 
measures, only the financial measures can be used instead.  
 The time lag search is carried out by adding lagged non-financial measures, i.e., 
NFt-2, NFt-3, etc., in equation (2.1) until the “best model” is found. This time lag 
search assumes, however, that the impact of an increasing non-financial measure is 
immediately affecting the financial measure in period t+1. This is not necessarily 
congruent within the concepts of leading and lagging measures. It is equally likely 
that the non-financial measure at t has an impact on the financial measure not before 
for example t+3. Further, the time lag found in Banker et al. (2000b) between the two 
non-financial measures and all financial measures, i.e., cost, revenues, and profits, is 
six months. Whether this is a coincidence or a restriction in the analysis is not clear 
from this paper. 
 The different methods used in the studies to assess the lag between improved non-
financial measures and improved financial measures means that they implicitly use 
different definitions. Most studies use an arbitrary lag and therefore implicitly assume 
that the impact of non-financial measures on future financial measures starts not 
before, for example, 6 months and that the complete impact of the improved non-
financial measures materializes in this period. This assumption leads to an 
understatement of the impact of non-financial measures on future financial measures 
both when the actual lag is shorter and longer and therefore, I conjecture that this 
leads to measurement error and that the effects found are therefore smaller than the 
“real” effects. In contrast, the lag search procedure used in Banker et al. (2000b) 
assumes that the impact of non-financial measures has an immediate impact on future 
financial performance in the next period and that this impact vanishes after, for 
example, 6 months.  
 It is often assumed that non-financial measures are better indicators for future 
financial performance. The specification used in equation (2.1), however, is not 
testing this. Instead, it tests whether non-financial measures explain additional 
variation over the financial measure at t-1 of the financial measure, not necessarily 
more. Explaining additional variation is called the incremental information concept 
(Biddle et al., 1995). In contrast, the question whether non-financial measures are 
better indicators than lagged financial measures for future financial performance, is 
the relative information content. Related to this observation is the fact that value-
relevance of non-financial performance measures, i.e., whether they explain more 
than the lagged dependent financial measure, is not the same as usefulness for control 
purposes.  For example, it is often argued that non-financial measures are more 
informative about causes than financial measures are (Singleton-Green, 1993). Thus, 
                                                          
18
 This results of course in a data driven procedure. Although it would be helpful to estimate the lag, 
and then use a holdout sample to validate this lag, this is a costly procedure. To assess the lag from the 
data, long time-series are needed, therefore the need to split this data leads to very long time-series. 
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providing non-financial measures might be more helpful for improving future 
financial performance than providing the lagged financial measures.  
 Although researchers are of course limited to work with data that is available, 
attention should be paid to the measurement of the non-financial measures. The non-
financial measures are not always measured in a reliable and valid way in 
organizations. Therefore, care should be taken with using this data in analysis 
(Lambert, 1998).  
 The literature and the review given above suggest a number of fruitful avenues for 
further research. First, Because non-financial measures are said to pay more attention 
to the long-run perspective of the organization, it is expected that a time lag between 
improved non-financial measures and improved financial measures will exist. 
However, research that examines factors that determine this lag length, is still 
unavailable. Therefore, further studies that examine determinants of the time lag 
length are valuable. A number of possible factors could be the repurchase time of 
products, and the number of competitors. Additionally, the method to test this time lag 
needs further development.  
 Second, the form of the specification used to test relationships between financial 
and non-financial measures, i.e., either level or change models, is an often discussed 
issue in this research stream. An advantage of change models is that they control for 
omitted variables in the specification (Lambert, 1998). Banker et al. (2000b), 
however, argued that level models are more appropriate, because change models 
assume that the non-financial measures from different periods have a constant impact 
on the financial measures at period t.19 This assumption is clearly not valid. Next to 
the question what the right specification from an econometric viewpoint is, the 
different models have different theoretical implications and therefore are not additive 
support for one and the same hypothesis. This should be incorporated into theory 
building in further research. 
 A further almost unexplored area is the linearity of the relationships between 
financial and non-financial measures. Although in so-called Japanese management the 
zero deficits and free quality philosophy is often advocated (Juran, 1979), diminishing 
returns to scale between improved non-financial and financial measures are very 
likely. Ittner and Larcker's (1998a) study is the only study that examines this non-
linear relationship.   
 Finally, the theoretical concepts of leading and lagging measures assume that non-
financial measures are indicators for financial measures. However, improving non-
financial measures probably will cost money first. Therefore, statistical methods that 
take the bi-directional causal nature of the relationship into account need to be used to 
explore relationships between financial and non-financial measures (Luft and Shields, 
forthcoming). This also suggests that the impact of non-financial measures on future 
financial performance is not the same for each dimension of financial performance, 
e.g., cost, revenues or profit.20    
  
                                                          
19
 Additional concerns of using change variables are its lower reliability, and dependence on the level 
of the measures (Cohen and Cohen, 1983).  
20
 In a cross-sectional data set from more than 1000 retailers, Banker and Mashruwala (2002) find 
simultaneity between customer satisfaction and revenues. They conjecture that higher customer 
satisfaction does not lead to higher revenues, but that higher revenues leads to more traffic in shops and 
therefore to lower customer satisfaction. 
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2.6.2 Use and usefulness of non-financial performance measures  
 
 The studies discussed in section 2.4 explore a large number of antecedents of non-
financial performance measures use, especially operational and organizational 
strategies. Whether organizations or organizational units perform better when they 
have the proper match between non-financial measure use and the contingency factor 
is unclear. For example, in Ittner and Larcker (1995, 1997) and Van der Stede et al. 
(2001), the highest performing companies were the companies that had a low 
emphasis on using non-financial measures, but had a quality oriented strategy.21 Carr 
et al. (1997) also argued that using a TQM-philosophy might be just as successful 
compared to a formal system. This suggests that the use of formal controls might 
inhibit increased performance.  
 Govindarajan and Gupta (1985), Carr et al. (1997), and Van der Stede et al. (2001) 
find that non-financial measures are used more with a build strategy, in ISO-
accredited organizations, or with a quality based manufacturing strategy, but that 
financial measures are not used less in these situations. This suggests that financial 
measures are always important but that non-financial measures are important only in 
certain circumstances.22 
 The studies that identify determinants of the relative use of non-financial 
performance measures show a heterogeneous picture. The studies seem to be an 
example of the disappointing state of nature of contingency theory of management 
accounting as shown in Otley (1980). One variable is never used twice in different 
studies, even by the same authors (for example, see Ittner and Larcker, 1995, 1997).  
 The measurement of effectiveness in contingency theory is a problem in general 
(Otley, 1980). There are several aspects of this problem specific for this subject. First, 
because non-financial measures are said to place more emphasis on the long-run 
position of the organization, long-run impacts can be expected. However, the 
performance measure used to assess effectiveness is often measured at one point in 
time, and therefore does not capture this effect. Thus, while the problems of an 
appropriate outcome variable are a general concern, it is even bigger in the area of 
non-financial performance measures use. Ittner and Larcker (1995, 1997) are partly 
controlling for this effect by explaining current performance by lagged practices. This 
also mitigates effects of implementation, i.e., the companies are in different states of 
implementation.  
 A second problem is that programs, such as TQM and investments in more new 
manufacturing practices, are more often implemented at moments that organizations 
are facing bad times instead of being on track. This will influence the perceived 
usefulness of the change in the performance measurement system. Thus, the moment 
of measuring effectiveness is important (Abernethy and Lillis, 1995).   
 Next to the moment of measuring, the instruments used to measure performance 
are different in each study. This further inhibits the comparability of the results. First, 
Sim and Killough (1998) assess performance on non-financial dimensions. Second, 
Chenhall (1997) and Perera et al. (1997) measure performance growth. Third, Ittner 
and Larcker (1995, 1997) use both return-on-assets, and a quality measure. Finally, 
                                                          
21
 In contrast, Van der Stede et al. (2001) find that companies that have a quality based manufacturing 
strategy and use subjective performance measures are the highest performers.  
22
 This result implies that the total emphasis on performance measures is not constant. When in the case 
of a build strategy or with ISO-accredited companies financial measures keep the same emphasis and 
the emphasis on non-financial measures increases, this means that the total emphasis on performance 
measures increases. 
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Abernethy and Lillis (1993) compare performance of departments to other 
departments, but do not specify on which dimension(s) of performance this is done. 
Banker et al. (2000b) assess a change in the contract of managers, from using 
relatively more financial to using relatively more non-financial measures, on both 
financial and non-financial dimensions of performance. Otley (1980, p. 424) gives as 
advice for measuring effectiveness that: 
 
“the evaluation of the appropriateness of particular varieties of accounting control 
systems must therefore take place by comparison with a range of measures of 
effectiveness, at both an organizational and individual level of analysis”. 
 
However, he meant that a particular system should be evaluated on a number of 
different performance dimensions in one study, not that each study should pick its 
own measure. 
 Sim and Killough (1998) use an absolute level of performance23, whereas Chenhall 
(1997) uses a relative measure, which is compared to the industry. Performance on a 
relative measure compared to the industry depends on practices of other companies in 
the industry, whereas an absolute measure does not. For example, when all companies 
in an industry use a TQM strategy in combination with the appropriate level of non-
financial performance measures use, no performance effect is expected when a 
relative measure is used. 
 Assessing the impact of the use of non-financial performance measures on  
performance at the individual level is not done so far. A skillful borrowing from the 
‘Reliance on accounting performance measures’-debate can be done, in which 
outcome variables like job-related-tension (JRT) and dysfunctional behavior are used. 
 The limitations of measuring performance in cross-sectional studies motivated 
Banker et al. (2000b) to assess performance effects of using more non-financial 
measures in the contracts of managers in a longitudinal study. This in itself valuable 
approach is problematic because it is difficult to get a control group for the units that 
use more non-financial measures. Further, it is difficult to test contingency measures 
in the relationships.  
 In general, the studies that measure performance hardly motivate the outcome 
measure used. Further research should make it explicit on which dimension of 
performance, i.e., individual, non-financial or financial, improvements are expected. 
 Another characteristic of these studies is the different measurement scales used for 
the financial versus non-financial construct. Abernethy and Lillis (1995) were one of 
the first to develop a measurement scale. Although others have created instruments 
based on this scale, they are all different. This is also a sign that the research area of 
non-financial measurement is relatively young. Two different methods are used to 
measure the relative use of financial and non-financial performance measures. First, 
several financial and non-financial performance measures are given. The respondents 
assess on a Likert-scale the use or emphasis of these performance measures in their 
organization (Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; Abernethy and Lillis, 1995; Perera et 
al., 1997; Van der Stede et al., 2001). This method could be rationalized by the 
argument that non-financial performance measures often have a different meaning and 
relevance in specific industries, and therefore the scales should be adapted for each 
study. However, the diverse samples used in each individual study are not supporting 
this argument.  The use of a common set of performance measures for companies 
from different industries might therefore influence the results. Second, a relative 
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 For example, one item is the percent of customer complaints.  
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measure of the financial versus non-financial construct, either a Likert or percentage 
scale, is used (Chenhall, 1997; Ittner et al., 1997; Morisette, 1998). The discussion 
above suggests that the second way might be a more precise scale, because this 
approach is more neutral to the different meaning of non-financial performance 
measures in different industries.24  
 Summarizing the discussion about the non-financial versus financial dimension, 
further attention should be paid to develop the financial versus non-financial 
construct. For example, by considering the number of dimensions in the items used 
with factor analysis. In addition, the question whether the financial versus non-
financial dimension has any discriminant validity from, for example, scales that 
measure accounting versus non-accounting should be answered. 
 A major econometric problem is that the contingency variables and the non-
financial performance measurement use are both choice variables for the organization. 
Therefore, the independent variables are endogenous in the performance hypotheses. 
This leads to problems of endogeneity and simultaneity, which are difficult to solve 
(Ittner and Larcker, 1997, 2001). 
 Another difference between the studies is the purpose of using non-financial 
measures. It might make a difference whether non-financial measures are used for 
decision-making purposes or for decision control (Zimmerman, 1997). For example, 
in Govindarajan and Gupta (1985), Ittner et al. (1997), and Banker et al. (2000b) the 
non-financial measures are used for the bonus of the managers. In Banker et al. 
(1993), Chenhall (1997), and Perera et al. (1997) the measures are only provided to 
the managers to make better decisions. Perera et al. (1997) suggest that the advantages 
of the use of non-financial measures, in their case operation-based measures, are more 
motivational than instrumental.25 This suggests that by giving managers specific goals 
they are only improving on these measures, whereas this is not necessary beneficial 
for the organization.26 In contrast, in Sim and Killough (1998) the hypotheses related 
to giving specific performance goals, and contingent rewards, i.e., motivational 
variables, are significant, whereas only providing the measures is not.27 Therefore, the 
purpose for using non-financial measures, for example for compensation or decision 
making, should get more attention in the theories underlying future studies. 
 With respect to the samples, in the studies that address contingencies mostly 
samples are used from manufacturing organizations (Banker et al., 1993; Abernethy 
and Lillis, 1995; Chenhall, 1997; Ittner and Larcker, 1995, 1997; Sim and Killough, 
1998), as the available literature is of course biased by the ‘operational strategy’-
contingency factor studies. Relatively less attention is paid to service organizations.28 
Although there is no a priori reason that things might be different in such 
organizations, it would be interesting to test this.  
  
                                                          
24
 However, this approach has the problem that it leaves too much to the perception of respondents. 
25
 Motivational means that managers have a specific goals which they try to maximize and instrumental 
is to help the managers implementing strategies by providing measures and giving feedback about these 
strategies. 
26
 This not only suggest that the motivational premise is stronger than the instrumental, but also 
implicitly means that the non-financial measures are not good indicators for financial performance. 
27
 It is interesting to compare this with the evaluation of ABC-systems. Anderson and Young (1999) 
find that providing rewards is one an important factor for ABC system evaluation. 
28
 A notable exception is Morissette (1998), who examines three manufacturing and three service 
organizations, but finds no differences. 
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2.7 Summary and conclusions 
 
 This chapter reviews two related branches of literature about non-financial 
performance measurement. The first branch are papers that examine relationships 
between financial and non-financial performance measures. All studies suggest that 
the non-financial measures are indicators for either current or future financial 
performance. Little evidence is available about a possible time lag between leading, 
i.e., non-financial measures, and lagging measures, i.e., financial measures. Although 
premature, there is evidence that relationships between non-financial measures and 
financial measures might be non-linear. 
 Further research in this branch should pay attention to contingency factors that 
influence the relationships between specific non-financial and financial measures, and 
that influence the time lag. The specifications used for testing the relationships 
between non-financial measures and financial measures, and the possible time lags, 
i.e., equation (1.1), need further development.  
 The second part examined antecedents of non-financial measure use, and 
contingency factors that influence the relationship between non-financial performance 
measure use and performance. Of the antecedents of non-financial measure use there 
is consistent evidence that when organizations or organization units have operational 
strategies like TQM or JIT, non-financial measures are used or emphasized more.  
Also, when organizations have a build or prospector strategy more non-financial 
measures are used than when organizations have a harvest or defender strategy. For a 
number of other determinants tested, it is too early to derive conclusions. Results on 
effectiveness when the hypothesized match between non-financial performance 
measure use and the contingency factor exists are inconclusive. There are specific 
limitations with the studies that need attention in further research.  
 Especially, measuring performance needs further attention. In theory building it 
should be made clear which dimension(s) of performance, either financial, non-
financial, or individual, are expected to increase when there is a match between non-
financial measurement use and the contingency variable. This also makes it clear on 
which level, for example, at the business unit, organization, or capital market, the 
improved performance is expected. In addition, the moment of measuring is 
important. Because non-financial measures pay more attention to the long-term 
position of the organization a short-run measure might not capture the effect. 
 Second, the measurement for the construct financial versus non-financial measures 
needs to be developed further. It is not clear whether financial versus non-financial 
measures is an uni-dimensional construct, and has discriminant validity from, for 
example, accounting versus non-accounting measures.  
 Finally, since different studies consider different determinants of non-financial 
performance measures use, this might be a partly explanation for the different results 
found. Therefore, future studies should also indicate what the goal is for using the 
non-financial performance measures.  
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3.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter describes the research site where the empirical part of the dissertation 
took place. I give a description of the company, the PMS, the change in the PMS, the 
goals of this change, and the controllability of the different performance measures by 
the area managers. This is used as background information for the interpretation of the 
analysis. 
 The chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes the organization 
and gives the motivation of selecting the company for the empirical analysis. Section 
3.3 discusses the change in the PMS that took place in 1996. Section 3.4 explains the 
goals of the change in the PMS. Section 3.5 outlines the complete performance 
measurement cycle. Section 3.6 describes the controllability of the different measures.  
 
3.2 Organization 
 
 The empirical part of the study took place in the business unit Letters of PTT Post1, 
the Dutch mail company. PTT Post is a daughter of KPN Holding and has 
approximately 55.000 employees. This company was privatized in 1989 and became 
listed in 1994 (Groot and Smidt, 2000). PTT Post delivers letters, parcels, 
international mail, direct marketing mail, non-addressed advertising mail and express 
mail to private persons and businesses (Groot and Smidt, 2000). 
 The primary task of the business unit Letters is delivering the different kind of 
postal items to the right customer at a pre-specified time period. It has a monopoly for 
letters up to 500 grams. An independent agency controls the price setting policy of the 
PTT Post to ensure that they are not misusing this monopoly. Before the on average 
21 million postal items a day are delivered, the products are collected from the 
mailboxes and transported to the sorting centers. These sorting centers sort the postal 
                                                          
1
 Currently this is called TPG Post, but I will use the name of the company during the time period of 
the study. This chapter presents the company as it was during the period of study, i.e., between 1995 
and 1997. 
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items and transport them to the areas. The areas sort the products again on zip code 
and distribute the postal items to the customers.   
 Figure 3.1 describes the organization structure of PTT Post. 
 
Figure 3.1: Organizational structure of PTT Post in 1995 
 
 
Notes: 
Source: adapted from Groot and Smidt (2000). 
 
 In 1995, business unit Letters has been reorganized into two different parts, i.e., 
sorting and distribution, because both functions needed a different focus. The sorting 
part needed a stronger focus on efficiency, and the distribution part needed a stronger 
focus on quality and customer service. The distribution part of business unit Letters is 
organized into 27 geographical areas, which are all responsibility centers. The area 
manager is responsible for the performance of the entire area. Each area has a number 
of locations (10 till 30) that collect postal items, sort the postal items on zip code and 
deliver the products to the customers. Next to the locations, each area has a service 
center and a customer service center. In the service center supporting, planning, and 
financial functions are organized. In the customer center contacts with customers are 
managed. Customers can, for example, ask for faster delivery, and bundled delivery. 
The 27 area managers are the unit of analyses. All areas have homogeneous tasks and 
responsibilities. Areas only differ in, for example, size, and geographical location. 
The processes of the company are labor intensive. Therefore, the critical resources of 
the areas are employees. Of the total costs measure in the contracts of the managers 
approximately 85 percent are employees' salaries.  
 The organization is chosen for a number of reasons. First, in 1996 the organization 
made an important and substantial change in the PMS of the area managers. Further, 
quality strategy is important for the organization. Quality strategy is a moderator for 
the relationship between non-financial performance measures use and financial 
performance (Ittner and Larcker, 1995, 1997). A third reason is that data requirements 
needed a substantial number of homogeneous responsibility centers. This 
homogeneity with respect to, for example, the activities performed, and technology 
used, is a relative advantage, because less opportunities for local history exist (Mohr, 
1995).  
BU Parcel Service BU International
Social Affairs
Marketing & Sales
Process Staff
Service center Customer center
Locations
10 till 30
Areas
27
Distribution
Process Staff
Sorting Centers
12 (6)
Transport
6
International Mail Service
2
Sorting & Transport Information-technology
& Finance
BU Letters Philately BU Media Service Post Office (50%)
Operating Company
PTT Post
Operating Company
PTT Telecom
Operating Company
PTT Miscellaneous
Management Board
KPN Holding
 Chapter 3 Research site 37 
 
 
 The data collection process finished at the end of 1997, since in 1998 the sorting 
part of the BU started to automate the sorting function, which led to problems that 
also influenced the distribution function.  
  
3.3 Change in the PMS 
 
 From 1988 onwards the company used contracts for different management layers. 
With these contracts PTT Post started to make managers more accountable, give more 
financial transparency, and decentralize responsibilities to lower management levels 
(Groot and Smidt, 2000). Before 1996, area managers were evaluated and rewarded 
based on costs, revenues, and process quality measures. Higher management started a 
program to promote quality initiatives throughout the whole organization. The 
European Foundation of Quality Management (EFQM) model was used to integrate 
these initiatives. The EFQM-model is a model, comparable with the Balanced 
Scorecard, in which relationships between different performance dimensions can be 
examined, and that can help implement a quality strategy. In 1996, the area managers 
were evaluated for the first time on 5 of the 9 parts of the EFQM-model. These were 
management of personnel, management of processes, worker satisfaction, customer 
satisfaction and financial results. Worker satisfaction and customer satisfaction are the 
new performance dimensions added to the contracts. These two dimensions determine 
roughly 30 percent of the area managers' evaluation. Table 3.1 gives an overview of 
the (added) performance dimensions used in the management contracts. 
 
Table 3.1: (Added) performance measures in the contract of the 27 area managers 
Performance dimensions in the contract 
before 1996  
Performance dimensions in the contract 
after 1996    
Costs Costs 
Revenues Revenues 
Process quality Process quality 
 Customer satisfaction  
 Worker satisfaction  
 
Before the change in the PMS the company had no formal system to continually 
improve customer and worker satisfaction.   
 
“Sometimes you talked with a customer, or heard complaints, but we never really 
examined what customers thought of us” (area manager). 
 
 Apart from the change in the items of the contracts of the managers no substantial 
changes took place in the PMS in the period under study. For example, the 
distribution director who evaluates the area managers is the same person during the 
period under study. Therefore, the evaluation style is expected to be the same before 
and after the change.  
 
3.4 Goals of the change in the PMS 
 
 As mentioned before, the distribution part of the business unit needed a stronger 
focus on quality and customer service. This was necessary to prepare the company on 
the anticipated liberalization of the post market. The EFQM-model was chosen to 
integrate these initiatives. With this model the managers have an instrument to make 
tradeoffs between different dimensions of performance. Therefore, this model can be 
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considered analogue to a Balanced Scorecard. One area manager made the following 
pertinent remark: 
 
“I see the EFQM-model as a number of saucers that I should keep in the air” (area 
manager). 
 
 There was agreement among the interviewed people that within the organization 
the most critical factor to achieve improvements in performance is through increased 
employee satisfaction. The following quote from an internal document called “the 
power of quality” supports this: “In service, there is a direct relationship between 
quality and motivated employees”. When employees are more satisfied there will be 
less absenteeism. As a result, less overtime and less temporary workers will be 
needed.  This will lead to a better process quality, because relatively more mistakes 
tend to be made in overtime and by temporary workers. Improved process quality, in 
turn, may lead to a higher customer satisfaction, and lower costs (rework). Better 
process quality and a higher customer satisfaction may also lead to an increase in 
revenues. Evaluating managers on worker satisfaction and quality is also congruent 
with the oft-cited critical components for a successful quality oriented strategy, i.e., 
employee involvement and process improvement (Ittner and Larcker, 1995). 
 
3.5 Performance measurement cycle 
 
 This section describes the performance measurement system of the area managers.  
The different parts of the system, that is the management contract, the chain contract 
and the bonus system, are described.  
 The 27 area managers are evaluated yearly. In the beginning of each year, 
agreements are made between the director of distribution and each individual area 
manager about the individual performance measures. At the end of the year each area 
manager's performance is evaluated. Although area managers are not forced to copy 
these management contracts to their location managers, service center managers, and 
customer center managers, all interviewed area managers used similar items to 
evaluate their subordinates. Additionally, one area manager puts his own targets at the 
top of the contracts of his subordinates to get an integrated focus. Also, the manager 
of the customer center is held more responsible for the results of the customer 
satisfaction survey.  
 The formal evaluation is subjective, based on reaching the targets. The director of 
distribution evaluates the area managers. This evaluation mark can be adapted if the 
area managers can make it clear that there are circumstances why they did not reach 
the targets. They have to support these circumstances by facts. This suggest that the 
director of distribution has a 'profit conscious' evaluation style (Hopwood, 1972).   
 History shows that the categories of the evaluation have a normal distribution in 
most years. The evaluation mark is the basis for future promotions, salary increases, 
and for 50 percent of the bonuses. The range of the evaluation mark is from 1 till 5, 
where 3 means on target.  
 
“Getting a 2 means that you get one or two years to improve. Getting a 1 means that 
you can look for another job. If you get a 4 this means in general that you can make 
promotion within the company” (contract manager). 
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 In the management contract there are a number of measures completely under 
control of the area manager and measures that are partly influenced by the other 
functions of the business unit Letters, i.e., the sorting and transport function. For these 
latter measures, from 1994 onwards the area managers make agreements with the 
sorting managers in a so-called chain contract. When these agreements are made the 
director of sorting and distribution are also present. In the chain contracts, agreements 
are made about the % of products that are delivered within a certain time period from 
the sorting centers to the areas. Although the chain contract is not formally input for 
the career prospective, salary increase or the bonus, it has become more important 
throughout the years. The outcomes of this chain contract can also be a factor in the 
subjective evaluation of the area manager by the distribution director. Of course a 
good functioning chain is important for the area manager as well. 
 Half of the manager’s bonus is based on the management contract. The other half is 
based on the performance of the business unit as a whole. The reason that part of the 
bonus relies on the business unit performance is to motivate cooperation between 
areas.  The maximum amount of the bonus is a substantial part of the base salary.   
 
3.6 Controllability of measures by area manager 
 
 Although the respondents of the worker satisfaction survey are the workers in the 
locations, service centers, and customer centers of each area, by adding the measure to 
the contract the area manager has an incentive to develop programs to improve worker 
satisfaction. One example of what an area manager did to improve worker 
satisfaction, was that employees from the locations could give their top three of 
elements most important for their satisfaction. After reaching agreement the location 
managers had to work on these elements and give monthly feedback to the workers. 
Another manager stressed the importance of selecting location managers who know 
how to cope with people.  
 
“Although not all his selection test results were very good, the fact that he also was a 
top-referee in soccer confirmed me of his capabilities” (area manager). 
 
 The outcomes of the customer satisfaction survey can be influenced by, for 
example, after sales service, handling complaints, product innovations, and looking 
for solutions of problems customers have getting their products in time. 
 The quality measure is an on-time delivery measure. This measure is completely 
controllable by area managers.  
 The cost measure is partly exogenous for the area manager because the number of 
products delivered, which is not controllable by the area manager, is the largest cost 
driver. This number of products is taken into account in the target setting process. The 
area manager can influence the cost measure by initiating efficiency programs. Cost 
savings from these programs can be used to invest in, for example, customer 
satisfaction or worker satisfaction. 
 The revenue item in the contract consists of all parts of revenues that are 
controllable by the customer service center of the area. Since the headquarters of the 
business unit arranges contracts with large customers2 that are located in different 
parts of the Netherlands, these are excludes from the area manager’ revenue measure. 
Although for a part of their products the company is a monopolist, they cannot 
                                                          
2
 Large customers are customers with a yearly revenue of 0.5 million guilders. The marketing and sales 
department handles these customers. 
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increase their prices because this is not allowed. An independent agency controls the 
price setting policy (see section 3.2). Therefore revenues can only be increases by 
attracting more customers and increasing the number of products per customer. 
 The fact that large customers are not the responsibility of the areas implies that 
revenues minus costs is not a proper profit figure in this situation. The area managers 
are therefore evaluated on separated revenue and cost measures instead of one profit 
measure. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
 This section describes the data for the empirical analysis. Because both empirical 
studies in chapter 5 and 6 use the same data set, I define the data and give the 
descriptives before the analyses.  
 The research questions addressed in this dissertation are difficult to answer within a 
cross-sectional research design. First, the incremental information question assesses 
the impact of lagged non-financial measures on future financial performance. 
Therefore a lag search is executed, which needs time-series. Second, the evaluation 
question assesses the impact of adding non-financial measures to the contract of 
managers. Because non-financial measures are argued to focus on the long-run 
perspective, a short-run performance measure would not capture the complete 
performance effects of adding non-financial measures in the PMS (Perera et al., 
1997). Therefore a pooled time-series data set of three year monthly observation was 
collected.  
 Data about the background of the company (see chapter 3) is gathered through 
interviews with, the director distribution, the department controller, four area 
managers, the director information-technology and finance, the contract manager, the 
manager of quality issues, a location manager, the commercial director, a human 
resource manager, and a marketing manager.1 In total, 31 hours of interviews with 21 
different managers were held. In addition, internal and external documents, such as 
contracts, European Foundation of Quality Management documents, were reviewed. 
Data about the performance measures were either manually or electronically gathered 
from different departments of the organization.  
 The first observation is from January 1995 since the 27 areas exist only from that 
moment. I end the data collection in December 1997 for a number of reasons. First, 
two areas were put together after 1997. Second, in 1998 there was no worker 
satisfaction survey and therefore the managers of the areas had less incentive to 
improve worker satisfaction. Finally, from 1998 onwards the company automated 
                                                          
1
 These interviews were recorded and subsequently transcripted.  
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parts of the process. This change in technologies might contaminate with effects 
estimated. 
 This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 defines the data and the data 
sources. Section 4.3 discusses advantages and disadvantages of pooled time-series 
data and explains the fixed effects model. Section 4.4 gives the descriptives of the 
variables and correlation coefficients between variables. 
 
4.2 Variable definition    
  
 The data for the variables used in the study are from the area managers' contracts. 
These contracts consists of costs, sales, on-time delivery, customer satisfaction and 
worker satisfaction.2 The controller prepares the contracts at the end of the year for the 
managers' evaluation. For the purpose of this study I need monthly observations and 
therefore the underlying monthly data that is aggregated to yearly data for the 
contracts is gathered. 
 First, the cost variable (Costit) consists of the employee payroll and material and 
services costs. The measure in the contract is a flexible measure, i.e., it depends on the 
number of products delivered by the area. The cost measure was collected manually 
from the contract department. Second, the revenue measure (Revit) consists of the 
revenues for which the area managers are held responsible. Large customers that are 
handled at the headquarters are excluded from the measure. The revenue measure was 
collected electronically from the financial department. Both Costit and Revit are 
deflated by a consumer price index (CPIt) to control for inflation. The CPIt measure is 
collected from the Dutch Bureau of the Census (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek). 
This measure is defined as an average change in price of goods and services for 
households. In this context revenues minus costs is not the profit of the area, since the 
revenue measure in the contract does not include the revenues of large customers. 
Therefore, revenues and costs are analyzed separately. A theoretical reason to analyze 
costs and revenues separately is that both might have a different weight in the contract 
when the measures differ in congruence and noise (Banker and Datar, 1989).  
 Third, because for worker satisfaction only yearly data are available and the 
empirical analysis needs monthly observations a proxy for this measure was sought in 
the literature. Vroom (1964) argued that worker satisfaction is correlated with short-
run sickness, whereas the relationship with an overall sickness measure is less clear. 
Workers who are less satisfied are more frequently sick for a short duration. An 
overall sickness measure also measures people that are sick for a long time period, 
whereas an absence frequency measure does not. Therefore, an absence frequency 
measure was preferred to use as a proxy. In two meta-studies, McShane (1984) and 
Hackett (1989) found an effect-size of -0.21 between worker satisfaction and absence-
frequency. To ascertain the quality of the proxy in the research setting, I correlated the 
results of the yearly worker satisfaction survey3, i.e., the measure used in the contract 
with the absence-frequency index, i.e., the proxy used. This correlation was -0.44. 
This absence-frequency (Freqit) measures the number of sickness reports per 100 
working days. The measure was manually collected from the human resource 
department. 
                                                          
2
 I also tried to find a proxy that is measured each month for the annual customer satisfaction survey. 
However, candidates like the number of complains, although measured in the company, were not 
available anymore. Therefore, I cannot use this measure in the analysis.   
3
 A factor analysis indicated that the yearly worker satisfaction surveys was uni-dimensional. 
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 Finally, a quality measure for the number of rightly supplied products within a 
certain pre-specified period is available. This measure (OTDit) is a ratio of the number 
of rightly supplied products within a pre-specified time period divided by the total 
number of supplied products. Therefore this is an on-time delivery measure. This 
measure was manually collected from internal reports from the Quality department.4 
 Next to the measures from the area managers' contract, in some models I use 
control variables. In the models with Costit as dependent variables, the number of 
products processed in each period is used as a control variable, because the area 
manager cannot control this number. This measure Volit, is defined as the number of 
products delivered in each time period for each area.  
 In the model with Freqit as dependent variable, I control for the number of 
Saturday workers, since McShane (1984) found that age and experience moderated 
the strength of the relationship between worker satisfaction and absence-frequency. 
Therefore a control is used for workers on Saturday (Rsatit), because these are 
employees with different characteristics than the regular employees. Most often they 
are students and are therefore younger and have less experience. Additionally, 
interviews with human resource managers confirmed the idea that the Saturday 
workers are less often sick. Rsatit is the number of Saturday workers divided by the 
total number of workers in each period. In addition, next to using dummies for each 
month to control for a seasonal pattern in Freqit another control variable used is 
influenza epidemics (IAZit). These epidemics are not always in the same month. Using 
indicator variables, being 1 for months where on average more than 20 out of 10.000 
people went to a family doctor in one of four geographical regions and 0 otherwise. 
This cutoff point of 20 out of 10.000 people is used by the Netherlands institute of 
primary health care to establish when there is an influenza epidemic. 
 All variables used in the empirical analyses in chapter 5 and 6, and its definitions 
are summarized in table 4.1.  
                                                          
4
 In addition, a second on-time delivery measure was available for a small product group. This variable 
was also used in the analysis. However, since the variable has hardly any variance the measure was not 
significant in any model. Therefore I choose not to report results for this variable.   
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Table 4.1: Variables definitions  
Variable Definition 
 
Revit The revenue measure from the contract of area managers of area i in period t. The measure 
is deflated by CPIt.  
 
Costit The cost measure from the contract of area managers of area i in period t. The measure is 
deflated by CPIt. The cost measure consists of employee salaries, and material and service 
costs. 
 
CPIt The Consumer price index in period t from the Dutch Bureau of the Census (Centraal 
Bureau voor de Statistiek). 
 
Freqit The absence-frequency index, measured by the number of sickness reports per 100 
working days of area i and period t.  
 
OTDit The ratio of the number of products supplied at the right place within a pre-specified time 
period divided by the total number of products of area i in period t 
 
Volit   The number of products of area i in period t. 
 
Rsatit The ratio of the number of workers on Saturday from the total number of workers of area i 
in period t. 
 
IAZit   An indicator variable that is 1 when more than 20 out of 10.000 people went to a family 
doctor in one of four geographical regions, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
4.3 Pooled time-series data  
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
  
 Data that consists of multiple measurement of a sample of subjects, for example 
individuals or organizations, over a period of time is called panel data or pooled time-
series data. The distinction between panel data and pooled time-series is that pooled 
time-series data have fixed intervals between each successive observation and panel 
data have not (Sayrs, 1989). This section describes pooled time-series data, its 
statistical problems, and potential solutions.  
 
4.3.2 Properties of pooled time-series data 
  
 The use of pooled time-series data has a number of advantages above cross-section 
or time-series data. The first obvious advantage is that it usually increases the number 
of observations. This not only increases the power of the tests, but has also some 
statistical advantages, such as mitigating the problem of multicollinearity, and 
increased variability (Baltagi, 1995).  
 A second advantage is that it can control for individual heterogeneity between 
cross-sections (Baltagi, 1995). That is parameters of independent variables are not 
constant for each cross-section and time period. For example unobserved cross-
sectional characteristics, such as the quality of the management, marketing or 
manufacturing strategies, can moderate the examined relationship (Huselid and 
Becker, 1996; Bowen and Wiersema, 1999). Time-series and cross-sectional studies 
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that do not control for heterogeneity can give biased results.5 Another advantage is the 
extra possibilities available to mitigate the problem of omitted variables in the 
specification. (Hsiao, 1990). For example in equation (4.1):  
 
itititit zxy εββα +++= ** 21 . (4.1) 
 
Where: 
yit is the dependent variable, 
xit is an observable variable, 
zit is an unobservable variable and, 
i is an subscript for each cross-sections and t for each time period. 
 
When zit correlates with xit then the OLS coefficients are biased. When zit is stable 
over time, but differs per cross-section, then the first differences6, i.e., a change model 
instead of a level model, of the regression drops the effect of the unobserved variable 
out, that is zit- zit-1 =0. Thus equation (4.2):  
 
)()(* 11,11, −−−− +−=− tttiittiit xxyy εεβ . (4.2) 
 
gives unbiased and consistent estimates of β1. 
 In addition, when omitted variables are stable for cross sections, but change over 
time, a regression with deviations from the mean, across cross-sections at a given time 
(yt), can give unbiased estimates of β1. 
 
)()(*1 tittittit xxyy εεβ −+−=−   (4.3) 
 
Because the research questions examined in this dissertation explore changes over 
time, and therefore equation (4.3) would remove effects we are interested in, this 
latter method is not used in this dissertation. 
 Potential disadvantages of pooled time-series data are the selectivity and 
heterogeneity bias (Hsiao, 1990). The selectivity bias is the non-random drawing of 
the sample. Although this is theoretically a problem, the problem is not bigger than 
for example in survey research in which subjects can choose to respond or not. Also, 
the research design chosen in this dissertation, i.e., quasi-experimental design is non-
random itself.  
 The process of combining cross-section data with time-series data is called pooling. 
Before pooling observations, analysis has to make clear whether this is allowed. 
Pooling data when this is not allowed leads to the heterogeneity bias, i.e., parameters 
are not the same for all cross-sections or time periods. The fixed effects model, 
described in the next section mitigates this problem. 
 
                                                          
5
 Bowen and Wiersema (1999) argued that heterogeneity in time in cross-sectional research is 
implicitly addressed when generalizabilty of the results of the study to other time periods is questioned. 
6
 Using intercept for each cross-section is an alternative method that leads to the same effect (see 
section 4.3.3). 
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4.3.3 Fixed effects model  
 
 The constant coefficient model, this is the standard ordinary least squares model, 
assumes that all coefficients are the same for each cross-section in the pool (Sayrs, 
1989) and is represented in the following way: 
 
ititit xy εβα ++=  (4.4) 
 
The drawback of this model is that it ignores variation that is specific to certain cross-
sections or time periods. This problem will reveal itself in heteroscedastic error terms. 
A model that accounts for both cross-sectional and time specific variation is the fixed-
effect model (or least square dummy variable) model.7 It allows parameters to vary 
across cross-sections and across time. This can be represented schematically in the 
following way: 
 
ititititit xy εβα ++=  (4.5) 
 
An F-test can formally identify the appropriate model (Baltagi, 1995; Hsiao, 1990). 
First, test if the parameters are constant for each cross-section (µ), and each time 
period (λ): 
 
H0: 121  1 ... and −− ===== tnji uuu λλλ  
 
Where: 
]//[]1/)[(0 KNNTUSSNUSSRSSF −−−−=  
has an F-distribution with N-1,N(t-1)-k degrees of freedom. 
 
RSS is the restricted model with a constant intercept and parameters, and USS is the 
unrestricted model with dummies for each period and each cross-section. If H0 is 
rejected similar F-test for constant parameters for each cross-section or for each time 
period can be assessed.  
 The choice between these different models is based on the research question 
examined, the degrees of freedom available and the F-tests described above (Hsiao, 
1990). Because in this dissertation the research question is examining a change in 
time, and therefore allowing parameters to change over time would absorb the effects 
I am interested in, whereas differences between cross-sections are not of interest, only 
the test for non-constant intercepts are executed. This means that I only introduce unit 
hetrogeneity in the models (Beck, 2001). For all models reported in the empirical 
analysis the specification with dummies for each cross-section was the best choice, 
based on the F-test discussed above.  
 
                                                          
7
 An alternative to the fixed effects model is the random effects model. This model however assumes 
that the source of heterogeneity, e.g., the quality of the management, is uncorrelated with the 
independent variables (Hsiao, 1990).  In addition, the random effect model is preferred over the fixed 
effects model when the goal of the study is to generalize results to the complete sample (Baltagi, 1995).  
Since the first assumption is not reasonable in my context, and I do not attempt to generalize to other 
samples I use the fixed effects models. 
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4.4 Description of the data 
 
 Tables 4.2 and 4.3 give the descriptives, and correlation matrix of all variables. The 
appendix gives graphs of the two financial and two non-financial measures for each 
cross-section.   
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of cost measure, revenues measure, non-financial measures, and 
control variables 
Variable1 Sample2 Mean Median Standard  deviation Minimum  Maximum 
Costit 972 56.35 55.00 13.61 26.78 108.24 
Revit 972 30.39 26.66 14.51 10.62 85.01 
Freqit 972 1.36 1.30 0.44 0.46 2.74 
OTDit 972 90.78 92.20 6.59 55.60 100.00 
Volit 972 17738 17089 5193 7039 41879 
Rzatit 972 0.05 0.05 2.46 0.03 0.08 
Notes: 
1 Descriptives for the lagged non-financial measures are not incorporated in the descriptives, because 
for different models the lag is different. 
2 3 years of monthly observations of 27 areas are available (N=3*12*27=972). 
 
Table 4.3: Correlation matrix of cost measure, revenues measure, non-financial measures, and control 
variables 
Variable1 Costit  Revit  Freqit  OTDit  Volit   
Costit 1.00          
Revit 0.79 ** 1.00        
Freqit 0.05  0.22 ** 1.00      
OTDit -0.12 ** -0.15 ** -0.14 ** 1.00    
Volit 0.87 ** 0.77 ** 0.23 ** -0.01  1.00  
Rzatit -0.23 ** -0.12 ** -0.06  0.10 ** -0.16 ** 
Notes: 
1 Where **,* means significant at the 0.01, and 0.05, levels (two-tailed test). 
 
 The standard deviation of the variables reflects both cross-sectional variance and 
variance over time. Further, significant correlation coefficients should be interpreted 
with caution because seasonality, and for example difference in size between the 
areas, lead to heterogeneity that can causes spurious correlation.  
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5.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter addresses the first research question, i.e., do non-financial 
performance measures have relative or incremental information content, or both, 
beyond financial performance measures in predicting future financial performance. As 
discussed before (see section 1.1) the accounting literature is ambiguous whether non-
financial measures have relative or incremental information beyond financial 
measures for predicting future financial performance. Although a lot of claims are 
made that non-financial measures are better indicators for future financial 
performance than financial measure (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Banker et al., 2000b), 
the empirical accounting literature often tests the incremental ability of non-financial 
measures beyond financial measures (Ittner and Larcker, 1998a; Banker et al., 2000b; 
Nagar and Rajan, 2001). Therefore, in this dissertation I test both the relative and 
incremental information content of non-financial measures to explore this contention. 
I use the data described in section 4.2 for the empirical analysis. 
 This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it is the first 
direct test of the relative information content of non-financial performance measures 
compared to financial measures. Second, I add to the growing literature that studies  
incremental information content of non-financial performance measures beyond 
financial performance for predicting future financial performance. In my context I use 
different non-financial measures, i.e., worker satisfaction and on-time delivery. I also 
address the non-linearity of the relationship between financial and non-financial 
measures. 
 This chapter is structures as follows. Section 5.2 explains the framework used for 
the empirical analysis. Section 5.3 gives the research methods and specifications used 
for the analysis. Section 5.4 gives the empirical results. Section 5.5 ends with a 
discussion and summary. 
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5.2 Framework  
 
5.2.1 Relative information content 
 
 Relative information content assesses whether one measure contains more 
information than another (Biddle et al., 1995). Therefore, relative information content 
is a stronger assumption than incremental information content, i.e., two measures can 
have incremental information content beyond each other. Relative information content 
reflects differences in incremental information content (Biddle et al., 1995)1. Relative 
information content is an important question when it is costly to gather information 
and therefore choices have to be made which measure to supply (Biddle et al., 1995). 
These costs might not only represent costs in money but also in time spent of 
managers to use the information. In addition, ranks of different information sources 
can be provided.  
 Relative information content can be graphically represented as in figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1: Graphical representation of relative information content 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In figure 5.1 the two circles represent the variance explained of future financial 
performance by financial and non-financial measures. The two measures represent 
each a part of the future financial performance, but in this case the non-financial 
measure (NFin) explains more than the financial measures (Fin). Therefore the non-
financial measure has a larger information content. The two circles are sketched as 
non-overlapping, but could equally well overlap. 
 Relative information content of alternative performance measures is often assessed 
for valuation purposes, for example, comparing earnings and cashflows to predict 
future stock returns (Dechow et al., 1994). However, Biddle et al. (1995, p.6) argued 
that “relative information content comparison [..] could be useful when evaluating 
alternative performance measures for internal evaluation and control”. For contracting 
purposes more than one performance measure can be used in the contract. Assessment 
of relative information content can be an input for assigning weights to different 
measures for performance evaluation purposes. For example, when agents are risk-
neutral or measures are noiseless, principals choose the weights of different 
performance measures in the contract to maximize congruity (Datar et al., 2001). 
Since relative information content assesses which measure better predicts future 
financial performance it can be considered as a comparison of the congruity of 
different measures.       
 Kaplan and Norton (1992) argued that non-financial performance measures are 
better indicators for future financial performance than financial measures. This claim 
is based on a number of different notions. A non-comprehensive enumeration is that 
non-financial measures are more actionable, more directly traceable to the strategies 
of the firm, work well with high-technology manufacturing systems like Automatic 
                                                          
1
 This implies that when measure 1 contains more information than measure 2, per definition measure 1 
provides incremental information beyond measure 2.  
 
 NFin Fin 
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Manufacturing Technologies and JIT, facilitate continuous improvements (Fisher, 
1992), focus attention to causes rather than effects (Singleton-Green, 1993), focus 
attention to the long-run perspective (Kaplan and Norton, 1992), and give less room 
for dysfunctional behavior (Fisher, 1992).2 Although a lot of anecdotal evidence has 
been provided to support these claims there is no direct test of the assumption to date.3 
Therefore, I compare the relative information content of non-financial measures with 
financial measures. 
 Based on the claims in front of non-financial measures given above, I expect the 
non-financial performance measures have more information content than financial 
performance measures. In addition, I expect that non-financial measures have higher 
relative information content compared to financial measures when the number of lags 
increases. The rational for this expectation is that non-financial measures are 
considered to be leading indicators for financial measures (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). 
Therefore, adding lagged measures in the models to predict future financial 
performance should favor the non-financial measures. Thus, I assess the relative 
information content of non-financial and financial measures with different 
(cumulative) lags.    
 Table 5.1 summarizes the predictions derived. 
 
Table 5.1: Predictions for the relative information content analysis 
 
Non-financial measures have higher information content than costs for predicting future costs. 
 
Non-financial measures have higher information content than revenues for predicting future 
revenues. 
 
Relative information content of non-financial measures compared with costs increases when 
(cumulative) lags are added. 
 
Relative information content of non-financial measures compared with revenues increases 
when (cumulative) lags are added. 
 
 
5.2.2 Incremental information content 
 
 Incremental information content is assessed to indicate whether information is 
helpful to make better predictions beyond an existing piece of information (Biddle et 
al., 1995). This can graphically be represented as in figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2: Graphical representation of incremental information content 
 
     
 Fin NFin 
        
 
 
                                                          
2
 Scarce evidence for some of these claims is available from a survey of Van der Stede et al. (2000) of 
128 US and Belgian manufacturing managers. 
3
 Nagar and Rajan, (2001) argued that they compare the relative ability of financial quality measures, 
e.g., external failure costs, and non-financial quality measures, e.g., defect rates. The tests executed 
however are incremental tests and do not test directly the relative ability.  
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Again, in figure 5.2 the circles represent the variance explained of future financial 
performance of respective the financial (Fin) and non-financial performance (NFin) 
measures. The figure indicates that both the financial and non-financial variable 
explain a part of future financial performance. The non-overlapping part of the non-
financial performance is the incremental information content of the non-financial 
measures beyond the financial measure, and vice versa.  
 Ittner et al. (1997, p. 233) state that Holmstrom's informativeness principle implies 
that: 
 
 “the bonus contract should place non-zero weight on any performance measure that provides 
incremental information content about the dimensions of managerial action that the owner 
wishes to motivate. (initials added)” 
 
In the context of financial and non-financial measures this implies that the non-
financial measures should have a non-zero weight in the reward system if it gives 
information content about the dimensions of managerial action that is not represented 
in the financial performance measure. This can graphically be represented as in figure 
5.3.  
 
Figure 5.3: Graphical representation of informativeness principle in the context of financial and non-
financial measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Managers allocate their effort about multiple dimensions. Because this effort is not 
directly observable, performance measures are used as signals for this effort. When 
the non-financial measure, i.e., signal 2, provides incremental information content 
about the manager's effort beyond the financial measure, i.e., signal 1, the non-
financial measures should have a non-zero weight in the reward system.   
 The concept of incremental information content implies that, to be beneficial the 
non-financial measure can have either a negative or positive relationship with future 
financial performance after controlling for the lagged financial measure. Both are 
helpful to make better predictions. However, for contracting purposes, i.e., to assign 
the weight to the different measures, it is relevant to know the direction of the 
relationship. Consequently, this is assessed.  
 Non-financial performance measures are argued to lead to a long-term orientation 
of managers (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Van der Stede et al., 2001). Additionally, 
non-financial measures better capture the strategic orientation of the organization 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Therefore, non-financial measures are expected to have 
additional information beyond lagged financial measures. However, the effects of 
lagged non-financial performance might be different for either future costs or future 
revenues. Improving non-financial measures often costs money first because 
investments must be made. Training employees for example can raise customer 
satisfaction measures, and improved quality can be reached by redesigning processes. 
Additionally, improved non-financial measures might also lead to a higher future cost 
level to maintain the higher level of the non-financial measure. In contrast, higher 
non-financial measures might lead to lower future cost levels when for example better 
 
Multi-dimensional 
effort agent 
Signal 1 (financial 
measure) 
Signal 2 (non-
financial measures) 
Economic wealth 
principal (future 
financial measure) 
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quality measures lead to lower future costs, due to less scrap, rework on faulty 
products. Earlier research is also inconclusive about the direction of the incremental 
ability of non-financial measures to predict future costs. Banker et al. (2000b) find 
that one of their customer satisfaction measures has a negative impact on future costs. 
Ittner and Larcker (1998a) however, find no relationship between the customer 
satisfaction measure and future expenses. Therefore lagged non-financial measures 
can have a differential effect on future costs, and no expectation is formulated for the 
incremental information content of non-financial measures beyond lagged financial 
measures.   
 As argued above non-financial performance measures are claimed to lead to a long-
term orientation of managers and better capture the strategic orientation of the 
organization. All available literature suggests that non-financial measures have a 
positive impact on future financial performance after controlling for current financial 
measures (Ittner and Larcker, 1998a; Banker et al., 2000b; Nagar and Rajan, 2001). 
Therefore, non-financial measures expected to have additional positive information to 
lagged revenues measures. 
 The expectations derived are summarized in table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2: Expectations for incremental information content 
Non-financial measure → financial measure 
 
Expectation1 
Worker satisfaction → future costs  
 
? 
On-time delivery     → future costs 
 
? 
Worker satisfaction → future revenues 
 
+ 
On-time delivery     → future revenues 
 
+ 
1A + means that the non-financial measure is expecting to have a positive impact on future financial 
performance after controlling for the lagged financial performance. A ? means that the non-financial 
measure is expecting to have a differential impact on future financial performance after controlling for 
the lagged financial performance. 
 
5.3 Specification 
 
5.3.1 Relative information content 
 
 Relative information content is assessed through a non-nested model procedure. It 
is not possible to test non-nested models with an F-test. Therefore, Vuong (1989) 
designed a likelihood statistic that compares two non-nested models with each other. 
He shows that this likelihood statistic has a normal distribution. The test is able to 
assess which of the competing models has more information content, i.e., is closer to 
the “true” model. Intuitively, the Vuong (1989) statistic compares the R2 ‘s of the two 
competing models, and assesses whether the difference is significant. 
 The z-value of the likelihood statistic can easily be computed by the following 
procedure (Dechow, 1989, p. 39). First, execute the following regressions:   
 
ttt FF εβα +∗+= − 1  (5.1)
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and, 
 
ttt NFF εβα +∗+= − 1 . (5.2) 
 
Where: 
Ft     = a financial performance measure in period t, 
Ft-1   = a lagged financial performance measure, and 
NFt-1 = a lagged non-financial measure.  
 
Then compute mit for each observation through mit 
=0.5log*(RSSf/RSSnf)+n/2*[(εf)2/RSSf -(εnf)2/RSSnf], where RSSf is the residual sum 
of square, and εf are the residuals of (5.1), and RSSnf is the residual sum of square, and 
εnf are the residuals of (5.2). The sum of mit is the Vuong statistic.  
 The next step is to show whether this statistic is significant, that is to compute the 
standard deviation from the statistic. This can be found through regressing mit on 
unity. The t-statistic from this coefficient times ((n-1)/n)1/2 gives the z-value. Since it 
uses the lagged financial performance measures as the benchmark a positive z-value 
indicates that the non-financial performance measures has more information content. 
For details of the test see Vuong (1989) and Dechow (1994). 
  For the revenues, the two models that are assessed against each other are:  
∑
=
− +++=
11
1
21 *Re*Re
k
ritkkrlitrriit MONTHvv εηηλ   (5.3) 
 
and, 
 
∑
=
−− ++++=
11
1
321 ***Re
k
ritkkrlitrlitrriit MONTHFreqOTDv εηηηλ .  (5.4) 
 
Where: 
Revit   = the revenue measure in the contract of area managers, that consist of all  
 revenues that areas can influence. The measure is deflated by CPIt, 
CPIt = Consumer price index from the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (the  
 Dutch Bureau of the Census), 
Freqit-l  = the frequency index with up to 12 lags,  
OTDit-l = the on-time delivery measure with up to 12 lags, 
MONTHk  = an indicator being 1 for month k and 0 otherwise, 
t  = index of period, 
i  = index for each area, 
l = number of lags. 
 
 In both models dummy variables are used for each area. These so-called fixed 
effects models are used to control for heterogeneity due to variables that are unique 
for each area, and are constant in time (Hsiao, 1990). Obvious examples in this 
context are the size of the area, leadership of the area manager, and socio-economic 
factors, that differ between the areas. Using dummies for eleven months controls for a 
seasonal pattern.  
 To assess the relative information content of the cost measure with the non-
financial measure the following models are compared:  
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and, 
 
∑
=
−− +++++=
11
1
4321 ****
k
cititckkclitclitcciit VolMONTHFreqOTDCost εηηηηλ .(5.6) 
Where: 
Costit  = the cost measure from the contract of area managers, consists of 
employee costs and cost for material and services. The measure is 
deflated by CPIt, 
Volit  = the number of products of area i in period t. 
 
 The cost measure in the contract is a flexible measure. It can vary by the number of 
products that are handled in the area in each period. Therefore, in the cost model a 
control for the number of products handled in each period (Volit) is used. Again, 
dummy variables are used for each area, and for eleven months.  
 Since I expect that relative information content of non-financial measures increases 
when more lags are used in the model, the models are compared using different 
cumulative lags. Thus, I assess the models with t-1, t-1 and t-2, etc. I stop adding lags 
to the models at 12 lags because at that point only 10 observations per parameter are 
available. 
 
5.3.2 Incremental information content 
 
 Incremental information content is assessed by observing the t-statistic of the 
parameter of the lagged non-financial measure (ß2) in the following regression:  
 
.** 211 tlttt NFFF εββα +++= −−
 (5.7) 
 
Where: 
NFt-l = a lagged non-financial measure, with l lags, 
and all other variables are as before. 
 
 The lagged dependent variable is used as an explanatory variable in the 
specification to ascertain whether the non-financial measures give additional 
information over the financial measure from the period before. 
 Ittner and Larcker (1998a) and Banker et al. (2000b) discuss the proper 
specification to assess the incremental information content of financial and non-
financial performance measures. Because both level models and change models have 
pros and cons (see section 5.3.3) they estimate both specifications to explore the 
relationship. This strategy is followed in this chapter as well.  
 The assumption that non-financial performance measures are indicators for future 
financial performance is a central issue in the Balanced Scorecard concept (Kaplan 
and Norton, 1992). However, non-financial measures do not need to have an 
immediate impact on financial measures, but might have an impact on them only a 
few periods later. Unfortunately, no formal theory is available that can indicate the 
length of this so-called “lag”. Therefore, a specification search is executed to explore 
this lag from the data. This specification search is executed for the first time in 
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management accounting research in Banker et al. (2000b), but is much more familiar 
in economic research.  
 The lag search is based on the following equation, an unrestricted finite distributed 
lag model (Greene, 2000):  
t
q
i
itit xy εβα ++= ∑
=
−
0
. (5.8) 
In which yt is the dependent variable in period t, in this context the financial measure, 
and the second term of the right hand site of (5.8) are the lagged independent 
variables, in this context the lagged non-financial measures, up to lag i. 
 The specification search is based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
(Akaike, 1973). The AIC is comparable with the adjusted R2 in that it penalizes losses 
in degrees of freedom and rewards increased fit. The AIC criterion differs form the 
adjusted R2 in that it penalizes losses in degrees of freedom more heavily (Greene, 
2000). A natural alternative for the AIC criteria would be a number of sequential F-
tests until the total number of lag coefficients is 0. This would however inflate the 
significant level (Greene, 2000). The equation used to compute the AIC is: 
nknlAIC /*2/*2 +−= .  (5.9)
   
In which k is the number of estimated parameters, l is the value of the log likelihood 
and, n is the number of observations.  
 The lag specification search chooses the number of lags where the AIC is minimal. 
Due to problems with degrees of freedom a maximum number of lags must be pre-
specified over which the search is executed (Winker, 2000). This is 12 months in this 
analysis.    
 The coefficients of the different lagged non-financial measures are not interpretable 
due to high multicollinearity. Therefore after finding the optimal number of lags in the 
model, a Principal Component (PC) analysis reduces the lagged non-financial 
measures to one construct (Greene, 2000). The coefficient of this construct, i.e., 
lagged non-financial performance, is the long-run average impact of the non-financial 
measure on contemporary performance.  
 Thus, the following equation is estimated to explore the relationship between Costit 
and the lagged non-financial performance measures:  
.*
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(5.10) 
 
Where: 
AvFreqi,tl  = averaged lagged performance of Freqit. Estimated by averaging the l  
  lagged measures, 
AvOTDi,tl = averaged lagged performance of OTDit. Estimated by averaging the l  
  lagged measures,
 
and other variables are as before. 
 
 Indicator variables are used for each area, i.e., the fixed effects model and for 
eleven months to control for a seasonal pattern. 
 The following equation is estimated to explore the relationship between revenues 
and the lagged non-financial performance measures: 
 Chapter 5 Relative and incremental information content 57 
 
 
.*
**Re*Re
11
1
4
,3,21,1
rit
k
kkr
tlirtlirtirriit
MONTH
AvOTDAvFreqvv
εη
ηηηλ
+
++++=
∑
=
−
 (5.11) 
 
Where: 
All variables are as before. 
 
5.3.3 Statistical considerations 
 
 The Jarque-Bera statistic does not reveal large problems with non-normality of the 
residuals. For example, in one model the Jarque-Bera statistic was significant at the 
5% level for only 9 of the 27 areas. Because of these results and in combination with 
the large sample size I choose not to transform the data for non-normality. 
 If the disturbances of each equation are uncorrelated there is no relationship 
between the equations and OLS is appropriate (Pindyck and Rubenfeld, 1998). When 
this is not the case the parameters are unbiased and consistent, but inefficient, and the 
estimates of their variance could be biased (Parks, 1967). Correlation between 
different cross-sections can be expected, since all areas are from one company. 
Therefore, a similar reaction of an external shock can lead to correlated residuals 
between the cross-sections. Therefore, the results reported are all from the seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR)-model.4,5 In addition, next to the problem of correlated 
residuals the SUR-model also mitigates the problem of cross-sectional 
heteroscedasticity. Heteroskedasticity can be expected because larger areas may have 
larger variance.  
 One of the most problematic specification issues is the choice for level or change 
models. Ittner and Larcker (1998a), and Banker et al. (2000b) discuss the proper 
specification to assess the incremental information content of non-financial measures. 
The change model has the advantage that it controls for omitted variables that are 
stable over time. However, it also assumes a constant relation between the change in 
the different lags and the dependent variable (Banker et al., 2000b), i.e., it expects that 
the impact of the non-financial measure at t-2, and t-1 have the same impact on the 
future financial performance measure. This is obviously not necessary (Banker et al., 
2000b). Additional, problems with change variables are high unreliability6 and 
correlation with its components7 (Cohen and Cohen, 1983). In addition, in my opinion 
most omitted variables are constant in time and therefore are picked up by the fixed 
                                                          
4
 Efficiency gains of SUR are higher when correlation between residuals increase. In contrast, the 
efficiency gains are low when in all models the same independent variables are used, data is trended 
and there is greater correlation among the independent variables (Doran and Griffiths, 1983). In this 
case, for each area the same independent and control variables are used, data of the control variables is 
trended and correlation between independent variables is low.  
5
 Correlations between the residuals of the different cross-section range between -0.6 and 0.8, 
indicating that using OLS might be seriously flawed.  
6
 The unreliability of a change score decreases when the correlation (ρ) between its component 
increases. Let assume that the both components (Y1 and Y2) have the same reliability. Then the 
reliability of the change score (Y2 -Y1) is (reliability(y1,y2)- ρ(y1,y2))/1- ρ(y1,y2) (Allison, 1990). Thus, 
when the reliability of the level variables is 0.7 and their correlation is 0.3. The reliability of the change 
variable is 0.57. 
7
 This is the “regression to the mean” effect. High values of a variable will probably go down in the 
next period.  
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effects model (see section 4.3.3). Therefore, although both level and change models 
are reported I rely on the level models for the overall conclusions.8,9   
 I re-estimated all models without observations that had residuals that are higher 
than 3 standard deviation from the mean (Hair et al., 1998). The maximum number of 
outliers for a model was 10. These outliers do not influence the results reported. T-
statistics are in general higher for these regressions without outliers. 
 Although in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 I derive expectations for some tests, these are 
highly exploratory. Therefore, for reasons of conservatism I report two sided 
significance tests.  
 The R2-adjusted are high in all models. These high R2-adjusted are mainly driven 
by the fixed effects for each area that control for omitted variables that are constant in 
time, such as size of the area, and indicator variables for the months to control for 
seasonality.  
 
5.4 Empirical results 
 
5.4.1 Introduction 
 
 The descriptives of the variables used in this section are given in table 4.2 and 4.3. 
Section 5.4.2 gives the results for the relative information content analysis. Next, 
Section 5.4.3 gives the results from the lag search procedure. Section 5.4.4 reports the 
incremental information content analysis. Section 5.4.5 discusses the managerial 
significance of the incremental information content of the analysis. Finally, section 
5.4.6 analysis whether incremental information content of non-financial measures is 
non-linear. 
   
5.4.2 Relative information content 
 
 The results of the relative information content analysis are reported in table 5.5. 
 
                                                          
8
 Interestingly, Lambert (1998) criticizes the use of level models in the discussion of Ittner and 
Larcker’s (1998a) paper. He only gives advantages of change models, i.e., mitigating omitted variables, 
without discussing the disadvantages. Nagar and Rajan (2001) also favor change models because it 
mitigates the problem of omitted variables.     
9
 A final difference between level and change models is that the results for these two different models 
do not have the same meaning. Therefore they are not additive support for the same hypothesis. 
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Table 5.5: Relative information content of non-financial performance measures (level models) 
 Number of observations1 Costit-model   
z-value2,3,4 (p-value5)  
Revit-model      
z-value2,3,4 (p-value5)
 
1   (945) -1.97  (<0.03)  1.72  (n.s.) 
2   (918) -1.98  (<0.03)  0.59  (n.s.) 
3   (891) -1.66
 
 (n.s.)  0.46  (n.s.) 
4   (864) -1.15  (n.s.) -0.09  (n.s.) 
5   (837) -1.06  (n.s.)  0.74  (n.s.) 
6   (810) -0.83  (n.s.)  0.02  (n.s.) 
7   (783) -0.09  (n.s.)  0.08  (n.s.) 
8   (756) -0.55  (n.s.) -0.56  (n.s.) 
9   (729) -0.64  (n.s.) -0.60  (n.s.) 
10 (702) -0.84  (n.s.) -0.50  (n.s.) 
11 (675) -0.57  (n.s.)  0.06  (n.s.) 
12 (648) -1.99  (<0.03)  0.28  (n.s.) 
Notes: 
1 Since I use a cumulative number of lags in each analysis, the number of observations decreases with 
27 observations with each test. 
2
 Z-values are from the Vuong (1989) likelihood statistic. 
3 The non-financial measure is used as a benchmark, therefore a + means that the non-financial measure 
has more information content, and a - means that the financial measures has more information content. 
4
 Results are from the SUR model. However to be able to estimate a SUR model more time periods 
than cross-sections are necessary. Therefore from the 9th lag onwards results are from White's (1980) 
procedure. 
5
 Where n.s. means not significant. 
 
 The results for the Costit-model show no support for the expectation that non-
financial measures are better indicators for future cost than lagged costs. In contrast, 
in most tests the lagged costs have higher information content than the non-financial 
measures, although only 3 are significant. In other cases, the models are not 
distinguishable from each other at a 5% level. Although z-values initially decrease 
when more lags are used in the test, this pattern is not stable over all tests. Therefore, 
there is also no support for the second expectation that the information content of non-
financial measures increases, compared to the financial measure, when more lags are 
added. 
 Also, for the Revit-model, the results are not supporting the claim that non-financial 
measures have more information content than financial measures. Although in most 
cases z-values are positive none of them is significant. In addition, there is no 
indication that the information content of non-financial measures increases when 
more lags are added. 
 To ascertain that the significant results for the cost model are not due to an artificial 
relationship, i.e., autocorrelation between t and t-1, t-2 and t-12, I also report the 
results for change variables. The results for these models are reported in table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6: Relative information content of non-financial performance measures (change models) 
Number  of observations1 ∆Costit-model  
z-value2,3,4 (p-value)  
∆Revit-model     
z-value2,3,4 (p-value)
 
1   (918) -3.38 (<0.01)  -4.03 (<0.01) 
2   (891) -4.59 (<0.01)  -4.36 (<0.01) 
3   (864) -4.00 (<0.01)  -4.21 (<0.01) 
4   (837) -3.43 (<0.01) -4.00 (<0.01) 
5   (810) -3.42 (<0.01) -4.08 (<0.01) 
6   (783) -3.38 (<0.01) -3.78 (<0.01) 
7   (756) -3.70 (<0.01) -4.39 (<0.01) 
8   (729) -3.83 (<0.01) -4.13 (<0.01) 
9   (702) -3.73 (<0.01) -4.11 (<0.01) 
10 (675) -4.29 (<0.01) -4.14 (<0.01) 
11 (648) -6.66 (<0.01) -4.06 (<0.01) 
12 (621) -5.77 (<0.01) -3.92 (<0.01) 
Notes:
 
1 Since I use a cumulative number of lags in each analysis, the number of observations decreases with 
27 observations in each step. 
2 Z-values are from the Vuong (1989) likelihood statistic. 
3 The non-financial measure is used as a benchmark, therefore a + means that the non-financial measure 
has more information content, and a - means that the financial measures has more information content. 
4
 Results are from the SUR model. However to be able to estimate a SUR model more time periods 
than cross-sections are necessary. Therefore from the 8th lag onwards results are from White's (1980) 
procedure.  
 
   For the change models, in all models with any number of lags the financial measure 
has more information content than the non-financial model. This suggests that the 
three significant results in favor of the financial measure in the level models are not 
due to an artificial relation between t and t-1 or t-2.  
 In sum, I interpret the results as no indication that the non-financial performance 
measures in this context have more information content than lagged financial 
performance measures.  There is also no evidence that non-financial measures have 
more relative information content compared with lagged financial measurers when the 
number of lags incorporated in the models increases.  
 
5.4.3 Lag search 
 
 In Table 5.7 the results for the lag search procedure for the Costit and Revit-model 
are summarized. 
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Table 5.7: lag search procedure 
Variable1 Costit Revit 
   
AvFreqit2 4 1 
% variance explained by first 
Principal Component 
57 - 
 
  
AvOTDit2 3 5 
% variance explained by first 
Principal Component 
61 50 
Notes: 
1 The results are from the lag specification search. The Akaike information criterion is used to find the 
proper specification. The lagged dependent variable (t-1) was used in the model.  
2 The Principal Component analysis summarizes the number of lagged periods to one construct, i.e., 
lagged non-financial performance. 
 
 The lag search led to the result that in the Costit-model the best model has a four 
period lag of AvFreqit and a three period lag of AvOTDit. In a Principal Component 
analysis the first component of AvFreqit explained 57 percent of the variance. For 
AvOTDit this was 61 percent. 
 For the Revit-model, the best model had a one period lag of AvFreqit, and a five 
period lag of AvOTDit. The first component of AvOTDit explained 50 percent of the 
variance. 
 These results show that non-financial measures can have different lags for the 
different measures. This result is in contrast with the study of Banker et al. (2000b), 
which shows a lag of six months for both non-financial measures for cost, revenue, 
and profit measures.  
 It is difficult to explain the drivers of the different lags for different non-financial 
and financial measures. One line of speculation could be that costs are more 
controllable than revenues, because they are made within each area, whereas revenues 
are made trough customers outside of the areas. This would suggest that lags for the 
cost measure are shorter than for the revenues. However this conjecture is not 
supported by the data.  
 
5.4.4 Incremental information content  
 
 Table 5.8 reports the results of the analyses of the incremental information content 
of the non-financial measures beyond the financial measures for predicting future 
financial performance for the level models.  
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Table 5.8: Incremental information content of non-financial performance measures (level models) 
Variable1 Expected 
Sign 
Costit (n=8642)  Expected 
Sign 
Revit (n=8373)  
  Coefficient4,5   Coefficient  
Costt-1  0.224 
(8.62) 
**    
Revt-1     -0.105 
(-3.66) 
** 
AvFreqit ? -1.489 
(-8.20) 
** - -0.642 
(-11.75) 
** 
AvOTDit ? -0.085 
(-13.93) 
** + 0.085 
(24.29) 
** 
Volit + 0.000 
(17.90) 
**    
       
R2-adj.  0.966   0.984  
Notes: 
1 The month dummies and intercepts for each area are considered to be nuisance variables, therefore 
they are not reported. 
2 Because 4 lags are the maximum in this model, (972-(4*27))=864 observations are available.  
3
 Because 6 lags are the maximum in this model,  (972-(5*27))=837 observations are available. 
4 Where **,* means significant at the 0.01, and 0.05 levels (two-tailed test). 
5
 t-statistics between parentheses. All results are from the seemingly unrelated regression. 
 
  Parameters ηc2 and ηc3 of equation (5.10) test the incremental information content 
of non-financial measures beyond lagged costs. The analysis supports the expectation 
that the non-financial measures have incremental information content beyond the 
lagged costs. The significant parameter ηc3, -1.489 (t=-8.20, p<0.01), suggest that 
lagged worker satisfaction, measured by AvFreqit, has a negative impact on future 
cost.10 One explanation for this result is that investments needed to improve worker 
satisfaction are larger than the returns in the long-run. Further, the lagged on-time 
delivery measure, AvOTDit, has a positive impact on long-run cost, represented by the 
significant parameter ηc3 of –0.085 (t=-13.93, p<0.01). One possible explanation is 
that better product quality needs less rework in future periods and therefore costs 
decrease. Current Cost, Costi,t-1 also has a significant positive impact on future costs, 
0.224 (t=8.62, p<0.01). This result is in resemblance with Banker et al. (2000b) that 
also find a positive lagged cost parameter.  
 Parameters ηr2, and ηr3 of equation (5.11) test the incremental information content 
of non-financial measures beyond lagged revenues
.
 The analysis supports the 
expectation that the non-financial measures have incremental information content 
beyond the lagged revenues. The impact of worker satisfaction, measured by AvFreqit, 
is positive, -0.642 (t=-11.75, p<0.01). That is higher lagged worker satisfaction leads 
to higher future revenues. This suggests that happy employees will lead to additional 
revenues in the long-run. Lagged performance on the on-time delivery measure 
AvOTDit, represented by a significant coefficient of 0.085 (t=24.29, p<0.01), is also 
positive on future revenues. Current revenue is also a significant predictor for future 
revenues, -0.105 (t=3.66 p<0.01). This result is in contrast with the study of Banker et 
al. (2000b) that finds a positive impact of lagged revenues on future revenues.  
                                                          
10
 Remember that the proxy is inversely related with worker satisfaction. 
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 In the analysis above the parameters for the lagged non-financial variables are 
considered to be homogeneous for each cross-section. Rerunning the regression with 
specific parameters for each cross-section for the Costit-model, i.e, parameters ηc2 and 
ηc3 in equation (5.10) are cross-section specific, learns that for AvFreqit for 16 areas 
the parameter is negative and significant, and for 11 it is not significant at the 5% 
level. For the AvOGSit 22 areas have negative significant parameters, 3 are 
insignificant, and 2 are significant positive. For the Revit-model, rerunning the 
regression with specific parameters for each cross-section, i.e, parameters ηr2 and ηr3 
in equation (5.11) are cross-section specific, learns that for AvFreqit for 15 areas the 
parameter is negative and significant, and for 12 it is not significant at the 5% level. 
For the AvOGSit 17 areas have positive significant parameters, 9 are insignificant, and 
1 is significant and negative. These analysis, reported in Table 5.9, suggest that there 
might consist considerable cross-sectional differences in the incremental information 
content of non-financial measures even in a relative homogeneous sample of different 
cross-sections from one organization.   
 
Table 5.9: Cross-sectional differences of incremental information content of non-financial measures 
 + n.s. - 
Costit-model    
AvFreqit 0 11 16 
AvOGSit 2 3 22 
    
Revit-model    
AvFreqit 0 12 15 
AvOGSit 17 9 1 
Notes:  
This table reports the number of cross-sections that have a positive (+), not significant (n.s.), and 
negative (-) incremental information content of the non-financial measure. 
  
 In sum, the data supports the expectation that the lagged non-financial measures 
have incremental information content beyond the lagged financial measures. Analyses 
for the level models suggest that higher lagged worker satisfaction has a negative 
impact on future cost, i.e., cost increase, and a positive impact on future revenues. 
Higher lagged quality, AvOTDit, leads to decreased future cost and increased 
revenues. The results for incremental information content of lagged on-time delivery 
for future revenues corroborates the finding of Nagar and Rajan (2001). However, 
they do not assess the impact on future costs.  
 Table 5.10 reports the results of the change models.  
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Table 5.10: Incremental information content of non-financial measures (change model)
 
Variable1 ∆Costsit 
(n=8372) 
 ∆Revit  
(n=8103) 
 
 Coefficient4,5  Coefficient  
∆Costt-1 -0.372 
(-20.54) 
**   
∆Revt-1   -0.610 
(-29.59) 
** 
∆AvFreqit -3.288 
(-14.74) 
** -0.017 
(-0.39) 
 
∆AvOTDit -0.041 
(-6.56) 
** -0.012 
(-8.90) 
** 
∆Volit 0.000 
(34.23) 
**   
     
R2-adj. 0.619  0.374  
Notes: 
1 The month dummies and intercepts for each area are considered to be nuisance variables, therefore 
they are not reported. 
2 Because 4 lags are the maximum in this model, and a change model is used (945-(4*27))=837 
observations are available.  
3 Because 5 lags are the maximum in this model, and a change model is used (945-(5*27))=810 
observations are available. 
4 Where **,* means significant at the 0.01, and 0.05 levels (two-tailed test). 
5
 t-statistics between parentheses. All results are from the seemingly unrelated regression. 
 
 For ∆Costit the analysis leads to the same results as for the level model. Thus, 
lagged changes in worker satisfaction leads to larger increases in costs. Improvements 
in the on-time delivery measure OTDit however leads to decreases in future costs.   
 Results for the ∆Revit-model are mixed. The impact of a change in the lagged 
worker satisfaction (∆AvFreqit) does not lead to a significant change in future 
revenues. The result for the impact of a change in lagged quality is even more 
puzzling. A lagged increase in ∆AvOTDit leads to a decrease in ∆Revit. This implies 
that customers do not reward the company for improvement in quality with more 
future revenues.  
 The variables for lagged non-financial performance, AvFreqit and AvOTDit, are 
measured by averaging the individual lagged measures. However this assumes that the 
impact of each lagged measures on the current financial measure is equal for each 
period. This also means that it is not necessarily congruent with the concepts of 
leading and lagging indicators. The lag search assumes that the impact of the non-
financial measure at period t-1 is immediately felt in the next period, however it is 
also possible, even more likely, that the measure at period t-1 influences the financial 
measure not before, for example, period t+2.  This assumption is not only unlikely but 
also unnecessary. Therefore, an alternative specification is used in which the lagged 
non-financial measure is measured by using the factor scores from the Principal 
Component analysis. These factor scores allow that different lags of non-financial 
measures can have a different impact on future financial performance. Results for this 
analysis for the level and change models are reported in table 5.11 and 5.12. 
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Table 5.11: Incremental information content of non-financial performance measures (level models 
with factor scores) 
Variable1 Costit 
(n=8642) 
 Revit  
(n=8373) 
 
 Coefficient4,5  Coefficient  
Costt-1 0.226 
(8.68) 
 
**   
Revt-1   -0.081 
(-2.82) 
** 
AvFreqit -1.70 
(-7.05) 
 
** -0.715 
(-12.32) 
** 
AvOTDit -0.101 
(13.48) 
** 0.127 
(22.14) 
** 
Volit 0.000 
(18.04) 
 
**   
     
R2-adj. 0.966  0.984  
1 The month dummies and intercepts for each area are considered to be nuisance variables, therefore 
they are not reported. 
2 Because 4 lags are the maximum in this model, (972-(4*27))=864 observations are available.  
3 Because 5 lags are the maximum in this model,  (972-(5*27))=837 observations are available. 
4 Where **,* means significant at the 0.01, and 0.05 levels (two-tailed test). 
5
 t-statistics between parentheses. All results are from the seemingly unrelated regression. 
 
Table 5.12: Incremental information content of non-financial performance measures (change models 
with factor scores) 
Variable1 ∆Costit 
(n=8372) 
 ∆Revit  
(n=8103) 
 
 Coefficient4,5  Coefficient  
∆Costt-1 -0.372 
(-20.39) 
**   
∆Revt-1   -0.606 
(-28.42) 
** 
∆AvFreqit -3.692 
(-10.67) 
** -0.003 
(-0.07) 
 
∆AvOTDit -0.054 
(-6.68) 
** -0.017 
(-7.58) 
** 
∆Volit 0.000 
(35.84) 
 
**   
     
R2-adj. 0.618  0.376  
1 The month dummies and intercepts for each area are considered to be nuisance variables, therefore 
they are not reported. 
2 Because 4 lags are the maximum in this model, and a change model is used (945-(4*27))=837 
observations are available.  
3 Because 5 lags are the maximum in this model, and a change model is used (945-(5*27))=810 
observations are available. 
4 Where **,* means significant at the 0.01, and 0.05 levels (two-tailed test). 
5
 t-statistics between parentheses. All results are from the seemingly unrelated regression. 
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 The results where the lagged non-financial measures are computed with factor 
scores are qualitatively the same compared to the results with averaging. Although the 
parameters for the lagged non-financial measures are somewhat higher they are in the 
same direction and have the same significance level. This can be explained by the fact 
that in this context the factor loadings are almost the same for each individual lagged 
measure. This set of results also mitigates the problem that Banker et al. (2000b) give 
with change models. They argued that the change models assume that each lagged 
non-financial measure has the same impact on the future financial measure and that 
this is an unrealistic assumption. In my setting this does not seem to be a problem. 
 In general, the data indicate that the non-financial measures have incremental 
information content beyond the lagged financial measure for future financial 
performance. Worker satisfaction has a negative impact on future costs but a positive 
influence on revenues. The on-time delivery measure had a positive impact on both 
costs and revenues.   
 
5.4.5 Managerial significance 
 
 To be able to compare the relative impact of the two non-financial measures with 
the financial measure I report standardized coefficient. In addition, to estimate 
whether the results found are material I estimate the managerial significance of the 
parameters of the lagged non-financial measures. These analyses are reported in table 
5.13. 
 
Table 5.13: Standardized coefficient and managerial significance of non-financial performance 
measures 
 Standardized coefficient Managerial  
significance (%)1 
Costit-model   
Costi,t-1 0.222  
AvFreqi,t-4  -0.037 -0.36  
AvOTDi,t-3 -0.031 -1.36  
   
Revit-model    
Revi,t-1 -0.105  
AvFreqi,t-1 -0.022 -0.28  
AvOTDi,t-5  0.025 2.54  
1 This measure is computed as followed: ((10% of average of independent variable*coefficient) / 
average dependent variable)*100%. 
 
 To be able to compare the amount of incremental information content of the non-
financial measures beyond the financial measure, I report the standardized coefficients 
of the non-financial measures and the lagged financial measures (Hair et al., 1998). 
This analysis indicates that the incremental information content of the two non-
financial measures beyond the financial measure is roughly equal in absolute terms. 
The incremental information content of the non-financial measures is roughly one-
seventh, -0.037 and -0.031 versus 0.224, of the information content of the lagged cost 
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measure. For the revenue model, the non-financial measures have roughly one-fifth, -
0.022 and 0.025 versus -0.105, of the information content of lagged revenues.11 
 The managerial significance of the incremental information content of the non-
financial measures is assessed by the percentage increase of the dependent variable 
with a 10% increase in the independent variable (column 3), assuming the rest of the 
variables are constant. This analysis shows that for the cost model, the future costs are 
0.36% lower when AvFreqi,t-4 is 10% higher, and the future costs are 1.36% lower 
when AvOGSi,t-3 is 10% higher. For the revenue model the future revenues are 0.28% 
lower when the AvFreqi,t-1 is 10% higher, and the future revenues are 2.54% higher 
when the AvOGSi,t-6 is 10% higher. Considering the fact that these measures are ratio 
measures, and therefore it is almost impossible to increase the non-financial measures 
with an additional 10% these effects are not very high.  
 
5.4.6 Non-linearity in incremental information content 
 
 Ittner and Larcker (1998) find non-linear relationships between customer 
satisfaction measures and future financial performance. One explanation for these 
results is that it becomes increasingly more difficult to improve non-financial 
measures when they are already on a high level. In addition, customers might not 
value further improvements in, for example, quality when quality is already high. 
Therefore, I test for non-linearities through an interaction between the change in 
lagged non-financial measures and the level of lagged non-financial measures.12 That 
is the following regressions are estimated: 
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Where all variables are as before.  
 In equations (5.12) and (5.13), the relationship is a non-linear when the parameters 
of the change variables and the parameters of the interaction differ in sign. Results for 
the non-linearity analysis are reported in table 5.14.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Unfortunately, these analyses can not be compared with the analysis of Banker et al. (2000b) since 
they do not provide the necessary information. 
12
 Ittner and Larcker (1998a) report problems with multicollinearity when they explore this analysis. 
However, my sample is more than ten times larger than their sample, which mitigates the problems. In 
addition, multicollinearity works against finding interactions.   
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Table 5.14: Incremental information content of non-financial performance measures (non-linearities) 
Variable1 ∆Costit 
(n=8642)         
 ∆Revit  
(n=8373)         
 
 Coefficient4,5  Coefficient  
∆Costt-1 -0.373 **   
∆Revt-1   -0.624 
(-61.00) 
** 
∆AvFreqit -14.812 
(-22.44) 
** -1.42 
(-28.36) 
** 
AvFreqit -1.310 
(-7.99) 
** 0.314 
(12.00) 
** 
∆AvFreqit* AvFreqit 8.895 
(19.34) 
 
** 0.783 
(25.40) 
 
** 
∆AvOTDit -1.028 
(-9.78) 
** -0.615 
(-10.15) 
** 
AvOTDit -0.02 
(-3.92) 
** 0.003 
(1.09) 
 
∆AvOTDit* AvOTDit 0.011 
(9.66) 
** 0.006 
(9.47) 
** 
Volit 0.000 
(34.86) 
**   
     
Incremental F-test for 
non-lineairities  
F=210.95 
(p<0.01) 
 F=323.18 
(p<0.01) 
 
     
R2-adj. 0.624  0.370  
1 The month dummies and intercepts for each area are considered to be nuisance variables, therefore 
they are not reported. 
2 Because 4 lags are the maximum in this model, and a change model is used (945-(4*27))=837 
observations are available.  
3 Because 5 lags are the maximum in this model, and a change model is used (945-(5*27))=810 
observations are available. 
4 Where **,* means significant at the 0.01, and 0.05 levels (two-tailed test). 
5
 t-statistics between parentheses. All results are from the seemingly unrelated regression. 
 
 F-tests support that non-linearities exist in the data set for both the cost (F=210.95, 
p<0.01), and revenue (F=323.18, p<0.01) model. The significant interaction between 
∆AvFreqit and AvFreqit of 8.895 (t=19.34, p<0.01) means that at low (high) worker 
satisfaction levels a further decrease (increase) leads to a higher increase in future 
costs than at a higher (lower) worker satisfaction level. This implies that it becomes 
increasingly more difficult to improve worker satisfaction at high levels. In addition, 
at a high on-time delivery level (AvOTDit) a further increase in on-time delivery leads 
to more increases in future costs than at a lower on-time delivery level, represented by 
the significant interaction of 0.011 (t= 9.66, p<0.01). This suggests again that it 
becomes increasingly more costly to increase on-time delivery.   
 Again results for the Revit-model are puzzling at least. At a low worker satisfaction 
level a further decrease in worker satisfaction leads to a higher increase in future 
revenues, represented by the significant interaction of 0.783 (t=25.40, p<0.01). In 
addition, at a high level of OTD an increase in OTD leads to a higher increase in 
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future revenues than at a lower OTD, represented by the significant interaction of 
0.006 (t=9.47, p<0.01). These results are completely counter-intuitive and 
unexplainable. 
 In sum, the tenor of these results suggests that the relationship between non-
financial measures and future financial variables is non-linear. For the cost model it 
becomes increasingly more difficult to improve the non-financial measures when they 
are already at a high level. For the revenue model it is more difficult to explain the 
results.    
  
5.5 Discussion and summary 
 
 The accounting literature is ambiguous whether non-financial performance 
measurers have relative or incremental information content, or both, to financial 
measures for predicting future financial performance. Therefore, in this chapter I 
directly test the claim that is advocated in the popular management literature, that 
non-financial performance are better predictors for future financial performance than 
lagged financial measure. In addition, I add to the growing literature that considers 
incremental information content of non-financial performance measures.  
 I find that the non-financial measures do not have more relative information 
content than lagged financial measures. Additionally, I find no support that relative 
information content of non-financial measures increases compared to lagged financial 
measures when more lags are used in the models. In contrast, the change models 
indicate that a change in the financial measure has more information content for 
predicting change in future financial performance than the non-financial measures. 
 The non-financial measures however have incremental information content 
beyond the lagged financial measures for both future cost and future revenues. More 
specific, I find that the non-financial measures worker satisfaction and on-time 
delivery have incremental information content beyond the one period lagged costs and 
revenues for both costs and revenues. Higher worker satisfaction leads to more future 
costs, but also to more future revenues. The on-time delivery measure has a positive 
impact on both costs and revenues. The incremental information content of the two 
lagged non-financial measures beyond the lagged financial measures is roughly one-
seventh beyond costs and one-fifth beyond revenues. The lag search procedure 
indicates that the individual non-financial measures have different lags for cost and 
revenues. Finally, I find that the incremental information content of the non-financial 
measures is nonlinear. For the cost model it becomes more costly to improve non-
financial measures at higher levels. Results for the revenue model are counter-
intuitive. These results suggest that at higher levels of the non-financial measures a 
further increase in the non-financial measures has a higher benefit than at lower levels 
of the non-financial measures.  
  The study suffers from a number of limitations. First, the results are found in one 
particular organization and therefore any generalizability of the results should be 
interpreted with caution. Second, for the lag search I assume for reasons of simplicity 
that the lag is the same for each cross-section. This is not necessarily true of course.  
Another limitation of the lag search is that it assumes that non-financial measures are 
indicators for financial measures. However, improving non-financial measures 
probably will probably cost money first. Therefore, statistical methods that take the 
bi-directional causal nature of the relationship into account should be considered to 
explore the relationships between financial and non-financial measures (Luft and 
Shields, 2001).  
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 Third, I only examine the information content of non-financial measures. To assess 
whether non-financial measures are useful for contracting purposes it is also important 
to consider the sensitivity and noise of the measure (Banker and Datar, 1989).  
 The study suggests a number of interesting avenues for future research. First, the 
results found should be corroborated in different settings and with different non-
financial measures. Second, further research could consider what factors explain 
differences in relative and incremental information content. Third, I find that higher 
worker satisfaction measure leads to higher future costs whereas higher on-time 
delivery measure leads to less future costs. Therefore an interesting research question 
would be which characteristics of non-financial measures leads to either higher or 
lower future financial performance. In addition, I find different lags between different 
non-financial measures and financial measures. Further research could consider what 
factors might explain these different lags. Fourth, it is interesting to explore what the 
difference between relative and incremental information contents means for 
contracting. The theoretical literature suggests that relative information content, i.e., 
the congruence of different measures, is an input for the weight placed on the different 
measures13 (Datar et al., 2001), whereas the incremental information content of 
measures gives insights in which measures have potential for using in contracts. 
However, little empirical evidence exists about these issues.   
                                                          
13
 Assuming risk-issues are constant. 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter addresses the second research question, i.e., do managers perform 
better when non-financial measures are added to their performance evaluation 
system? As discussed before (see section 1.1) the accounting literature is full of 
suggestions of management accounting innovations. However, there are hardly any 
studies that systematically evaluate such innovations. The study in this chapter is an 
empirical account of such an innovation in one company.  The data used in this study 
is defined in section 4.2. In addition, the background information about the company 
given in chapter 3 is used to explain the results. 
 Earlier research that considers the relationship between non-financial performance 
measures use and performance are often cross-sectional and show inconclusive results 
(Abernethy and Lillis, 1995; Ittner and Larcker, 1995, 1997; Chenhall, 1997; Perera et 
al. 1997; Van der Stede, 2001). This study differs from other studies in a number of 
ways. First, in contrast with most studies, this study has a longitudinal research 
design. This is often stated as a useful improvement to consider the long-run 
performance effects of an innovation (Perera et al., 1997). This study differs in a 
number of aspects from the only other study that uses a longitudinal design. One 
limitation of the study of Banker et al. (2000b) is that next to the added non-financial 
measures the company also increased the maximum bonus of the managers.1 This 
effect might contaminate the impact of the change in the PMS. Therefore the current 
study is a purer test of the value of adding non-financial measures into the contract of 
managers. Second, in this study different non-financial measures are added to the 
contract. In this study the organization added a worker satisfaction measure to the 
contract, whereas Banker et al. (2000b) consider the impact of adding a customer 
satisfaction measure to the contract.   
 The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the framework used that 
guides the research question. Section 6.3 explains the research design used to answer 
                                                          
1
 The existing bonus before the change in the PMS was below the industry average (Banker et al., 
2000b, p. 69).  
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the question. Section 6.4 outlines the research methods. Section 6.5 gives the 
specification for the empirical analysis, and discusses some statistical considerations. 
Section 6.6 gives the empirical results. Finally, section 6.7 summarizes the results, 
and gives limitations, and directions for further research. 
 
6.2 Framework 
 
6.2.1 Introduction 
  
 Results from formal agency models, more specific from principal-agent models, 
can guide the research question addressed in this chapter. A second theoretical 
justification why the change in the PMS might be beneficial for the organization is the 
notion of complementarity (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). This assumes that a 
particular strategy can only be successful when other systems of the company are 
congruent with this strategy. For example, Wruck and Jensen (1994) suggest that a 
successful implementation of a TQM-system require changes in the decision rights, 
performance measurement system, and reward system. Milgrom and Roberts (1995) 
argued that complementarities means that the returns of A increase when the level of 
B is higher. In the current research context, the positive effects of using a quality 
strategy in the company (see chapter 3) increase when the PMS is congruent with this 
strategy.  
 Section 6.2 is structured as follows. First, agency theory is introduced. Second, the 
role of principal-agent models in explaining management accounting procedures is 
described. Section 6.2.4 explains the value of adding measure to a contract. Next, 
limitations of the principal-agent models are enumerated. Finally, expectations for the 
impact of the change in the PMS are derived.    
 
6.2.2 Agency theory 
 
 Agency models explain how features of information, accounting, and compensation 
systems influence incentive problems, and how these incentive problems influence the 
design of information, accounting, and compensation systems (Lambert, 2001). It thus 
assumes that there are conflicts of interest2, motivational problems, and explains how 
mechanisms can mitigate these problems. 
 The agency model compares information, accounting, and incentive systems when 
they are used optimally with respect to the amount of incentive problems. This 
suggests that no performance improvements can be gained by adopting certain 
accounting systems3. However, this state of equilibrium is often not realistic in 
organizations as they are in a process of constant updating their systems, reacting on 
exogenous shocks in the internal and external environment of the organization 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Ittner and Larcker, 2001). Baiman (1990, p. 567) 
suggests that one strategy to increase the contribution of agency models to 
management accounting is “to concentrate less on deriving optimal compensation 
contracts, and concentrate more on more easily observed aspects of the firm”. In this 
                                                          
2
 Causes of conflicts of interest are, among others, effort aversion of the agent, different time-horizons 
between the principal and the agent, and risk-aversion of the agent (Lambert, 2001). 
3
 This also implies that under this condition, “..empirical researchers should not even attempt to explain 
organizational performance because any statistical significant coefficient on the managerial accounting 
choice will only occur because of measurement error, misspecification of functional form, inadequate 
set of exogenous controls, etc. (Ittner and Larcker, 2001, p.398)”. 
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dissertation, with the change in the PMS examined the organization strives for 
optimality. Consequently, this is tested in the empirical analysis (Banker et al., 1996a; 
Banker et al., 2000b).   
    Although the agency models have attractive features for studying management 
accounting procedures, the model cannot explain why, for example, rewards and 
punishments are assymmetrically distributed, and pay systems often lead to the same 
rewards for many employees (Baker et al., 1988).   
 
6.2.3 The principal-agent problem and management accounting procedures 
 
 A principal-agent relationship exists when the principal delegates some of his 
responsibilities to others, the agents4. Further, the goals of the principal(s) are not the 
same as the goals of the agent(s), and the principal cannot, or it is too expensive, 
completely observe (monitor) the behavior and actions of the agent. Hence, there is 
information asymmetry between the principal and agent, about the effort chosen by 
the agent and the possible states of nature. Since the principal is assumed to be risk 
neutral he could bear all the risk and give the agent a fixed wage. However, in that 
case a work averse agent has no incentive to work. In contrast, production would be 
optimal if the principal sold the firm to the agent for a fixed fee. In that case the agent 
would bear all the risk. However, the risk-averse agent is asking for an extra 
compensation for this risk bearing.  
 Thus, the principal-agent model can be characterized as a trade-off between the 
optimal risk bearing by the agent for incentive purposes, and the risk premium the 
agent is asking. The principal-agent problem exists when there is information 
asymmetry between the principal and agent, and the agent is risk and work averse. 
 Principal-agent theory is one of the few coherent economic theories that addresses 
managerial accounting procedures and poses managerial accounting questions 
(Baiman, 1990). The model is studied to explain the role of managerial accounting 
procedures, such as budgeting, monitoring, cost allocation, and transfer-pricing. 
Based on the principal-agent model one would expect to find these managerial 
accounting procedures only in situations in which individuals (or organizations) 
would benefit from their use (Baiman, 1990). In addition, one could use the principal-
agent model to explain the usefulness of two competing systems in an organization. If 
the second system better mitigates the agency problems than the first, the second 
system is to be preferred. 
 In this study, the principal-agency model is used in the context of a changing 
performance measurement system. In the old system managerial performance is 
measured, evaluated and rewarded mainly on financial performance measures, while 
in the new system managerial performance is evaluated and rewarded based on 
relatively more non-financial performance measures5. Observing outcome variables, 
which are indicators of the agents’ actions, assesses preference for the two systems.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 The description of the principal-agent problem is based on Baiman (1990). 
5
 Principal-agent models explore the incentive function of performance measures use. The incentive 
function is a composition of both the evaluation and reward function (Baiman, 1990).  
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6.2.4 Value of non-financial performance measures in the multi-task principal-
agent framework 
 
 This section describes the value of using additional measures in the contract in the 
multi-task principal-agent framework. The context described is the value of non-
financial measures that are added to the financial measures in the contract. 
 The primary distinction of a multi-task principal-agent model is the premise that 
the agent performs more than one task or that the task is multi-dimensional 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991)6. This raises the issue of incomplete measures in 
agency models, i.e., incongruence. Next to the functions of allocating risk between the 
principal and agent, and inducing effort, in a multi-task principal-agent model the 
contract directs the choice of the agent to allocate his attention among the different 
tasks, or dimensions of the task. This means that an increase in the agents' 
compensation tied to one task will reallocate his attention to this task, and lessen the 
attention to other tasks. 
 The two most important characteristics of a performance measure are its 
congruence with the principal's expected gross payoff, and its noise, that is 
uncontrollability, of the measure. Non-congruent measures lead to sub-optimal effort 
allocation, whereas noise of the measure leads to sub-optimal effort intensity (Feltham 
and Xie, 1994). The value of additional performance measures over an existing 
measure differs in both cases. First, if the existing measure is non-congruent, 
additional measures increase the action set of the agent and therefore makes the 
behavior of the agent more congruent with the principal's expected gross pay-off. 
Second, additional measures can reduce risk imposed on the agent due to noise, i.e., 
uncontrollability, in the existing performance measure (Feltham and Xie, 1994). 
 The effects of evaluating managers (agents) only on a measure which does not 
appropriately incorporate the economic consequences of all relevant activities are 
often described in the multi-task principal-agent literature (Hemmer, 1996). This can 
lead to a short-run orientation or have negative side-effects on other departments 
(externalities). An often used example is hard selling. Sales people can improve their 
sales measure by two strategies. First, the salesman aggressively sells products to his 
customers. This strategy can in the long-run lead to unsatisfied customers. The sales 
measure probably rises in the short-run, but may deteriorate in the long-run when 
customers feel unsatisfied with the product. A second strategy is to provide extra 
service to the customers, which will make them more satisfied, and leads to more 
sales in the future. The principal can induce the second strategy, which is more 
congruent with his goals, by contracting the agent on a sales and a customer 
satisfaction measure.  
 The case of risk reduction can formally be expressed in the following way. If 
measure x is a function of effort (a) and noise (εx), that is x=a+εx, and y is only a 
function of noise, that is y= εy, then the value of adding measure y to the contract is 
only 0 in the case where the correlation (ρ) between x and y is 0 (Feltham and Xie, 
1994). In practice the case of risk reduction is seen with relative performance 
evaluation. The performance of agent two says something, i.e., ρ(x,y)≠0, about the 
performance of agent one, even he it cannot influence the measure itself. In the case 
of the salesman, if customer satisfaction is an indicator of sales, that is, financial and 
                                                          
6
 Another distinction is that in a multi-task principal-agent model the design of the job becomes a 
relevant issue. When a function consists of more than one dimension, these dimensions can be 
aggregated into one person or in different persons. An example is separating the production and quality 
control of production workers into two persons, or incorporating it into one.  
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non-financial measures are correlated, adding non-financial measures to financial 
measures has value.  
 In sum, adding non-financial measures to financial measures in the contracts of 
managers can lead to a better allocation of effort, and to reduce the overall risk of the 
manager. 
  
6.2.5 Limitations of the principal-agent model  
 
 In this section, I discuss a number of limitations of the principal-agent model, and 
the way my empirical study addresses these limitations. The principal-agent model 
has been the subject of severe criticism regarding the assumptions underlying the 
model, the outcomes of the model, and the simplicity of the model (Baiman, 1990). 
This makes it difficult to perform a direct test of the model.  
 A criticism regarding the outcomes of the model relates to Holmstrom's result, 
called the informativeness principle, that information about the effort of an agent 
needs to be in the contract if it gives incremental value over the other signals in the 
contract (Holmstrom, 1979). This leads to the outcome that many (infinite) measures 
should be used in the contract. Together with the assumption that contracts are 
costless7, the result of the principal-agent model gives complicated and complete 
contracts. In practice, simple (linear) and incomplete contracts are often found 
(Baiman, 1990). Reasons for this observation are higher costs, both in time and 
money, of maintaining the information system, and cognitive limitations of 
managers8, which leads to dilution of attention to each individual measure when 
contracts are extended with additional measures9. For example, in a Perrin Towers 
survey under 60 companies that adopted the Balanced Scorecard, the large number of 
measures was one of the problems managers indicated (Ittner and Larcker, 1998b). 
Therefore, Holmstrom's result is probably only true for the region where the 
incremental value of an extra signal about the effort of the agent is less than the extra 
costs of gathering data for the signal. Therefore, added value of additional 
performance measures that are indicators of managerial effort, in practice is expected 
to be an inverted U-curve.  
 In the current study, the evaluation and rewarding of managers is based on a 
limited number of performance measures that are important for the organization (see 
table 3.1). This suggests that the added value of adding measures in the contract of the 
managers of this organization may still be in the increasing part of the inverted U-
curve. 
  
6.2.6 Effect of change in PMS on financial and non-financial measures 
 
 Defining performance is difficult in every study. Perera et al. (1997) remark that: 
  
“Performance is a complex variable with a multiplicity of factors contributing to the level of 
global performance at any point in time” (Perera et al., 1997, p. 569). 
 
                                                          
7
 In a principal-agent model extra measures cannot have a negative value because the principal can 
always assign zero incentive to the measures (Feltham and  Xie, 1994).  
8
 Miller (1956) found that individuals can store only 7 plus or minus 2 information elements in their 
working memory. Empirical evidence shows that for non-management jobs three till five measures is 
the optimum. Afterwards, benefits decline (McAdams and Hawk, 1994). 
9
 Baiman (1990) suggests incorporating a contract design cost within the agency model, but admits that 
the form of such a measure is not well understood.    
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Therefore, for assessing the effectiveness of the use of relatively more non-financial 
performance measures to evaluate managers, both financial and a number of for the 
organization important non-financial performance measures are used. Becker and 
Gerhart (1996, p.791) argued that effectiveness measures should be “natural and 
meaningful measures” that have inherent meaning in the context of the research 
problem. The effectiveness measures used in this study are the measures from the 
contracts of the area managers, and are therefore indicators of managerial 
performance. All dimensions of performance partly correlate with the manager’s 
action, i.e., effort level. Although the study in this chapter is not a formal test of the 
principal-agent model, insights from the model can guide the research question.  
 In a multi-task principal-agent model the weight placed on a measure of a task 
directs the amount of effort of the agent to the task (Feldham and Xie, 1994). Hence, 
adding additional measures to the contract, in this case non-financial measures, 
increases the effort allocated to the tasks of the added measures. Additionally, based 
on self-selection the new contract will attract managers that are better in executing the 
tasks that are emphasized relatively more (Banker et al., 2000a). Therefore, the added 
non-financial measure worker satisfaction is expected to increase when added to the 
contracts. There is little empirical evidence of the impact of adding measures in 
compensation plans in longitudinal studies. Banker et al. (2000b) find a positive 
impact of the added non-financial measure customer satisfaction after its inclusion in 
the bonus plan. Symons and Jacobs (1995) find that operational performance 
improved after the inclusion of a TQM-based rewards system for production workers 
was installed. However, Pearce et al. (1985) find no impact of adding 4 organizational 
performance measures in a compensation plan.10  
 In contrast, principal-agent theory states that the tasks for the measures that were in 
the contract already get relatively less emphasis, and are therefore expected to 
decrease. This would lead to the expectation that the on-time delivery measure that 
was already in the contract is expected to decrease. However, when increased worker 
satisfaction has a positive impact on the on-time delivery measure this might lead to 
an increase in on-time delivery. Therefore, no direction is formulated for the impact of 
the change in the PMS on the on-time delivery measure. 
 Again, principal-agent theory states that the tasks for measures that were in the 
contract already get relatively less emphasis, and are therefore expected to decrease. 
However when the non-financial measures are leading indicators for the financial 
measures the financial measures might also increase after the change in the PMS. In 
addition, the multi-task principal-agent model assumes that the weight of the existing 
measure becomes less when a new measure is added to the contract.11 However, some 
empirical evidence shows that when relatively more non-financial measures are used, 
this does not mean that less emphasis is placed on financial measures (Govindarajan 
and Gupta, 1985; Carr et al., 1997; Van der Stede et al., 2001).  
 The impact of the change in the PMS might have different effects for either cost or 
revenues. Next to the effect that less emphasis is given to measures that were in the 
contract already, improving non-financial measures might lead to either more or less 
future cost (see section 5.2.2). Therefore, the change in the PMS has a differential 
                                                          
10
 In this study like in Banker et al. (2000b) study, before the change in the PMS there was no bonus 
awarded to the managers and therefore there are two simultaneous changes in the PMS. 
11
 Theoretically, this is true under most conditions. However when the (normalized) co-incongruence 
and correlation between the two measures are highly negative, it is possible that the weight on the 
existing measure increases after a measure is added, because the added measure filters noise and offsets 
distortions of the existing measures. (Banker and Theveranjan, 2000). 
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effect on the cost measure and it is not clear which effect, i.e., the “less weight” 
versus “leading indicator” is dominant. The empirical evidence from Banker et al. 
(2000b) shows that the inclusion of non-financial measures in the contracts of 
managers did not lead to a decrease or increase in the cost measure in their context. 
 For the revenue measures, improved lagged non-financial measures are expected to 
have a positive impact on revenues (see the empirical results in chapter 4). In contrast, 
principal-agent theory would predict that existing measures in the contract get less 
weight when the contract is extended with extra measures. Since the number of items 
in the contract of the managers increased only from three to five, and therefore the 
attention for each measures is not diluted too much, I suggest that the “leading 
indicator” argument is dominant over the “less weight” argument. Thus, I expect that 
revenues do increase after the inclusion of the non-financial measures in the contract 
of the managers. The empirical evidence in Banker et al. (2000b) shows that the 
revenues do indeed increase after the inclusion of the non-financial measure customer 
satisfaction in the contract.     
 Table 6.2 summarizes the expectations derived from the framework used in this 
study. 
 
Table 6.2: Summary of expectations of adding non-financial measures to the contracts of managers 
Impact of change in PMS Expectation1 
Non-financial measures2  
Change in PMS → Worker satisfaction + 
Change in PMS → On-time delivery ? 
  
Financial measures  
Change in PMS → Costs  ? 
Change in PMS → Revenues  + 
Notes: 
1 Where a + means that the change in the PMS is expected to have a positive impact on the measure, a ? 
means that the change is expected to have a differential effect on the measure.  
2 Only the worker satisfaction measure was added to the contract. 
 
6.3 Research design  
 
6.3.1 Introduction 
 
 This section explains the research design for this study. First, the research method 
of experimentation, more specific the quasi-experimental design, is described. Next, a 
short description of the interrupted time-series design is given. Afterwards, potential 
problems, i.e., threats to internal validity, with this method are enumerated. 
  
6.3.2 Quasi-experimental design 
 
 Experiments can be characterized by their structure and function (Cook and 
Shadish, 1994). The structure of an experiments consist of a) a sudden intervention, b) 
knowledge of when the intervention occurred, c) one of more post-intervention 
outcome measures, and d) some form of counterfactual, that is a base-line, to compare 
the after intervention outcome measure with. 
 The function of an experiment is to test causal hypotheses. Causal relationships are 
dependence relationships between two or more variables in which the researcher 
clearly specifies that one or more variables “cause” or create an outcome represented 
by at least one other variable (Hair et al., 1998). Cook and Campbell (1979) give three 
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conditions that have to be met before confidence in a causal relationship can be 
derived. First, there must be a temporal ordering, where the cause comes before the 
effect in time. Second, the cause and effect have to co-vary.12 Third, there are no 
plausible alternative explanations for the observed effect.13  
 Social experiments, or the more familiar name field experiments, differ from 
laboratory experiments in that the subjects are less isolated from their environment, 
and intervention procedures are less standardized (Cook and Shadish, 1994). 
Although this is considered an advantage of the method, because results found are 
considered to be more generalizable (Cook, 1979), it is also a weakness. Especially 
the third condition of causality is hard to meet, because an unlimited number of 
factors, next to the treatment can be the reason for the effect observed. This leads to a 
number of potential alternative explanations for the effect found. 
 Social experiments can be classified as either randomized experiments or quasi-
experiments. Quasi-experiments differ from randomized experiments in the selection 
criteria of the assignment of the treatment over the subjects. In randomized 
experiments the subjects that get the treatment are randomly chosen. In contrast, in 
quasi-experiments the treatment is assigned to subjects based on self-selection or 
administrative procedures (Cook and Shadish, 1994). This non-randomness is a 
serious threat for the causal inference of a relationship.  For example, the treatment 
can be based on self-selection, that is more qualified subjects get the treatment, 
whereas, less qualified end up in the control group. However, researchers hardly ever 
get an opportunity to execute, or observe, a randomized social experiment. Therefore 
most experiments are non-random. 
 
6.3.3 Interrupted time-series design 
 
 From the large family of quasi-experimental designs the interrupted time-series 
design is considered to be one of the strongest (Marcantonio and Cook, 1994). The 
relative strength of the interrupted time-series design compared with, for example, a 
simple before-after design is that in the interrupted time-series design a trend that 
already exists in the time-series can be controlled for.  
 
Figure 6.1: Before-after design Figure 6.2: Interrupted time-series design 
 
        
    ● ●  
  ●    ● 
  ● ● 
 
 
  
 
 For example, in figure 6.1 a simple before-after test would indicate that the 
intervention had a positive impact. However, figure 6.2 indicates that the time-series 
increased already before the intervention, and therefore the intervention had no 
positive effect.   
 The interrupted time-series design is especially strong when a sudden intervention 
took place, and a rapid effect is expected or the delay before the intervention has an 
                                                          
12
 Called statistical conclusion validity (Cook and Campbell, 1979). 
13
 Called internal validity (Cook and Campbell, 1979). 
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effect is known (Marcantonio and Cook, 1994). The basic interrupted time-series 
design can be represented schematically in the following way: 
 
O
-n….. O-4 O-3 O-2 O-1 X O1 O2 O3 O4 …….. On 
 
Where:  
O
-n through O-1 are observations before the treatment,   
O1 through On are observations after the treatment, and  
X is the treatment.  
 
 In this design the post-treatment observations are compared with the pre-treatment 
observations, i.e., the counterfactual, to estimate the impact of the intervention. This 
basic design can be extended with additional features, for example with a control 
group, additional outcome variables, more than one or switching interventions, and 
more explanatory variables in the analysis that explain the outcome measures. In the 
study in this chapter, the post change outcome measures are compared with the trend 
in the time-series of the outcome measures before the change.   
 
6.3.4 Threats to internal validity  
  
 The interrupted time-series design is subject to a number of threats to internal 
validity (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Internal validity deals with ruling out alternative 
explanations for the causal inference, and is the most discussed type of validity in a 
quasi-experimental design. Cook et al., (1990) give a list of threats to internal validity 
specific for the interrupted time-series designs. These threats are 1) maturation, 2) the 
cyclical nature of time-series, 3) main effect of history, 4) instrumentation, and 5) 
selection effects. Cambell argued that only plausible threats need to be ruled out, but 
admits that plausibility is a slippery concept (in, Cook and Shadish, 1994).  
 First, in the case of maturation another trend, independent of the treatment, started 
already before the intervention. This threat is for example due to learning experience, 
or just ageing. I control for maturation by assuming that the trend in the time-series 
before the change in the PMS persists after the change.  
 Second, a seasonal effect may hide the effects of the treatment. Identifying the 
source of seasonality, for example, monthly or quarterly, can control for this effect. In 
this study, I use dummies for each month to control for the cyclical nature of the time-
series. 
 Third, a main effect of history exists when alternative causes started at the same 
time of the treatment. Possible solutions for this effect are the use of a control group, 
and a record of all plausible effect-causation events. The problem of history is 
mitigated when the interval between two observations is smaller, since the probability 
that two or more causes started at the same moment is decreasing. In this study, main 
effects of history are qualitatively examined, by interviews with different managers 
from the organization, or from theory.  
 A fourth threat is changes in recordkeeping practices, called instrumentation during 
the measurement period. This problem reveals itself in a changed definition of the 
time-series over time, or a more than normal emphasis on following the measure. 
Since an intervention is often a process of re-organizing existing procedures, the 
instrumentation problem is often a problem. Instrumentation is addressed in this study 
in a number of ways such as interviews with managers, investigating several internal 
documents, and examining time-series visually for sudden breaks.  
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 The last threat is selection and mortality. A selection effect is an effect that exists 
because the analyzed units have different attributes and therefore may react differently 
on the intervention. A related effect is mortality. In that case, subjects with bad 
attributes for the specific treatment drop out. Possible solutions for these threats are 
the measurements of units that have complete time-series, or a background analysis of 
all units to identify attributes of the subjects. In this study, no control is used for the 
selection effect. In the principal-agent paradigm both the effort effect and selection 
effect are determinants for performance effects (Banker et al., 2000a). Hence, a 
control for the selection effect would absorb a part of the effect we are interested in. 
 The threats to internal validity specific for the interrupted time-series design and 
the way this study addresses these threats are summarized in table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3: Threats to internal validity 
Threats to internal validity1  This study 
 
Maturation 
 
 Is assumed to be controlled for through the use of a 
linear increasing base-line in the specification 
 
Cyclical nature of time-series 
 
 Use indicator variables for each month 
Main effect of history 
 
 Qualitative examination by interviews  
Instrumentation  Interviews, visual examination of time-series, and 
internal documents 
 
Selection effect 
 
 No controls since selection effect is part of the theory 
Notes: 
1 These threats are specific for the interrupted time-series design (Cook et al., 1990). 
 
6.4 Research methods  
 
6.4.1 Introduction 
 
 This section reviews different methods to analyze time-series and assess evaluation 
questions. First, two different research methods to analyze the panel data set, i.e., 
time-series analysis and time-series regression, are compared. Afterwards alternative 
specifications to estimate the impact of the change in the PMS are examined. Finally, 
evaluation studies in accounting research, and their research methods are reviewed.  
 
6.4.2 Time-series regression versus time-series analysis 
 
 Autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) modeling and regression 
approaches are two different approaches to analyze time-series14. The most important 
difference is that regression models are built from prior theory and/or research, 
whereas ARIMA models are build from the time-series itself (Orwin, 1997). 
 A problem with the regression method is that there is often no theory to explain the 
time-series completely. A statistical problem is that time-series often contain 
autocorrelated observations. When autocorrelation is present an observation is 
                                                          
14
 In addition, there are more approaches available to analyze time-series. It is also possible to use a 
combination of the regression and ARIMA approach. 
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explained by one or more of its former observations. Although neglecting 
autocorrelation in regression models does not bias coefficients, they are not efficient 
(Greene, 2000). In the more general case of positive autocorrelation the standard 
deviation is deflated, which leads to more significant coefficients (Mohr, 1995).15  
 The ARIMA, or Box-Jenkins, model mitigates the problem of autoregression. It 
differs from the better known regression model, in that a time-series is explained in 
terms of autoregressive and moving average16 processes that characterize the series 
itself. In addition to “whitening” the time-series17, i.e., removing any recurring 
systematic components from the data, a transferfunction is used to assess the impact 
of an intervention into the series (Orwin, 1997). These transferfunctions can take 
different forms depending on the expected impact of the change. 
 A disadvantages of ARIMA-modeling is that the removal of the trend by 
differencing, and the estimation of the autoregressive and moving average processes 
are a-theoretical, i.e., it is driven by the data and can remove the effects of 
unmeasured variables which can interact with the intervention (Pearce et al., 1985).18 
Further, because ARIMA modeling is an empirical method it needs relatively long 
time-series. McCleary (1980) gives as a rule of thump a minimum of 50 observations.   
 The predominant factor why time-series regression, instead of time-series 
analysis, is used in this dissertation is that only 36 observation for each time-series is 
available. Small time-series lead to relatively high standard errors of the parameters. 
Therefore, the time-series regression approach is preferred. 
 
6.4.3 Impact assessment  
 
 Cook and Campbell (1979) discuss three elements that drives the proper 
specification to estimate a possible impact, i.e., 1) the shape of the impact, 2) the type 
of the impact, and 3) the permanence of the impact.  
 First, the appropriate specification to estimate the impact of an intervention 
depends on the expected impact of the intervention. An intervention can lead to a 1) 
change in the mean of the time-series (a structural shift), 2) a change in the slope of 
the time-series (a gradual shift), and 3) a change in the variability round the mean or a 
change in the seasonal pattern, or 4) a combination of 1, 2 and 3 (Cook and Campbell, 
1979).  
 Second, the impact can be instantaneously or delayed. Estimating the impact of an 
intervention is easier when the exact date of the intervention is known and the 
expected effect comes rapidly or has a known delay (Marcantonio and Cook, 1994). 
Unfortunately, in management accounting research there is little theory that guides the 
expectation of such a possible lag.  
                                                          
15
 Cook and Campbell (1979) give an indication of the impact of autocorrelation on significant testing. 
  
ttest = treal* (1+θ) / 1-θ).  
 
Thus, for example in the case of an autocorrelation coefficient (θ) of 0.5. The Ttest is inflated by 225%. 
In that case t-statistics of 4.5 are not significant. 
16
 Moving average processes are positive or negative random shock that influence the time-series.  
17
 For a complete overview of the method is referred to McCleary and  Hay (1980).  
18
 Although the a-theoretical solution of the problems is a standard critic, for example in Harvey and 
Durbin (1986), controlling for a trend in the data that existed already before the event, transforming 
observations for autoregression, and controlling for a seasonal pattern in time-series regression has the 
same characteristic. 
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 The third element is the permanency of the effect. Cook and Campell (1979) 
argued that most effects decay over time even if the program or new system is still in 
place. The opposite possibility of an impact that grows over time is less often 
observed.   
 The different possible shapes of an expected impact all use different specifications. 
The simplest specification to assess the impact is a change in the mean of the time-
series: 
ttt Dy εβα ++= *1 . (6.11) 
 
Where: 
Dt is 0 before the intervention and 1 after the intervention19, and  
yt is the outcome variable.  
 
In equation (6.11) the outcome variable after the implementation is compared with the 
outcome variable before the implementation. 
 Equation (6.12) is a more sophisticated specification that controls for a trend in the 
time-series that already existed before the intervention: 
 
itttit DTy εββα +++= ** 21 . (6.12) 
 
Where: 
Tt is a trend in the data measured by 0 in period 0, 1 in period 1, and 2 in period 2, 
etc., and other variables are as before.20 
 
The rationale behind equation (6.12) is that when a trend existed already before the 
intervention, this cannot be explained by the intervention itself.21 This is a control for 
the maturation treat to internal validity. β2 estimates the impact of the intervention. 
This specification assumes a direct abrupt effect of the intervention. Equation (6.12) is 
graphically represented in figure 6.3.  
 
Figure 6.3: Graphical representation of an abrupt shift in the time-series 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An alternative specification that allows the effect to be abrupt or gradual is: 
 
itttttit TDDTy εβββα ++++= **** 321 . (6.13)
   
                                                          
19
 This specification is a t-test on the average mean before and after the change. 
20
 This assumes a linear trend, however other specifications are also possible. 
21
 This specification is a problem in the case of dependent variables measures estimated in percentages, 
for example in percentage of rejections. In the case of reaching 100% it is more difficult to improve the 
measure. 
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In equation (6.13), β3 gives a change in the slope of the time-series, whereas β2 still 
gives a shift in the intercept of the time-series. Equation (6.13) is graphically 
represented in figure 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4: Graphical representation of a gradual and abrupt change in the time-series 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A change in the variability of the time-series might be expected when organizations 
are better able to control the process, and therefore the variance of the time-series 
decreases.22  
 The methods described above to estimate the effect of a certain treatment can all be 
extended to capture other factors beside the intervention that can influence the time-
series.  
 
6.4.4 Impact assessment in accounting research 
 
 Few studies in management accounting literature estimate the impact of a change 
in the PMS through an interrupted time-series design. In Banker et al. (1996b) the 
impact of an incentive plan based on sales, for sales consultants in a retail 
organization is explored. This is the only study were the treatment is randomly 
assigned to the cross-sections. Therefore the counterfactual of the cross-sections 
where the treatment is implemented are the cross-sections where it is not 
implemented. They estimate the impact of the change in the incentive system through 
considering models with either a shift in the trend of the time-series, a shift in the 
intercept, and both, that is specification (6.13) is used.  
 Banker et al. (1996a) use the following specification to estimate the impact of the 
change under study (specification given without control variables):  
 
itttitit postTpreTOut εββα +++= ** 21 . (6.14) 
 
Where:  
Outit = the outcome measure of cross-section i at period t, 
PreTt = a variable that is 0 after the change and has the number equal to the period  
  before the change,  
PostTt  = the variable is 0 before the change and has the number equal to the period  
  after the change. 
 
 The PreTt variable controls for a trend in the time-series that is independent of the 
treatment. Coefficient β2 of the PostTt variable is the indicator for the effect of the 
change.  Because β1 was not, and β2 was significantly different from zero this led 
                                                          
22
 Wruck and Jensen (1994) also argued that TQM organizations use a different way of setting targets. 
Next to setting a target for the level of a variable, these companies often stress a limited variance of a 
measure to increase its predictability.  
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them to the conclusion that the change had a positive impact. An F-test that β2 is 
statistically different from β1 would be the proper test if the change in the PMS had an 
impact. This specification does only ascertain whether there is a change in the slope of 
the time-series and not whether there is a change in the intercept of the time-series. 
 Banker et al. (2000b) use ARIMA modeling to analyze the impact of the change in 
the PMS.  Banker et al. (2000b, p. 77) state that:  
 
“a significant change in the slope or level predictable from the model describing the time-
series indicates that the intervention event had an effect on the dependent variable” (italics 
added).  
 
However in the econometric models they only use a dummy, being 1 after the change 
and 0 before the change, and therefore they only consider a change in the level of the 
time-series. The reason that the specification in Banker et al. (2000b) is not used in 
this study is because of the relative short time-series, i.e., 36 periods.  
 Finally, Emsley (2000) tests the impact of the change under study by a t-test 
between the average performance after and before the change. Statistical controls used 
are a test that there was no trend already before the change, and a test of 
autocorrelation. Further, only a qualitative indication of disturbing factors is given. 
 In sum, the accounting research literature uses a wide variety of methods to 
estimate the impact of in intervention. This can be explained by the lack of theory 
available that should guide such a specification.  
 
6.5 Specification  
  
 Cook and Campell (1979) argued that the impact of a program can lead to a change 
in the intercept (a structural shift), slope (a gradual shift), variance of the time-series, 
or a combination of these. Ideally, theory should guide the choice of the appropriate 
specification. Unfortunately, management accounting theory gives no guidance for a 
possible performance effect of the change in the PMS. Since there is no theory what 
kind of effect to expect it could be argued that this should be an empirical question, 
i.e., use a specification that allows either a change in the slope, and a change in the 
intercept. However, such a specification, comparable with equation (6.13), is subject 
to multicollineairity problems between the parameter that estimates the change in the 
slope of the time-series (D*T), and the baseline (T) against with the change is 
compared. The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of these parameters are above 40, 
where a rule of thump indicates that VIF's above 20 are problematic (Hair et al. 
(1998). Therefore, I used the structure of equation (6.12) to estimate the impact of the 
change in PMS. In this specification, the coefficient of the variable Dt estimates the 
change in the intercept of the time-series, that is a structural impact. This specification 
assumes that the impact of the change in the PMS starts immediately and is permanent 
over the time period of the study.   
 The variable Tt is used to control for a trend in the time-series that existed already 
before the change in the PMS. This so-called maturation effect controls, for example, 
for the larger emphasis on quality after the business unit Letters separated the two 
functions in 1995. Tt assumes that possible maturation effects are linear and persist 
over time, therefore it might overcompensate. This makes the test of the impact of the 
change in the PMS very conservative. Especially, for ratios, like the quality and 
frequency measure, it is more difficult to improve them when they are already on a 
higher level. 
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 Again, I estimate the fixed effects model, that is in all models dummies for each 
area are used to control for difference in size, leadership style, etc (see also section 
4.3.3).  
 Thus, for the impact of the change in the PMS on Freqit the following equation is 
estimated: 
 
.*
****
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 (6.15) 
 
Where: 
Freqit  = the absence-frequency index, measured by the number of sickness  
  reports per 100 working days, 
Tt  = a trend, being –1, -2, -3, etc. before the change, and 1, 2, 3, etc. after the  
 change,  
Dt  = the moment of the change in the PMS. Where Dt is an indicator that is 0  
 before the change and 1 after the change, 
MONTHk  = an indicator being 1 for month k and 0 otherwise, 
Rsatit  = the ratio of the number of workers on Saturday from the total number of  
  workers, 
IAZit = an indicator variable that is 1 when more than 20 out of 10.000 people  
 went to a family doctor in one of four geographical regions, and 0  
 otherwise. 
and other variables and indices are as before. 
 
 In the model with Freqit as dependent variable there is a control for a seasonal 
pattern, because the larger part of the work of most employees is outdoor, hence 
weather conditions influence the measure. This is a control for the threat of internal 
validity of the cyclical nature of the time-series. Further, in the meta-study referred to 
before, McShane (1984) found that age and experience moderated the strength of the 
relationship between worker satisfaction and absence-frequency. Therefore a control 
is used for workers on Saturday (Rsatit), because these are employees with other 
characteristics. Most often they are students and are therefore younger and have less 
experience. Additionally, interviews with human resource managers confirmed the 
idea that the Saturday workers are less often sick.  
 The impact on the on-time delivery measure is estimated by: 
 
oit
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=
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1
321 *** . (6.16) 
 
Where: 
OTDit = the ratio of the number of products supplied at the right place within a pre- 
 specified time period divided by the total number of products, 
and other variables and indices are as before. 
  
Again dummies for months to control for a seasonal pattern are used. The impact of 
the change in the PMS on Costit is estimated by:     
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Where: 
Volit   = number of products, 
and other variables and indices are as before. 
  
 In the Costit-model, the dependent variable is deflated by CPIt to control for 
inflation. The number of products handled of the organization differs considerable in 
each time period, e.g., Christmas and New Year is an important period for the 
organization, therefore, dummies are used for each month. The most important driver 
of costs is the volume of the production, measured by variable Volit. Whereas this 
production volume is for a large part exogenous to the area manager, and is used in 
the target setting progress, it is also used as a control variable.  
 The impact of the change in the PMS on revenues is estimated by: 
 
∑
=
++++=
11
1
321 ***Re
k
ritkkrtrtrriit MONTHDTv εβββα . (6.18)
  
Where all variables are as before. 
 In the Revit-model again the dependent variable is deflated by CPIt to control for 
inflation. Using dummies for each month controls for a seasonal pattern.  
 
6.5.1 Statistical consideration  
 
 The Jarque-Bera statistic reveals no large problems with non-normality. The 
maximum number of cross-sections for one model that had multivariate non-normal 
residuals was 10 out of 27. Because of these results and together with the large sample 
size I choose not to transform the data.   
 Due to the time-series nature of the data autocorrelation can be expected. Although 
autocorrelation does not bias coefficients it deflates the standard deviations. 
Surprisingly, based on the Durbin Watson statistics autocorrelation was not a 
problem. A plausible explanation for this is that the source of autocorrelation is 
seasonal, and the use of dummies for each month absorbs this.  
 One advantage of pooled time-series data is the ability to control for individual 
heterogeneity of firms, countries etc. (Baltagi, 1995). Therefore, the fixed effects 
model with dummies for each area is used to control for omitted variables that are 
constant over time.  
 Again, I use the seemingly unrelated regression to control for correlated residuals 
between the areas and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity (see section 5.3.3).  
 I re-estimated all models without observations that had residuals that are more than 
3 standard deviation from the mean (Hair et al. 1998). The maximum number of 
outliers for a model was 8. These outliers do not influence the results reported. 
 The R2-adjusted are high in most models. These are mainly driven by the fixed 
effects for each area that control for omitted variables, such as size of the area, and 
indicator variables for the months to control for seasonality.  
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6.6 Empirical results 
 
6.6.1 Introduction 
 
 Since I use the same variables for this analysis as in chapter 5, I refer for the 
descriptives and correlation matrix for all variables to table 4.2 and 4.3. The next 
section reports the results of the change in the PMS on the yearly data. Section 6.6.3 
gives the impact of the change in the PMS on the non-financial performance 
measures. Section 6.6.4 gives the results on the financial measures. Finally, the 
managerial significance of the results is reported in section 6.6.5. 
 
6.6.2 Impact of change in PMS with yearly data 
 
 Before I estimate the impact on the change in the PMS in the interrupted time-
series design with monthly data I perform a simple before-after design. I execute a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with the 5 performance dimensions 
from the contracts of the managers as dependent variables and a dummy that is 1 after 
the change and 0 before the change. In this analysis I use the number of products 
handled in a year as a covariate, since this is exogenous for the area manager. The 
rational to execute this analysis is threefold. First, it shows the differences between a 
simple before-after design, and an interrupted time-series design. Second, I have no 
proxy for the customer satisfaction measure, but can use this performance dimension 
in the yearly analysis. Third, in the detailed analysis the impact of the change in the 
PMS is considered individual in each performance measure from the contract. 
However, the question whether managers perform better after the change in the PMS 
is an intrinsically multivariate question (Hair, 1998). MANOVA is the proper research 
method to analyze these multivariate questions. 
 The descriptives for the yearly data are reported in table 6.3. The results for this 
MANOVA analysis are reported in table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.3: Descriptives for yearly data 
Variables1 (n=812) Mean 
 
Standard 
deviation 
Median Minimum Maximum 
Cost 664.84 161.65 657.96 338.33 1125.81 
Revenues 364.65 173.76 320.19 171.70 876.89 
On-time delivery 90.79 3.96 92.10 81.40 97.00 
Worker satisfaction 333.96 16.97 336.00 294.00 369.00 
Customer satisfaction 334.27 10.12 336.00 300.00 356.00 
Notes: 
1 The cost and revenues measures are deflated by CPI to control for inflation. 
2
 3 years of yearly observations of 27 areas are available (N=3*27=81). 
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Table 6.4: Impact of change in PMS on yearly data 
 Coefficient1,2   
Multivariate significant tests: 
-Pillais 
-Hotellings 
-Wilks 
 
0.826 
4.757 
0.174 
 
** 
** 
** 
   
Dependent variables   
Cost -48.316 
(-5.19) 
** 
Revenues -15.055 
(-0.77) 
 
On-time delivery 7.243 
(15.70) 
** 
Worker satisfaction -10.224 
(-3.02) 
** 
Customer satisfaction 9.500 
(4.67) 
** 
   
Multivariate homogeneity 
test (Box-M) 
p-value 
=0.722 
 
Notes: 
This table reports an MANOVA-analysis of the impact of the change in the PMS on the 5 performance 
dimensions from the managers' contracts. The number of product handled in each cross-section, is used 
as a co-variate. The data of 1995 (n=27) is compared with the 1996 and 1997 data (n=54).  
1
 t-values between brackets. 
2 Where **,* means significant at the 0.01, and 0.05 levels (two-tailed test). 
 
 The multivariate significant tests indicate that the change in the PMS had an impact 
on the complete set of performance dimensions (p<0.01). The cost measure decreased 
after the change in the PMS with -48.316 (t=-5.19, p<0.01). The change had no 
impact on the revenue measure. The change in the PMS had a positive impact on on-
time delivery, and the added measure customer satisfaction. The on-time delivery 
measure increases with 7.243 after the change (t=15.70, p<0.01). The customer 
satisfaction increased with 9.500 after the change (t=4.67, p<0.01). Finally, the added 
measure worker satisfaction measure decreased with -10.224 (t=-3.02, p<0.01) after 
the change. 
 A critical assumption of the MANOVA analysis is the homogeneity assumption 
(Hair et al., 1998), i.e., whether the variance is the same before and after the change in 
the PMS. The Box-M test does not indicate problems with this assumption (p=0.722).    
 In sum, the analyses show that the change in the PMS had a positive impact on 
cost, customer satisfaction, and on-time delivery. The impact on the added measure 
worker satisfaction, however, was negative. A limitation of this analysis is that there 
is no control for the trend in the time-series, (see section 6.4.3) and consequently the 
results might differ compared to the detailed analysis from the next sections. 
Therefore, for the overall conclusions I focus on the results from the interrupted time-
series analysis in the next sections.  
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6.6.3 Impact of change in PMS on non-financial performance 
 
 Table 6.5 gives the results of the impact of the change in the PMS on the non-
financial measures.  
 
Table 6.5: Impact of change in the PMS on non-financial measures 
Variables1 Expected 
sign 
Freqit  
(n=9722) 
 Expected 
sign 
OTDit 
(n=9722) 
 
Impact:  Coefficient3,4   Coefficient  
Dt + 0.074 
(1.57) 
 ? 0.044 
(7.04) 
** 
       
Controls:       
Tt ? -0.006 
(-2.80) 
** ? 0.001 
(4.84) 
** 
Rsatit + -7.675 
(-10.06) 
**    
IAZit + 0.388 
(19.22) 
**    
       
R2-adj. 
DW-statistic5 
 0.813 
1.63 
  0.373 
1.86 
 
Notes: 
1 The month dummies and intercepts for each area are considered to be nuisance variables, therefore 
they are not reported. 
2 3 years of monthly observations of 27 areas are available. 
3 Where **,* means significant at the 0.01, and 0.05 levels (two-tailed test). 
4
 t-statistics between parentheses. All results are from the seemingly unrelated regression. 
5
 Where the DW-statistic means the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
 
 ßf2 of equation (6.15) measures the impact of the change in the PMS on worker 
satisfaction23. The significant coefficient of Tt, ßf1, of -0.006 (t=-2.80, p<0.01), 
indicates that there was a negative trend in Freqit before the change in the PMS. There 
was no impact of adding the worker satisfaction measure to the contract, i.e., ßf2 was 
not significant (t=1.57). This is in contrast with the result form the yearly analysis (see 
section 6.6.2), where a positive impact was found. There are a number of possible 
explanations for this surprising result. First, Freqit was decreasing already before the 
change and since it is a ratio-measure it becomes increasingly more difficult to 
improve when the measure goes down24. This is especially the case since the baseline, 
i.e., Tt, is assumed to be linear. Second, worker satisfaction had a negative impact on 
future costs (see section 5.4.4). Therefore, there is a trade-off between improving on 
worker satisfaction and costs, and the managers might have valued improvements in 
costs more.  
   Parameter ßf4 of Rzatit is negative and significant, -7.675 (t=-10.06, p<0.01) 
indicating that workers on Saterday are more satisfied. Finally, the control for 
influenza epidemics (IAZit) is significant, ßf5 is 0.307 (t=16.69, p<0.01), indicating that 
during epidemics workers are more often sick for a short period. 
                                                          
23
 Remember that Freqit  is negatively related with worker satisfaction. 
24
 The Freqit measure decreased with 0.006*36=0.216 for the period under study, whereas the average 
of the measure was 1.36.  
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 ßo2 of equation (6.16) measures the impact of the change in the PMS on on-time 
delivery.
 
The on-time delivery measure OTDit has a positive trend before the change in 
the PMS system, represented by a ßo1 of 0.001 (t=4.84, p<0.01). The change in the 
PMS had a positive impact on the on-time delivery measure, represented by a 
significant ßo2 of 0.044 (t=7.04, p<0.01).  
 In sum, the data suggest a mixed impact of the change in the PMS on non-financial 
performance. There was no impact on the added worker satisfaction measure, the on-
time delivery measure however increased after the change in the PMS.  
 
6.6.4 Impact of change in PMS on financial performance 
 
 Table 6.6 reports the results of the impact of the change in the PMS on the financial 
measures.  
 
Table 6.6: Impact of the change in PMS on financial performance 
Variables1  Costsit 
(n=9722) 
  Revit  
(n=9722) 
 
 
Expected 
sign 
Coefficient  Expected 
sign 
Coefficient3,4  
Impact 
variables: 
      
Dt ?   -2.892 
(-9.31) 
** + 0.426 
(5.23) 
** 
       
Controls:       
Tt ? 0.037 
(2.46) 
** ? 0.027 
(6.92) 
** 
Volit 
 
+ 0.001 
(22.87) 
**    
       
R2-adj. 
DW-statistic 5 
     0.980 
1.75 
  0.984 
2.14 
 
Notes: 
1 The month dummies and intercepts for each area are considered to be nuisance variables, therefore 
they are not reported. 
2
 3 years of monthly observations of 27 areas. 
3 Where **,* means significant at the 0.01, and 0.05 levels (two-tailed test). 
4
 t-statistics between parentheses. All results are from the seemingly unrelated regression model. 
5 Where the DW-statistic means the Durbin-Watson statistic.  
 
 ßc2 of equation (6.17) measures the impact of the change in the PMS on costs. 
There was a positive trend in the cost measure before the change in the PMS, 
expressed by a significant ßc1 (t=2.46, p<0.01). The change in the PMS had a positive 
impact on costs, that is ßc2 is negative (-2.892) and significant (t=-9.31, p<0.01). 
Because the production volume is almost given for the area managers (see section 
3.6), I controlled for the number of products, Volit, in each time period. This 
parameter was positive, 0.001 (t=22.87, p<0.01), as expected.  
 ßr2 of equation (6.18) measures the impact of the change in the PMS on revenues. 
The trend in Revit before the change in the PMS was significant, i.e., 0.027 (t=6.92, 
p<0.01). The change seems to have a positive impact on revenues expressed by a 
significant parameter ßr2 of 0.426 (t=5.23, p<0.01).  
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 In sum, the data suggest that the change in the PMS has a positive impact on both 
costs and revenues.  
 
6.6.5 Managerial significance 
 
 Since the number of observations is large, even very small effects become 
significant (Rosenthal and DiMatteo, 2001). Therefore, the managerial significance of 
the results is expressed by computing the improvement of the change in the PMS as a 
percentage of the dependent variable, i.e., the coefficient that estimated the impact of 
the change divided by the average of the dependent variable. Results for this analysis 
are reported in table 6.7.  
 
Table 6.7: Managerial significance of the change in the PMS 
Variable Impact parameter (Dt) Managerial significance (%)1 
Freqit 0 0 
OTDit 0.044 4.9 
Costit -2.892 -5.2 
Revit 0.426 1.4 
Notes: 
1 The managerial significance of the change in PMS is measured as a % of the average dependent 
variable, i.e., this is the parameter that estimates the impact divided by the average dependent variable 
multiplied by 100%. 
 
 The change in the PMS led to a 4.9% increase in the on-time delivery measure. 
Considering the fact that this measure was high already, i.e., the average is 90%, and 
the benchmark against which the change in the PMS is compared, i.e., Tt, is linear25, 
this can be considered a high value. The cost measure decreased with -5.2% of the 
average dependent variable after the change in the PMS. The impact of the change in 
the PMS on the revenues was an increase of only 1.4% of the average revenues.  
 The managerial impact of the change in the PMS from this study is comparable 
with Banker et al. (2000b). In their study they find improvements of 1.1% and 9.8% 
of the average dependent variables for the two non-financial measures that are 
indicators for customer satisfaction. The impact on the costs and revenues is -1.68% 
and 1.78%.  
 
6.7 Summary and conclusion 
 
 This chapter assesses the impact of a change in the performance measurement 
system on managerial performance. Before the change the main emphasis in the 
contracts of middle managers was on financial measures, after the change the 
financial measures were added with a substantial emphasis on non-financial 
performance measures.  
 The change in the PMS had a positive effect on the financial measures costs, and 
revenues, i.e., cost decreased and revenues increased. However, of the non-financial 
measures there was only a positive impact on on-time delivery. The change in the 
PMS had no impact on the proxy used for the worker satisfaction, i.e., Freqit. This is 
surprising since worker satisfaction was the measure that was added to the contract of 
the manager. There are a number of explanations for this result. First, the results from 
                                                          
25
 This means that the baseline improved with 0.001*36*100%=3.6% already. The impact of 4.9% of 
the change in the PMS is additional to this improvement.  
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the incremental information content analysis (see section 5.4.4) show that worker 
satisfaction had a negative impact on future costs. Therefore, the managers have to 
make a tradeoff between improving costs and worker satisfaction. Second, the worker 
satisfaction measure improved already before the change in the PMS and therefore it 
was difficult for the managers to improve it further. Third, it is possible that worker 
satisfaction only had a positive impact via the other measures. To assess such indirect 
effects, path analysis should be used. Finally, the frequency index may not have been 
a good proxy for worker satisfaction. The impact of the change in the PMS on the 
measures was a 5% improvement for the cost, and on-time delivery measure, and a 
2% improvement for the revenues. 
 There are a number of limitations to this research. First, although a number of 
variables and statistical techniques are used to control for threats to internal validity, a 
limitation is not having a natural control group to estimate the performance impact. 
This is a problem of all field studies where the change under study was not under 
control of the researcher. Second, the proxy used for the variable, for which no 
monthly time-series were available (i.e., absence-frequency for worker satisfaction), 
was identified from the literature. Although the correlation between both variables in 
the sample was higher than the effect-size that meta-studies indicate, the quality of the 
proxy can be discussed.  Third, the company changed the PMS to align the contracts 
of the managers with the increased quality orientation in the organization. Therefore 
the problem of endogeneity exists, that is both are choice variables for the 
organization (Ittner and Larcker, 2001). 
 Despite these limitations, this paper shows that many insights can be gained to 
observe effects of changes in management accounting practices. A number of 
directions for further research could be considered. First, results of this study should 
be corroborated in different settings. Ittner and Larcker (1997) give as a further 
research stream the evaluation of BSC-type of performance measurement systems. 
However, since it is almost impossible to evaluate changes in the PMS with 
comparable time-series data it is difficult to collect a large sample. Generalization of 
result from different studies is therefore probably only possible through theoretical 
generalization (Yin, 1989). Further, research could consider such efforts. Second, the 
PMS system in this company was used for both decision making and decision control 
purposes (Zimmerman, 1997). However, both purposes have different demands. 
Research that considers these different demands, and ascertains the problems with 
these dual purposes of one PMS might be helpful.  
 Although the results from the studies are specific for this case, the emphasis on the 
quality strategy through the whole organization, operationalized by the EFQM-model, 
is an important moderator for the relationship between non-financial performance 
measures use and performance (Ittner and Larcker, 1995, 1997).  
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7.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter summarizes the content of the dissertation. The next section gives a 
brief overview of each chapter. Section 7.3 states the conclusions from the empirical 
studies and its implications. Section 7.4 enumerates the contributions of the research. 
Section 7.5 addresses the limitations of the research. Section 7.6 gives the directions 
for further research that can be derived from this dissertation.  
 
7.2 Summary 
 
 This dissertation addresses two general research questions. First,   
 
“Do non-financial performance measures have relative or incremental information 
content, or both, beyond financial performance measures in predicting future 
financial performance?”   
 
Second,  
 
"Do managers perform better when non-financial measures are added to their 
performance evaluation system?" 
 
 The first question is motivated trough an existing ambiguity in the literature. 
Although it is often stated that non-financial measures are better indicators for future 
financial performance, the empirical literature always analyzes the incremental 
predictability of the non-financial measures beyond the financial measures.  
 The second research question is motivated by a direction of further research given 
by Foster and Young (1997). They argued that a lot of innovations are proposed in 
management accounting literature, but that a systematic evaluation of these 
innovations is mostly absent. This is in contrast with other scientific disciplines in 
which innovations are not implemented without a thorough evaluation. The second 
research question evaluates such an evaluation.  
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 The empirical analysis took place in a large Dutch logistic company that had a 
substantial change in the PMS. Before the change managers were evaluated on 
financial measures, whereas after the change a substantial part of the evaluation was 
based on added non-financial measure. The data are from 27 geographically dispersed 
areas of the company. Three years of monthly data is used.  
 Chapter 2 gives a broad review of the available literature about the two research 
questions. In this chapter I review studies that discuss relationships between financial 
and non-financial performance measures, and studies that explore the use and 
usefulness of non-financial performance measures.  From this review I conclude first 
that most research that explores relationships between financial and non-financial 
performance measures find empirical support for such relationships. However, these 
results are found in studies that are hardly comparable with each other, since each 
study uses a different definition for the lag, uses different specification, e.g., lag 
versus level models, and the results are found in different samples. 
 Second, I argue that the inconclusive results from performance effects of 
emphasizing non-financial measures relatively more might be explained by a number 
of limitations of the cross-sectional methodology. These limitations are the 
measurement of performance at one period and the short-term performance measures 
used.  By adopting a longitudinal research methodology these limitations might be 
mitigated. 
  Chapter 3 gives background information about the company that might facilitate 
the understanding of the empirical analysis. First I describe the organization. Then, I 
describe the different elements of the PMS in the company, and explain the exact 
change in the PMS that took place in 1996. Finally, the controllability of the 
performance measures from the manager's contract is assessed. 
 Chapter 4 defines the performance data used in the empirical analysis. In addition, 
some properties of pooled time-series data, i.e., the data set used in the empirical 
analysis, are discussed. The biggest advantage of pooled time-series data is that it has 
more mechanisms to mitigate problems of heterogeneity. Finally, the descriptives of 
the data are reported.   
 Chapter 5 reports the empirical study that addresses the first research question. In 
this study, I test both the relative information content of non-financial measures 
compared with the financial measures, and the incremental information content of 
non-financial measures beyond financial measures. The relative information content 
question is the first test of the claim advocated in the popular management accounting 
literature that non-financial measures are better indicators for further financial 
performance measures than financial measures. The incremental information content 
analysis adds to the growing literature that assesses whether the non-financial 
measures explain future financial performance beyond the lagged financial measure. I 
suggest that the relative information content analysis is an important question to 
assess the relative weight of the different measures in the performance evaluation 
system. In contrast, results from the incremental information content question might 
be an input to answer the question, which measures need to get a weight in the 
contract. 
 Chapter 6 reports the empirical study that addresses the second research question. 
In this chapter a quasi-experimental study is executed that assesses the impact of the 
change in the PMS. Before the change managers were evaluated mainly on financial 
measures. After the change non-financial measures were included in the PMS.  
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7.3 Conclusions and implications 
 
7.3.1 Information content of performance measures 
 
 In the first empirical study reported in chapter 5, I find that non-financial measures 
are not better predictors than lagged financial measures for future financial 
performance. In contrast, for the change models the lagged financial measures are 
better predictors. In addition, the expectation that the non-financial measure explains 
more when the number of lags increase is not supported by the results. Together, this 
implies that the claim that non-financial measures are better indicators for future 
financial performance than lagged financial measures is not true in this setting.  
 These results are summarized in table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1: Summary of results for the relative information content analysis 
Information content of non-financial (ICnf) versus financial 
(ICf) measures  for predicting future financial measures 
Expectations Results1 
Future costs ICnf > ICcost n.s. 
Future revenues ICnf > ICcost n.s. 
Notes:   
1 
n.s means that there was no significant difference in the information content between the financial and 
non-financial measures. 
 
  
 The non-financial measures worker satisfaction and on-time delivery measures 
have incremental information content beyond the lagged financial measures for future 
financial performance. More specific, a higher worker satisfaction measure leads to 
more future costs, but also to higher future revenues. A partial explanation for the 
result for future costs is that improving worker satisfaction costs more due to, for 
example, training, than it brings in the long-run. An explanation for the result for 
future revenues is that more satisfied workers provide better service to customers and 
therefore lead to more future revenues. Higher on-time delivery leads to lower future 
costs. This might be explained by the fact that when products are delivered at the 
wrong place, rework to get the product to the right place is costly. The on-time 
delivery measure also has a positive impact on future revenues. This again suggests 
that better service provided to the customer through a higher on-time delivery leads to 
more future revenues.  
 These results are summarized in table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2: Summary of result for incremental information content analysis 
Non-financial measure → financial measure Expectation1 Result2 
Worker satisfaction → future costs  ? + 
On-time delivery     → future costs ? + 
Worker satisfaction → future revenues + + 
On-time delivery     → future revenues + + 
Notes: 
1
 A + means that the non-financial measure is expecting to have a positive impact on future financial 
performance after controlling for the lagged financial performance. A ? means that the non-financial 
measure is expecting to have a differential impact on  future financial performance after controlling for 
the lagged financial performance. 
2 A + means that the non-financial measure has a positive impact on future financial performance after 
controlling for lagged financial performance. A - means the non-financial measure has a negative 
impact on financial performance after controlling for future financial performance. 
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 The non-financial measures give a substantial amount of incremental information 
content beyond the lagged financial measures. The incremental information content of 
the non-financial measures is roughly one-seventh for both worker satisfaction and 
on-time delivery compared with the information content of the lagged costs. For the 
revenues, the incremental information content is roughly one-fifth for each non-
financial measure of the lagged revenues.  
 I also find that the incremental information content of non-financial measures is 
non-linear. For future costs, this means that when the level of non-financial measures 
is already high, an increase in non-financial measures leads to a lower change in the 
future financial measures than when the level of the non-financial measure is low. 
This means that it becomes increasingly more difficult, i.e., in terms of cost, to 
improve the non-financial measures when they are high already. An implication from 
this result is that there is an optimal level of the non-financial measure and that above 
this level cost increase. Although, the incremental information content for future 
revenues is also non-linear, it is opposite to the expected direction.  
 The results from the first empirical studies indicate that the non-financial measures 
are not better indicators than financial measures for future financial performance, but 
that the non-financial give substantial additional information beyond the financial 
measure. Theoretically, this implies that the non-financial measure should not get a 
higher weight in the contract than financial measures1, but that they should get a non-
zero weight.     
 In my opinion the results indicate that the almost mechanical statement that is often 
made that non-financial measures are better indicators for future financial 
performance than lagged financial measures should be reconsidered or at least used 
more cautiously.2 
 
7.3.2 Evaluation of the change in the PMS 
 
 The expectations for the second empirical study are partly derived form the multi-
task principal-agent model. However, this model uses the maximizing performance 
model, in which I use elements of the political and business model (see section 1.4).  
In addition, the principal-agent models assume that contracts are costless. Finally, the 
notion of the BSC assumes that non-financial measures are indicators of financial 
measures. This implies that adding non-financial measures in the contract of managers 
does not only have a direct effect on performance measures but might also have an 
indirect effect via non-financial measures on the financial measures. Together these 
elements lead to the result that it is difficult to derive uni-directional expectations.   
 The empirical results in chapter 6 show that the financial measures, i.e., costs and 
revenues, improve after the inclusion of non-financial measures in the managers' 
contract.  In addition, the non-financial measure on-time delivery improved after the 
change. However, worker satisfaction, one of the measures that was added to the 
contract, did not improve after the inclusion in the contracts. There are a number of 
potential explanations for this surprising result. First, the empirical analysis in chapter 
5 shows that the worker satisfaction measure had a negative impact on future costs. 
Thus, managers have to make a trade-off between improving costs or worker 
                                                          
1
 Again, this result only holds when measures have the same level of noise and sensitivity.  
2
 This is an illustration of Luft and Shields (forthcoming) critique on using “practice defined variables”. 
Without describing the underlying theoretical properties, non-financial measures are attributed a 
number of characteristics that are used to motivate its advantages. 
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satisfaction. Second, worker satisfaction improved already before the change in the 
PMS and therefore it is more difficult to improve it further after the change. Third, 
although I assess the association of the proxy used for worker satisfaction with yearly 
data, it is possible that the measure is not a proper proxy. Finally, it may be possible 
that there was no direct effect of the change in the PMS on worker satisfaction but 
that there was a beneficial indirect effect via worker satisfaction on on-time delivery 
and the financial measures.  
 These results are summarized in table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3: Summary of results of adding non-financial measures to the contracts of managers 
Impact of change in PMS Expectation1 Result2 
Non-financial measures3   
Change in PMS → Worker satisfaction + n.s. 
Change in PMS → On-time delivery ? + 
   
Financial measures   
Change in PMS → Costs  ? + 
Change in PMS → Revenues  + + 
Notes: 
1 Where a + means that the change is expected to have a positive impact on the measure, a ? means that 
the change is expected to have a differential effect on the measure.  
2
 Where a + means that the change has a positive impact on the measure, and n.s. means that the change 
had not a significant effect on the measure.  
3 Only the worker satisfaction measure was added to the contract. 
 
  The change in the PMS had a substantial impact on the performance measures. The 
on-time delivery measure rose with 4.9%, the cost measure declined with 5.2% and 
the revenues rose with 1.4% of the average dependent variable.3  
 The tenet of these results seems to indicate that the change in the PMS had a 
favorable impact on most measures.   
 
7.4 Contributions of the dissertation  
 
 This section enumerates the contributions of the research to the literature. First, the 
first empirical study addresses the difference between relative and incremental 
information content in a management control context. Although earlier research often 
assumed that non-financial measures are better indicators of future performance, i.e., 
have more relative information, the empirical analyses always assessed non-financial 
measures' incremental contribution beyond lagged financial measures.  
 Second, I add to the growing literature that assesses incremental information 
content of non-financial measures. Contributions to this stream of literature are that, I 
use different non-financial measures, and assess non-linearities in these relationships. 
In addition, the empirical study finds that the lag between non-financial measures and 
financial measures is different for the two non-financial measures and the two 
financial measures. This result contrast earlier research that finds the same lag 
between each non-financial measure and each financial measure. Further, in the 
methodology used for the lag search procedure I relax the constraint that the impact of 
the non-financial measure on the financial measure is the same for each period.  
                                                          
3
 This percentage is computed by the parameter of the change in the PMS, divided by the average 
dependent variable multiplied by 100%. 
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 Third, this study is one of the few studies that assess long-term impact of including 
non-financial performance measures in the PMS. This method might overcome at 
least two limitations of earlier research. First, most studies that are conducted before 
used short-term performance measures, e.g., return-on-assets, to evaluate the use of 
non-financial performance measures. A second related problem is that these studies 
all use a cross-sectional methodology to assess the performance consequences. Such a 
methodology might understate the positive effects.      
 Finally, the two empirical studies are executed in a different context. In the study 
of Banker et al. (2000b), customer satisfaction was the most strategic issue in their 
research setting. In my setting, the company stresses a quality orientation. In addition, 
in the study of Banker et al. (2000b) the compensation element considered is the 
bonus of managers. In contrast, in my research setting the performance measures is 
the input for salary increase, bonus allocation, and future promotions. 
 The contributions given above are all important for management accounting 
research. However there are also some contributions for practice. Especially, the first 
study shows a number of methods to assess whether non-financial measures are 
helpful in a particular situation. Therefore although the generalizability of the results 
might be limited (see section 7.5), the methods used could be adopted more widely.   
 
7.5 Limitations of the study 
 
 As with all empirical studies, the results of the studies should be interpreted in the 
context of its limitations. In the first empirical study, the usefulness of incorporating 
the non-financial measures in the contract of the area managers is assessed through 
the relative and incremental information content of the measures. However weight of 
a measure in the contract also depends on the noise and sensitivity of the measure 
(Banker and Datar, 1989). In addition, the results are based on the information content 
of the measures and therefore do not incorporate other potential advantages of non-
financial measures, for example, that non-financial measures are better understood 
than financial measures by lower level workers.   
  The method to compute a lag between non-financial and financial performance 
measures assumes that the causality is from improved non-financial measures to 
improved financial measures. However, to improve non-financial measures the area 
managers probably need to invest first, for example in redesigning processes to 
improve on-time delivery. Therefore, bi-directional methods should be used to assess 
this impact (Luft and Shield, forthcoming). However this raises the difficulty that it is 
necessary to estimate two lags. 
 Finally, the results are found in a sample of one company. Therefore, interpretation 
of the results should be done with caution. For example, in this context a higher on-
time delivery leads to less future costs. However, in other contexts this relationship 
could equally well be positive depending on the circumstances. 
 The evaluation study also has a number of additional limitations. The most 
important limitation is the absence of a control group of areas in which the change in 
the PMS did not take place. Due too this absence, alternative methods are used to 
compare the impact of the change in the PMS against a benchmark. These alternatives 
give room for additional alternative explanations for the results found. The problem of 
the lack of a natural control group is a general problem in management accounting 
evaluation research. Researchers do not often get a change to implement a 
management accounting innovation in a number of departments or business units 
whereas the others are used as a control group. Hence, this type of research should be 
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accomplished without a limited control group or performance impacts of new 
management accounting systems should only be considered in cross-sectional studies. 
 The results found are specific for this company. Therefore any generalizatiblity of 
the results to other companies, situations or samples should be made cautiously. 
However, the organization implemented the new PMS to align the PMS with the 
increased emphasis on a quality orientation. This quality orientation is a moderator for 
non-financial performance measure use and performance (Ittner and Larcker, 1995, 
1997). 
 The fact that the change in the PMS was motivated by the increase quality 
orientation suggest that the study is subject to the endogeneity problem (Ittner and 
Larcker, 2001). This means that both the change in the PMS and increased quality 
orientation are both choice variables. Although the quality orientation is not explicitly 
used as a variable in the analysis, endogeneity might still have an impact on the 
results.     
 A limitation of the data is the absence of monthly observations for the two added 
performance dimensions. For one of the performance dimension, i.e., worker 
satisfaction, I used a proxy. Although the quality of this proxy is estimated, its validity 
can be questioned.  
 Finally, Cook and Campell (1979) suggest a number of potential effects that can be 
expected in an interrupted time-series design. Since there is no theory that can guide 
the expected effects on performance after the change in the PMS, for econometric 
reasons I ascertain these effects by modeling only a structural shift in the time-series 
in the specifications. However, this specification is clearly arguable.   
 
7.6 Further research 
 
 The two empirical studies suggest a number of interesting research questions. First, 
the study in chapter 5 finds different lags between the 2 non-financial measures and 
the financial measures. It is unclear what factors explain these differences. Further 
research could consider what factors drive these differences in lags. Some variables 
that could be considered are the competitiveness of the industry, the type of products 
sold, etc. In addition, I find that the worker satisfaction measure has a negative impact 
on future costs, whereas the on-time delivery measure has a positive impact on future 
cost after controlling for the current costs. Further research could consider which 
types of measures have a negative or positive impact, or which characteristics of 
measures drive this negative or positive impact.  
 The relative information content analysis can be used as an input to compare the 
relative weight of different measures in the PMS. The incremental information 
content can be used as an input to the question which measures should get a weight in 
the PMS4. Further research could consider whether this distinction is really used in 
practice for the choice to select performance measures in contracts.  
 Second, the empirical accounting literature uses the change models often as a 
robustness check for level models. However both models test a different relationship, 
and therefore test different theories (see Lambert, 1998). Further research should 
consider these differences and use this distinction in theory building.  
 Also from the second empirical study some directions for further research come to 
mind. The PMS in the company that is studied had both decision making and decision 
control aspects. However, the literature review already indicated that these two 
                                                          
4
 Again, this conjecture only holds when measures are noiseless and agents are risk-averse. 
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purposes of PMS systems can have a contrary impact. Therefore future research 
should acknowledge this difference and take it into consideration in empirical work.   
 To my knowledge there are two longitudinal studies that assess the performance 
impact of including non-financial performance measures into the contract of managers 
in the literature, i.e., Banker et al. (2000b) and this study. Both studies use different 
samples and are accomplished in a different context. Therefore, the generalizability is 
limited in both studies and efforts to theoretically generalize the results might be 
helpful. In general, this stream of research is not characterized by strong theoretical 
underpinnings, this manifests itself, for example, by the high number of differential 
expectations. Efforts to strengthen this body of theory, if possible, would be most 
helpful.      
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Figure A.1 Standardized frequency-index of each area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
These are the standardized observations of Freqit of the 27 areas. The y-axis is the number of standard 
deviations from the area mean. The x-axis is the time period.
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Figure A.2 Standardized on-time delivery of each area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
These are the standardized observations of OTDit of the 27 areas. The y-axis is the number of standard 
deviations from the mean. The x-axis is the time period. 
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Figure A.3 Standardized costs of each area  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
These are the standardized observations of Costit of the 27 areas. The y-axis is the number of standard 
deviations from the area mean. The x-axis is the time period. 
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Figure A.4 Standardized revenues of each area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
These are the standardized observations of Revit of the 27 areas. The y-axis is the number of standard 
deviations from the area mean. The x-axis is the time period. 
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Summary in Dutch    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dit proefschrift bestudeert aspecten van het nut van het gebruik van niet-financiële 
prestatiemaatstaven in het prestatiemeting- en evaluatiesysteem van managers. Van 
niet-financiële maatstaven wordt onder andere beweerd dat ze meer naar lange termijn 
aspecten van beslissingen die managers nemen kijken, en meer aanknopingspunten 
voor oplossingen van potentiële afwijkingen ten opzichte van de planning geven. 
Alhoewel dergelijke beweringen vaak voorkomen in zowel wetenschappelijke- als 
vakliteratuur is er nog steeds relatief weinig onderzoek gedaan naar kenmerken en 
effecten van niet-financiële maatstaven.          
 De onderzoeksvragen die gesteld worden in dit proefschrift en de motivatie 
daarvan worden uiteengezet in hoofdstuk 1. De volgende onderzoeksvragen staan 
centraal. Ten eerste,  
 
"Hebben niet-financiële prestatiemaatstaven relatieve of additionele 
informatiewaarde, of beide, boven financiële maatstaven voor het voorspellen van 
toekomstige financiële prestaties?" 
 
Ten tweede,  
 
"Presteren managers beter wanneer niet-financiële prestatiemaatstaven aan hun 
prestatiemeting- en evaluatiesysteem worden toegevoegd?" 
 
 De eerste onderzoeksvraag wordt gemotiveerd door een bestaande ambiguïteit in 
de literatuur.  In de literatuur wordt vaak beweerd dat niet-financiële maatstaven 
betere voorspellers zijn voor toekomstige financiële prestaties dan financiële 
maatstaven. Dit suggereert dat niet-financiële maatstaven meer informatiewaarde 
hebben dan financiële maatstaven voor het voorspellen van toekomstige financiële 
prestaties. Empirische onderzoeken testen echter vaak de additionele 
informatiewaarde van niet-financiële prestatiemaatstaven boven financiële 
maatstaven. Dat wil zeggen dat niet-financiële maatstaven informatiewaarde hebben 
voor het voorspellen van toekomstige financiële prestaties wanneer gecontroleerd 
wordt voor de huidige financiële maatstaven. Resultaten van dergelijke analyses 
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kunnen als startpunt dienen voor de gehanteerde weging van de verschillende 
maatstaven in de beoordeling van managers. 
 De tweede onderzoeksvraag komt tegemoet aan de veelvuldig gehoorde vraag naar 
meer evaluatie van management accounting innovaties. In andere wetenschappelijke 
disciplines worden nieuwe programma's, behandelingsmethodes, etc., voor gebruik 
grondig geëvalueerd op de effecten die ze hebben. In de management accounting 
literatuur worden effecten van “nieuwe” management accounting systemen echter 
zelden systematisch getest.   
 In hoofdstuk 2 wordt een uitgebreid literatuuroverzicht gegeven. Dit overzicht 
bespreekt studies die relaties tussen financiële en niet-financiële maatstaven 
onderzoeken, die onderzoeken welke factoren het gebruik van niet-financiële 
prestatiemaatstaven stimuleren, en die beschrijven of prestatiemetingsystemen die de 
nadruk leggen op niet-financiële maatstaven succesvol zijn wanneer ze in de juiste 
omstandigheden worden gebruikt. Na het overzicht worden de sterke en zwakke 
punten van en tegenstrijdigheden in de verschillende studies besproken. Tenslotte geef 
ik in dit hoofdstuk enkele richtingen voor verder onderzoek aan.    
 Hoofdstuk 3 geeft achtergrondinformatie over de onderneming waar het onderzoek 
is uitgevoerd. In de onderneming vond een belangrijke verandering in het 
prestatiemetingsysteem (PMS) plaats. Voor de veranderingen werden managers 
voornamelijk op financiële prestatiemaatstaven beoordeeld en beloond, terwijl na de 
veranderingen het PMS werd uitgebreid met een aantal niet-financiële 
prestatiemaatstaven. Dit hoofdstuk beschrijft de onderneming, de analyse-eenheden 
die zijn bekeken, het prestatiemetingsysteem en veranderingen in dit systeem en het 
doel van de veranderingen. 
 De gebruikte data voor de empirische studies in hoofdstuk 5 en 6 worden 
beschreven in hoofdstuk 4. Aangezien de onderzoeksvragen gaan over veranderingen 
in de tijd is een gepoolde tijdreeks dataset verzameld. Van de 27 analyse-eenheden 
werden drie jaar maandelijkse maatstaven van zowel financiële als niet-financiële 
maatstaven verzameld. In dit hoofdstuk wordt verder nog aandacht besteed aan de 
unieke karakteristieken van een gepoolde tijdreeks dataset.  
 In hoofdstuk 5 wordt een antwoord gegeven op de eerste onderzoeksvraag. In dit 
hoofdstuk wordt bekeken of de twee niet-financiële maatstaven 
werknemerstevredenheid en on-time delivery voorspellende waarde hebben voor de 
toekomstige financiële prestaties op kosten en omzet. Eerst wordt bekeken welk type 
maatstaven, financiële of niet-financiële, meer voorspellende waarde heeft voor 
toekomstige financiële maatstaven. Vervolgens wordt geanalyseerd of niet-financiële 
maatstaven voorspellende waarde hebben voor toekomstige financiële maatstaven 
wanneer voor huidige financiële maatstaven is gecontroleerd.  
 De resultaten van deze studie tonen aan dat de niet-financiële maatstaven niet meer 
informatiewaarde hebben dan de financiële maatstaven om toekomstige financiële 
prestaties te voorspellen. Deze verwachting komt ook niet uit wanneer meerdere 
vertraagde periodes worden opgenomen in de modellen. Deze resultaten suggereren 
dat de vaak gehoorde claim dat niet-financiële maatstaven betere voorspellers zijn dan 
financiële maatstaven om toekomstige financiële prestaties te voorspellen in deze 
context niet opgaat. 
 De niet-financiële maatstaven hebben wel additionele informatiewaarde naast de 
financiële maatstaven om toekomstige financiële prestaties te voorspellen. Meer 
specifiek blijkt dat een verhoging van de werknemerstevredenheid leidt tot meer 
toekomstige kosten maar ook tot meer toekomstige omzetten. Een verhoogde on-time 
delivery blijkt zowel tot een verlaging van toekomstige kosten als een verhoging van 
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toekomstige opbrengsten te leiden. Voor deze test werd eerst een zogenaamde “lag 
search” procedure uitgevoerd. Deze procedure bekijkt tot hoever in de tijd de niet-
financiële maatstaven voorspellende waarde hebben voor toekomstige financiële 
prestatiemaatstaven. Deze procedure geeft aan dat de niet-financiële 
prestatiemaatstaven werknemerstevredenheid en on-time delivery een verschillende 
“lag” hebben voor de kosten en opbrengsten. Verder is de relatie tussen niet-financiële 
prestatiemaatstaven en toekomstige financiële prestaties niet-lineair. Voor zowel 
werknemerstevredenheid als on-time delivery is het moeilijker, c.q. leidt het tot een 
grotere stijging in de kosten, om deze maatstaven te verhogen wanneer ze al op een 
hoog niveau zitten. De resultaten voor toekomstige omzetten geven opmerkelijke 
resultaten weer. Hier leidt een verdere verhoging van zowel werknemerstevredenheid 
als on-time delivery die al op een hoog niveau zitten tot grotere verhogingen van 
toekomstige omzetten.  
 In hoofdstuk 6 wordt de tweede onderzoeksvraag beantwoord. In dit hoofdstuk 
wordt een quasi-experiment beschreven dat de verandering in het PMS zoals 
beschreven in hoofdstuk 3 evalueert. Deze evaluatie vindt plaats door de tijdreeksen 
van de verschillende maatstaven uit het contract van de managers voor de verandering 
te vergelijken met de tijdreeksen van de maatstaven na de verandering. Er zijn 
verschillende theorieën die kunnen motiveren waarom de toevoeging van niet-
financiële prestatiemaatstaven in het PMS tot beter presterende managers zou leiden. 
Ten eerste stelt het multi-task principaal-agentschap model dat de waarde van 
additionele prestatiemaatstaven kan liggen in een grotere doelcongruentie van de 
manager en de eigenaar alsmede door de informatiewaarde die het heeft over 
oncontroleerbare effecten in de reeds gebruikte maatstaven. Verder geeft het idee van 
complementariteit aan dat opbrengsten van een bepaalde strategie groter zijn naarmate 
gelieerde systemen complementair zijn met de strategie. Aangezien de onderneming 
waar de empirische analyses plaats vinden een kwaliteit georiënteerde strategie 
nastreeft zal een dergelijke strategie meer opleveren wanneer gelieerde systemen 
zoals het PMS complementair zijn.      
 Deze studie geeft aan dat de financiële maatstaven, zowel kosten als omzetten, 
verbeteren nadat de niet-financiële maatstaven in de contracten van managers worden 
opgenomen. Verder verbeterde de niet-financiële maatstaf on-time delivery, die reeds 
voor de verandering in het PMS zat.  De aan het PMS systeem toegevoegde maatstaf 
werknemerstevredenheid  veranderde niet. Er zijn een aantal redenen aan te voeren 
voor dit opmerkelijke resultaat. Ten eerste bleek uit hoofdstuk 5 reeds dat een 
verhoging van werknemerstevredenheid tot meer toekomstige kosten leidde. Hieruit 
volgt dat managers dus een afweging moeten maken of ze de kosten willen verlagen 
of werknemerstevredenheid willen verhogen. Ten tweede steeg de 
werknemerstevredenheid reeds voordat het werd toegevoegd aan het PMS, dit maakt 
het moeilijk om de maatstaf nog verder te verbeteren. Tenslotte kan het zijn dat de 
verandering in het PMS geen direct effect had op werknemerstevredenheid maar wel 
een indirect positief effect via de werknemerstevredenheid op de on-time delivery 
maatstaf.   
 Hoofdstuk 7 vat de conclusies van het onderzoek samen en bespreekt de 
implicaties. Dit hoofdstuk wordt afgesloten met de beperkingen van het onderzoek en 
geeft richtingen aan voor verder onderzoek. Een van de belangrijkste beperkingen van 
het onderzoek is dat het is uitgevoerd binnen één onderneming. Theoretische 
generalisatie van de resultaten kan plaats vinden naar ondernemingen met een 
kwaliteit georiënteerde strategie. 
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